Tag: tether

Tether and Northern Data. Part II: the partnership

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard
  • If you like this post, please tell one other person. It really helps!
  • To encourage more posts, here’s Amy’s Patreon, and here’s David’s. For casual tips, here’s Amy’s Ko-Fi, and here’s David’s.

AI is the hottest thing in 2024. Nvidia GPU chips are in high demand and shortages are common, so many AI startups rent computation from cloud providers instead of buying their own chips. 

If you’re an AI cloud provider, you could stand to make a lot of money.

CoreWeave, once a little-known bitcoin miner, is now a $19 billion purported value unicorn that provides GPU access to AI startups. Other crypto miners, Hut8, Core Scientific, Hive, and Riot, are trying to tap into the AI gold rush by converting their data centers to AI. [FT, archive]

Northern Data also wants to get in on the gold rush, so it devised a cunning plan: pivot to AI and get rich in an IPO. 

But Nvidia won’t take diluted shares of company stock for its cards. So Northern Data needed a partner with lots of cash. They found one in Tether, everyone’s favorite stablecoin issuer.

And in Northern Data, Tether found … a banker of sorts.

We talked about the history of Northern Data in part I of our series. Here, we’ll discuss their partnership with Tether and plans to strike it rich in an IPO. In part III, we’ll dig into the lawsuit against Northern Data by its former directors. 

A perfect backer

Northern Data had a plan: pivot to “AI” and IPO for billions.  

But first, they needed Nvidia cards to grow their cloud computing business — and convince investors that their money-losing operation had profit potential if they spun it off.

If you believe their unaudited claims, Tether is sitting on piles of cash. They’ve been boasting about huge profits from interest earned on US Treasury holdings and market gains on bitcoin and gold. They claim to be so loaded up now that they’re looking for investments.

In June 2024, Tether said they planned to put $1 billion into investments over the next twelve months. In the last two years, they’ve invested $2 billion, with Northern Data as their single largest beneficiary. [Bloomberg, archive]

What is Tether getting in return? Northern Data wants to combine its cloud business and its data center business. If they can IPO the new entity, the stock could be worth multiples of the current value of the two divisions.

Tether also has the prospect of gaining access to the bank accounts of a publicly traded company with businesses in Europe and the US.  (Northern Data AG is listed on the Munich Stock Exchange.) 

Tether’s banking dilemma

Tether has 112 billion tethers (USDT) sloshing around in the crypto markets, allegedly backed 1:1 with US dollars and also with squirrels and confetti. But quite a bit is Treasury bills and things very close to actual cash.

US banks really, really hate Tether — they’re not happy with all the crime, money laundering, and sanctions evasion. Even if Tether has the cash they claim, they still have the problem of moving money to and from customers without banks freezing their accounts.

Tether was cut off from the US banking system in 2017. This has left Tether resorting to clown banks like Deltec and playing cat-and-mouse games to keep banking access. If Tether wants to stay afloat, they need to find ways to move large sums of money from parts of the world where they don’t need it to low money laundering risk countries, like the US, where they can more easily wire funds to other jurisdictions.

After a few years of problems (that lost them $850 million), Tether made very good friends with Sam Bankman-Fried, who founded crypto exchange FTX and its trading arm Alameda Research. Bankman-Fried and Tether formed a partnership that fueled a new bitcoin bubble. In 2021 alone, Tether printed $60 billion worth of tethers, pushing bitcoin to new all-time highs. FTX grew to become the third-largest crypto exchange in the world. 

Before it collapsed like a clown car, FTX  served as Tether’s main financial launderette. Alameda Research was one of Tether’s largest non-exchange customers. Between 2020 and 2022, Alameda received almost 40 billion tethers directly from Tether. [Bloomberg, archive]

“These guys were running a one-way USD to USDT bureau de change,” Jonathan Reiter (Data Finnovation) of ChainArgos told Bloomberg. 

FTX and Tether used the same money launderers and they all worked together to prop each other up. Their shared bank, Deltec, is also alleged to have falsified invoices on behalf of FTX and Alameda to other banks. 

FTX was functionally Tether’s banker. But in November 2022, FTX blew up. Tether needed something new.

Tether pivots to AI

Tether announced a “strategic investment” in Northern Data in September 2023 — in what turned out to be a convoluted capital raise. (Tether swears they didn’t dip into the alleged reserves for Tether, which would have been abusing customer money.) [Tether, archive]

In June 2023, Tether set up a subsidiary in Ireland, Damoon Designated Activity Company, and funded it with “the equivalent of 10,000 Nvidia H100 GPUs,” worth 400 million euros. The key word here is “equivalent,” so potentially neither GPUs nor actual money.

A few weeks later, Tether and Northern Data announced they had entered a formal agreement. Northern Data would buy Damoon and Tether would get Northern Data stock — valued at 400 million euros. Before the sale closed, Damoon would acquire the “equivalent” in Nvidia chips: [Press release]

The valuation of EUR 400 million for 100% of Damoon is equivalent to the purchase value of the associated hardware without any up-writing. In essence, on completion of the transaction, Northern Data will have acquired latest-generation GPU hardware for a value of EUR 400 million.

In November, Northern Data also secured a 575 million euros ($610 million) debt-financing facility from Tether — a line of credit — “to drive further investments across its three business lines.” The debt facility is unsecured and has a term until January 1, 2030, meaning Northern Data had six years to draw on the funds. [Press release]

We know little else about the terms of the loan. Does Northern Data even have to pay interest on this?

Northern Data completed its stock-for-stock acquisition of Damoon in January 2024, bringing Tether’s total exposure to Northern Data to 1.1 billion euros — or the “equivalent” of that. [Press release, archive, Bloomberg, archive]

In an interview with Benzinga, Northern Data CEO Aroosh Thillainathan explained the transaction: [Benzinga, 2023]

Through our acquisition of a company called Damoon, a special-purpose investment vehicle owned by crypto giant Tether, we have acquired 20 NVIDIA Pods, each with 512 H100 GPUs. The transaction has been done as a contribution in kind, in return for issuing new shares, at exactly the valuation that these pods would have cost us if we had bought them directly from NVIDIA. 

That is: yet again, Northern Data spun up the stock printer to buy a company.

Tether now owns 51% of Northern Data’s stock. So they now have majority control of a German-listed public company.

How the money, if any, flows 

We can’t find third-party evidence that Northern Data has acquired or installed the 10,240 GPUs that it says Damoon purchased. Press releases state that Northern Data now have the GPUs — but it’s utterly unclear how Tether, of all the companies, could have even paid for them.

We wondered how Tether got banking in Ireland when most banks hate Tether, and realized: well, maybe they didn’t. 

Let’s run a pure hypothetical on how you might buy GPUs without moving money.

Tether could have placed an order for Nvidia chips — without paying for them. Companies do this all of the time.

They would have just needed to show that Damoon was creditworthy. Tether would then negotiate the purchase, issue a purchase order to get in the queue for delivery, and then, before Nvidia delivered the chips, sell Damoon for diluted Northern Data stock. This would release Tether from needing to underwrite the purchase or take delivery.

In this scheme, no money has flowed from Tether or Northern Data to any account in Ireland or to Nvidia, but now Tether has $400 million in clean receivables in Ireland.

That is: Northern Data bought a company with no assets or operations other than an incoming Nvidia delivery. 

This is a scenario that could have happened. Certainly, third-party evidence could exist to the contrary.

Northern Data said in January that they now “own” 18,000 Nvidia H100 GPUs and had started deploying them in December. The move “strengthens Taiga Cloud’s position as Europe’s first and largest dedicated Generative AI Cloud Service Provider.” [Press release, archive]

It’s possible Northern Data actually do own 18,000 Nvidia GPUs! From somewhere. It would be a big deal for a public company to flat-out lie in a press release, especially a company that’s already had run-ins with BaFin.

But there’s good reason to doubt the GPUs were paid for using dollars from Tether.

Get rich quick

Now that Northern Data has acquired its AI chips — or at least the “equivalent” as part of a Tether subsidiary — they can move to the next phase of their plan. 

Northern Data wants to combine two of its divisions — its Taiga cloud computing division and its Ardent data center division — and list the resulting company on the Nasdaq in the first half of 2025. (A third business division, Peak, still focuses on bitcoin mining.) [Bloomberg, archive]

The hope is that an IPO in the current AI bubble will lure in enough suckers to pull in a massive pile of cash. The new company wants to IPO for $10 billion to $16 billion — even though Northern Data’s entire market cap is only $1.4 billion. 

The immediate beneficiaries will be Northern Data CEO Aroosh Thillainathan, the largest employee shareholder, and Tether, who now owns 51% of Northern Data.

Reuters columnist Yawen Chen says the IPO “sounds more like valuation voodoo than financial reality.” [Breaking Views, paywalled, archive]

I’m totally good for it, bro

It also could be that Tether really do need the cash — if there were some sort of issues with the heaps of money they claim to have.

If Tether have $112 billion backing their USDT, they could make literally billions in the current high interest rate environment just from Treasury notes and similar. They don’t need to make risky investments.

So why is Tether even making these investments?

In “Lying for Money,” Dan Davies describes how financial frauds tend to grow exponentially over time as the gap between real dollars and fake dollars in the system widens. That’s because compound interest is the enemy of fraud.

In a legitimate business, money increases, gets invested back into the business, and grows over time. In a fraudulent business, that process works in reverse:

The reason for this is that unlike a genuine business, a fraud does not generate enough real returns to support itself, particularly as money is extracted by the criminal. Because of this, at every date when repayment is expected, the fraudster has to make the choice whether to shut the fraud down and try to make an escape, or to increase its size; more and more money has to be defrauded in order to keep the scheme going as time progresses.

Riding a spiral of fraud is a tempting explanation for Tether’s rapid growth, especially since 2020 when Tether put the tether printer into overdrive. 

Fraudsters also often turn to get-rich-quick schemes in the hope that they can miraculously dig themselves out of their ever-deepening money pit.

So we suspect Tether is short on actual cash dollars. They think they can turn $1 billion into $10 billion by entering a deal with cash-strapped Northern Data.

And when Tether needs to move dollars around, despite their limited access to proper banking, they’ll have their very good friends at Northern Data to help them.

We see an interesting future for Northern Data and its CEO Aroosh Thillainathan. We’re just not sure what that will look like.

Image: “A rendering provided Wednesday, March 9, 2022, by technology company Northern Data, MidAmerica Industrial Park, Grand River Dam Authority and the Oklahoma Commerce Department shows plans for Northern Data’s planned data center and North American operations headquarters at the industrial park in Pryor, Okla.” [KTUL]

Read more:
Tether and Northern Data. Part III: the whistleblowers

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

Tether and sanctions: what’s coming for Paolo’s beautiful launderette

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

Tether has long played financial shell games to keep its dollar stablecoin USDT up and running. It’s also been happy to ignore money laundering laws for most of its existence.

But we think Tether’s day of reckoning is on the horizon due to USDT’s latest use case: sanctions evasion.

How sanctions work

The international financial sanctions system, led by the US and Europe, aims to cut off cash flows to serious bad actors — terrorists, enemy countries, major criminals, and so on.

As Congressman Juan Vargas told Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook in the Libra hearings: “The dollar is very important to us as a tool of American power and also a tool of American values. So we would much prefer to put sanctions on a country than send our soldiers there.”

The US regards the power of the dollar and the sanctions system as part of the national defense. Sanctions are taken very seriously. 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control at the US Treasury keeps a list of sanctioned individuals, countries, and companies. [OFAC]

Doing business with an OFAC-sanctioned entity is a strict liability offense that can result in massive fines. That hasn’t stopped Tether.

Use case for Tether: North Korea, Hamas, Russia

Tether’s sanction violations started hitting the papers two years ago. 

In August 2022, the US sanctioned Tornado Cash — the favorite crypto mixer of North Korea’s Lazarus Group for laundering stolen ETH to help the country get hard currency. OFAC posted a list of sanctioned Ethereum blockchain addresses for the Tornado Cash smart contract.

Tether flat-out ignored the sanctions. The  company posted that it “does not operate in the United States or onboard U.S. persons as customers,” so is not obliged to comply with US sanctions. [Tether, archive]

(This theory doesn’t quite hold, as we detail later.)

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad received $93 million in crypto between August 2021 and June 2023, according to Elliptic. Wallets connected to Hamas received $41 million over a similar period, almost all in USDT, according to Israeli blockchain firm Bitok. [WSJ, archive]

Chainalysis found that stablecoins like Tether were used in the vast majority of crypto-based scam transactions and sanctions evasion in 2023. [Wired, archive; Chainalysis]

TRM Labs concurred, saying that Tether was the most used stablecoin in illicit crypto flows in 2023. Tether on the Tron blockchain in particular had “cemented its position as the currency of choice for use by terrorist financing entities.” [TRM; Bloomberg, archive]

In April 2024, Reuters reported that PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-run oil company, was steering users to USDT and asking for half of each payment upfront in tethers to avoid having their money frozen in foreign bank accounts. US President Biden lifted sanctions in October — but said he would be reimposing them as Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro had failed to uphold his commitment to free and fair elections. [Reuters, archive; CoinDesk]

Also in April, the Wall Street Journal reported that tethers had become “indispensable” to fund the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian middlemen used USDT to skirt US sanctions and procure parts for drones and other equipment. [WSJ, archive]

Bloomberg reported that the US and the UK were investigating $20 billion in tethers that passed through Garantax, a Russian-based crypto exchange that both the US and the UK have sanctioned. [Bloomberg, archive] 

Russians were using tethers to skirt sanctions quite soon after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. You would buy tethers in Russia with rubles and sell them in London for pounds. [CoinDesk]

The Counter ISIS Finance Group is a group of countries aiming to cut off funding to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Most of ISIS’s funding is in cash — but the US Treasury fact sheet on the CIFG’s January 2024 meeting has a whole section on their fondness for tethers, particularly in Western Africa. [Press release; fact sheet, PDF]

Liberty Reserve

Liberty Reserve was a digital currency service run out of Costa Rica, active from 2006 to 2013. It issued dollar-backed liabilities called “LR.” These were just entries in a ledger at Liberty Reserve — everything was centralized. But otherwise, LR worked very like a stablecoin.

Customers purchased LR through middlemen — such as Gerry Cotten and Michael Patryn, who ran Midas Gold before starting the now-collapsed Quadriga crypto exchange. These “exchangers” bought LR in bulk directly from Liberty Reserve and sold them to secondary users. This helped obscure the money trails.

LR and its ilk ushered in a new era of cyber money laundering. Gone were the days of crossing borders with suitcases full of cash. You could simply set up an LR account and send dollar equivalents digitally!

Liberty Reserve was a bustling laundromat for seven years — until the DOJ seized its website and arrested its merry band of founders in Spain and New York. The US charged them under the Patriot Act with money laundering and running an unlicensed money transmitter. Liberty Reserve’s founder, Arthur Budovsky, is currently serving a twenty-year sentence. [DoJ; DoJ] 

Liberty Reserve Junior

Tether is Liberty Reserve but on the blockchain.

Tether has large clients who purchase USDT in bulk — or maybe borrow it, the tethers being created out of thin air with the loan being the “backing reserve.”

Secondary users buy the tethers on offshore crypto exchanges, such as Bitfinex, Binance, and Huobi.

Tether disclaims any responsibility for what these secondary users do with their tethers — even as Tether has complete control over all USDT and can freeze or destroy individual tethers at any time.

Tether is an improvement over Liberty Reserve because it runs on a blockchain — 15 different blockchains, in fact, with Tron being its main blockchain.

As well as DeFi shenanigans local to each chain, this also facilitates chain hopping — where you take a pile of tethers from multiple customers, mix them up, and move them to a new chain, making the funds harder to trace. 

Tether routinely creates hundreds of thousands of tethers at a time on one chain, so they can “swap” them from another chain. Sometimes they actually burn the old tethers on the original chain! [Tether]

While Liberty Reserve was mainly used by fraudsters, hackers, and traffickers, it never grew to the scale that Tether has — and it never became popular as a tool for sanctions evasion, not just crime. 

Why hasn’t Tether been shut down yet?

Shutting down Liberty Reserve was a huge job — it took a multi-year investigation spanning 17 countries. Tether is even more complex.

Tether is not very linked to the US. None of its principals are US citizens. The company is registered in the British Virgin Islands. The CEO, Paolo Ardoino, lives in El Salvador. Tether’s main bank is Deltec in the Bahamas. A major owner is based in Thailand. 

Tether has a long and sketchy history, back to its launch in 2015. They operated under the radar for years. By 2017, federal enforcement agencies were too busy tackling the ICO boom to take notice. So Tether grew unchecked.

In 2018, the New York Attorney General charged Tether and its crypto exchange sibling Bitfinex with fraud when they tried to cover up $850 million in missing reserves. The companies settled in February 2021 for $18.5 million, a small slap on the wrist. 

In the process of investigating Tether and Bitfinex, the NYAG accumulated quite a lot of dirt on the companies. You might think they would have passed this pile of evidence to the Feds with a bow on top — and they did try.

In his book Number Go Up, Zeke Faux writes how New York reached out to the SEC, the DOJ, and the CFTC about Tether in early 2021 — but the Feds just weren’t interested?! The CFTC did eventually act against Tether later in 2021.

It wasn’t until 2022 that the Feds finally started to pay attention — when they noticed Tether’s role in sanctions evasion.

A bigger hammer

Despite Tether’s claims to have no links to the US, the company has more than a little US exposure — they have substantial backing reserves held in the US in dollars, such as their Treasury notes at Cantor Fitzgerald. This makes them at least slightly subject to US law.

In any case, non-US entities who work around US sanctions risk being sanctioned themselves. This may be applied to individuals as well as companies. [OFAC, PDF]

An entity may be cut off from the US dollar system altogether — and from any entity elsewhere in the world that wants to keep its access to US dollars. This is a financial death penalty. It’s a big stick.

If Tether remains noncompliant, this could put their banking and reserve relations at risk. Having Tether as a client could become too risky even for Cantor. 

By 2023, Tether had wised up a bit. They froze 32 wallets that were linked to terrorism and warfare in Ukraine and Israel in October 2023. In December, Tether froze 41 wallets tied to sanctions as a “precautionary” measure. [Tether; Tether]

By this time, the Feds were keeping a close eye on Tether. 

Ardoino wrote public letters to US senators in November and December proclaiming Tether was now in “alignment” with OFAC, and they were fine with freezing secondary addresses. Also, Tether had “onboarded” the Secret Service onto their platform — though it’s not clear just what that meant — and they were working with the FBI and the DOJ. [Yahoo; Tether; Letter, PDF; Letter, PDF]

Seriously, stop it

While Tether was blocking addresses and trying to convince the world it was in full compliance, the US government was making its annoyance more explicit.

Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo gave a speech at the November 2023 Blockchain Association Summit. This was the earliest example we could find of the government using the words “national security” about cryptocurrency: [Treasury]

While some have heeded our calls and taken steps to prevent illicit activity, the lack of action by too many firms—both large and small—represents a clear and present risk to our national security.

Adeyemo doesn’t name Tether in the speech, but it’s clear who he’s talking about:

We cannot allow dollar-backed stable coin providers outside the United States to have the privilege of using our currency without the responsibility of putting in place procedures to prevent terrorists from abusing their platform.

He gave this speech just after the Binance settlement dropped.

Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Roger Marshall (R-KS) sent a letter to the Treasury, the Department of Defense, and the White House in April 2024 saying that they were concerned about Russia, Iran, and North Korea using Tether to evade sanctions: [Letter, PDF; WSJ]

The national security threat posed by cryptocurrency requires a commensurate response by our country’s defense community. We seek information on the additional authorities you may need in order to neutralize this threat.

The US has decades-old laws in place for dealing with sanction violators. The Bank Secrecy Act, the Patriot Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act give the US sweeping powers. 

The government is also working on new stablecoin regulations — and any effective regulation on US dollar stablecoins would likely be fatal to Tether. 

What happens next?

Binance already learned this lesson after supplying services to Iran. They had to settle fines of more than $4 billion for violating the BSA, money transmitter laws, and the IEEPA. Former Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao was sentenced to four months in prison. Binance is getting a monitor.

We expect something similar to happen to Tether — large fines, compliance requirements, and the possibility of jail time for Tether principals.

If the heat gets too much, Tether might try to unwind the entire fund and shut down. The tricky parts will be how to do this while keeping as much of the money as possible and how to realize and return the dollar value of what reserves actually exist in any tangible sense.

But most importantly, they have to not unduly upset any of the more demanding sort of Tether customer who knows where they live.

___________________

  • You can sponsor our efforts to produce more work like this. Here’s Amy’s Patreon and here’s David’s. For casual tips, here’s Amy’s Ko-Fi and here’s David’s.
  • Help our work: if you liked this post, tell just one other person.

Posted on by Amy Castor 3

Bitcoin goes up, so it must come down. What goes into the price of BTC?

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

Bitcoin has set yet another new all-time high — $73,835 on Coinbase BTC-USD on March 14. This means bitcoin is good now! All our past objections are resolved. Going forward, we only deal in Finances U Desire.

Sound and fury, signifying nothing

What’s interesting is that while the price is back up, the bitcoin trading market has not recovered. If anyone says “the market is back!” that’s an incorrect claim.

Market volume is one-eighth of what it was in November 2021, the last time the price was this high.

We get that number from Coinbase retail trading fee income, which is 2% of the volume. Coinbase is the largest actual-dollar exchange and it’s not allowed to lie in SEC filings — so for once in crypto, we have numbers we can trust a bit.

The retail trade volume against actual dollars on Coinbase went down in seven of the past eight quarters. Here’s a table from Q4 2021 to Q3 2023. Q4 2023 didn’t show any improvement.

Even as the price went up through 2023, every day people wanted bitcoins less and less. Coinbase gives us the numbers showing this.

Flash boys

Without trading volume, the bitcoin markets are painfully thin. It doesn’t help that market liquidity is horribly fragmented.

(This is why we prefer to just quote the Coinbase price — the skew between exchanges can be hundreds of dollars when anything interesting is happening.)

BTC-USDT on BitMEX flash-crashed from $66,000 to just $8,900 on Monday, March 18. Starting at around 22:40 UTC, someone dumped 1,000 BTC as fast as possible at whatever the market would pay for it. [CoinDesk; Twitter, archive]

By the time the flash crash flowed through to Coinbase, it was a mere $2,000 drop.

BitMEX has much less bitcoin liquidity than Coinbase BTC-USD or Binance BTC-USDT — so we suspect this was a very urgent seller who felt that FinCEN didn’t need his details.

Remember that after Binance got hit with the compliance hammer, traders’ details are no longer safe from US anti-money-laundering agencies.

We’re not sure why our trader didn’t use OKX, HTX (formerly Huobi), or Bitfinex, which would have had more liquidity and thus less price slippage — hence our impression that they were really in a hurry. And now they have to put all that USDT somewhere.

ETFs will save bitcoin!

BlackRock says its spot bitcoin ETF has reached $10 billion in assets. But Grayscale’s GBTC has seen over $11 billion in outflows because nobody wants to pay their 1.5% fee. (Everyone else is around 0.3%.)

Bitcoin ETFs aren’t hitting the institutions they were hoping for — pension funds and so on. (Thankfully.) For all of BlackRock’s helpful ETF marketing advice, financial advisors are being very careful about recommending these things. [WSJ, archive]  

The money flowing into the ETFs seems to be from individual investors. It’s not clear whether these are new investors or just existing holders dumping their bitcoin for ETFs because they’re tired of being their own bank.

This Financial Times article starts with BlackRock talking up its bitcoin ETF and the fabulous future of the blockchain … then details every way in which crypto is utterly incompatible with sane finance and doesn’t work. [FT, archive]  

The hot air crypto bubble

Meanwhile, Tether has printed 11 billion tethers just since the start of 2024. It’s at 103 billion tethers and counting. 

We very much doubt that most of these billions of tethers are being bought with real US dollars. Why would you send real dollars to an unregulated offshore wildcat bank to buy bitcoins when you could just put them into a US-regulated bitcoin ETF?

We suspect the tethers are being printed out of thin air and accounted as loans — the fresh USDT is “backed” by the loan itself.

This supports our theory that the present pump is not real money flooding into bitcoin. It’s stablecoins on Binance — tethers and FDUSD. The volume on Binance completely swamps the volumes on Coinbase or ETF trading.

The bitcoin price chart looks very like someone’s trying to pump the price. You’ll see the price slowly getting walked up, as if someone’s wash-trading it up … then it hits a round number of dollars, someone tries to cash out, and the price drops several thousand.

Fake dollars going up, real dollars going down.

So we’re not in a bubble. We’re in a balloon, one being pumped full of hot air. It’s fun going up — but the trip down can be very quick.  

What do I do with my holdings?

Back in November 2022, when exchanges were suffering urgent unplanned maintenance left, right, and center, we went so far as to say that if you insisted on investing in bitcoins, you should not risk storing your coins on an exchange. Holding private keys is ridiculously fraught and the tech is still unusable trash — but it’s still not as bad as trusting bitcoin exchanges.

If you must hold bitcoins in the hope of getting dollars for them one day, the least-worst option is to buy into an ETF. That way you’re in a regulated market and your only risk is Coinbase Custody getting hacked.

If you’ve bought into crypto, please at least cash out your principal — the cash basis that you paid to buy in. Then everything you make from then on is pure profit. When the price crashes, you won’t have lost anything.

Our real recommendation, of course, is not to touch this garbage.

Back in the snake pit

Bitcoin suffered a year of its media coverage being “Sam Bankman-Fried is a crook.” Crypto pumpers tried to make out that FTX, the second-largest exchange, being a massive fraud was a mere aberration on the part of Bankman-Fried, and everyone else in crypto was a good guy.

Then the first-largest exchange, Binance, got busted too. So price discovery for bitcoin — what determines where the number goes — happens on an exchange that literally admitted a few months ago to being a criminal conspiracy. Binance’s founder and former CEO, Changpeng “CZ” Zhao, is in the US awaiting sentencing. 

We find, over and over, that normal people keep assuming that crypto isn’t just a completely criminal snake pit. Because US dollars are able to touch it in any way, so surely it’s regulated. Right?

Finance and finance journalism seem to have collectively forgotten what a hellhole unregulated markets always were.

The way crypto works is:

  1. Actual dollars flow from retail suckers to a few rich guys;
  2. There’s lots of fancy bafflegab to obscure the very simple flow of actual dollars.

Crypto is an unregulated mob casino and the regulated exchanges are just the cashier’s desk.

You can absolutely make money in crypto — we would never say that you can’t. But you have to be a better shark than all the other sharks who built the shark pool.

Trade carefully.

Media stardom

Billy Bambrough wrote about the bitcoin price for the Sunday Times and spoke to David. In a rare moment for journalistic coverage of the number, Tether was mentioned! [Sunday Times, archive]

____________________________________________

A word from our sponsors

  • Spread  the good word — if you liked this post, tell just one other person. It really helps!
  • We write this newsletter for money. Please send us some! Here’s Amy’s Patreon and here’s David’s. For casual tips, here’s Amy’s Ko-Fi and here’s David’s.
Posted on by Amy Castor 1

Amy and David answer your questions — bitcoin mining, ETH staking, FTX, Tether, and more! 

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

We asked readers what they were curious about in crypto. We posted part one of our answers earlier this month. Now here’s part two! [Twitter; Bluesky] 

Sending us money will definitely help — here’s Amy’s Patreon, and here’s David’s.

Q: An update on the carbon footprint of the crypto industry for 2023, if this hasn’t been done by someone else already? Thanks [Thomas Endgame on Twitter]

The news is still dismal. The bitcoin network’s annual carbon footprint is a shocking 76.79 million tons of carbon dioxide, comparable to the entire country of Oman, according to Digiconomist. [Digiconomist, archive]

In terms of energy, bitcoin uses as much electricity as the country of Ukraine — 137.68 terawatt-hours annually. Energy consumption was highest in the first half of 2022 — 204 terawatt-hours per year — but started to go down in July, after the crypto collapse. 

The network currently produces 23.75 kilotons of e-waste per year, comparable to the entire Netherlands, and every bitcoin transaction uses enough water to fill a swimming pool.

This is why some of the good citizens of Texas are fighting back against the crypto mines there. 

Q: Who’ll be left holding bags when Tether collapses? [Julius Cobbett on Twitter]

Tethers (USDT) function as substitute dollars on offshore crypto exchanges that have no access to US dollar banking.

The biggest holders of tethers are arbitrageurs, such as Cumberland, who pass tethers along to secondary users in exchange for bitcoins and other crypto. [CoinTelegraph, 2020; Protos]

If all tethers were suddenly switched off tomorrow, that would be nearly 100 billion “dollars” in liquidity instantly sucked out of the market.  

Any secondary users stuck holding tether would find their virtual dollars suddenly worthless. Arbitrageurs would have nothing to buy and sell bitcoin with on offshore exchanges — they would have to switch over to a different stablecoin — and the price of bitcoin would likely take a serious hit.

We would expect to see a large number of bitcoin holders trying to dump their holdings on actual-dollar exchanges like Coinbase in a mad rush to get out of the market. It might look like a bunch of mice trying to squeeze out of a tiny hole. 

Q. We all know crypto is garbage, why does YAHOO finance continue to have the BTC ticker and other crypto related garbage up? I’d have thought by now it would be gone. [Barsoapguy on Twitter]

Sadly, with bitcoin ETFs and so on still all over the finance press, it’s a relevant number to put up. Even if they just pull the number from whatever CoinMarketCap says.

Q. In the bankruptcy of FTX, about 7B of the $8.7B said to be “lost” has been found, and with Crypto making a comeback all creditors may become whole or better. But SBF rots in prison for decades? And BK firms make over a billion in fees? [Bill Hochberg on Twitter]

There are two misconceptions here — one is that John Jay Ray and his team have found all the money and everything will be fine. The other is that Ray and his lawyers are gouging the creditors and nobody can stop them.

FTX got itself into trouble because it had stolen the customer assets, then inflated its balance sheets with worthless FTT tokens — its own illiquid supermarket loyalty card points. The FTT made up a third of its balance sheet. When FTX filed for bankruptcy in November 2022, it had a shortfall of $8.7 billion.

As we wrote at the time, FTX’s debts were real, but its assets were fake. The FTT was unsaleable garbage, not something that Ray and his team could turn into cash.

In August 2023, Ray estimated his team had recovered $7 billion — but that included spurious dollar values for trash crypto assets. A lot of it will be FTT and other worthless tokens that aren’t realistically convertible to cash in those quantities. 

In October 2023, FTX said it would refund up to 90% of “distributable assets” to creditors. That’s 90% of the amount of funds that FTX was able to recover — not 90% of the amount owed to creditors. [FTX]

Bitcoin has gone up in price since FTX fell over. The price of bitcoin was $17,000 when FTX filed for bankruptcy. Now it’s over $40,000. If FTX held onto its crypto holdings, instead of converting them into cash as soon as possible, they might have made some money. But bankruptcy lawyers typically don’t gamble on volatile markets. 

Bankruptcy professionals are super expensive. Ray’s team has so far cost about $200 million. That’s a lot of money, and many people questioned this — but even the independent fee examiner said, yep, that looked about right for the ridiculous mess Ray had to sort out here.

An appeals court has ordered the appointment of an independent examiner reporting to the US Trustee, paid for out of the bankruptcy estate, which will likely cost another $100 million or so.

Q: Eth staking and destaking? It was not possible to unstake at launch, does it work now? Are stakers happy? How scammy is the whole thing? There was some stuff about OFAC compliance for stakers too? I don’t know? I might use an explainer? [Laventeot on Twitter]

Ethereum proof of stake uses validators rather than miners like bitcoin does. Every validator has a chance at winning this moment’s ETH. If your block is the winner, you get the block reward, transaction fees, and all the MEV you can steal.

You can set up a validator at the cost of staking 32 ETH. When Ethereum moved to proof of stake in September 2022, this 32 ETH couldn’t be unstaked. But since Ethereum’s Shanghai upgrade in April 2023, it is now possible to unstake your staked ETH.

Unstaking has a queueing mechanism to avoid there being too much churn. So when there’s a big dump — such as when Celsius Network destaked 30,000 ETH recently to hand back to their bankruptcy creditors — it can take days or even weeks to process. [Nansen]

The staking process seems to work as advertised and the stakers are pleased with it.

The process closely resembles an unregistered security in the US — the Ethereum Foundation (incorporated in Switzerland) promotes that you put in your ETH and you get a return on it from the efforts of others.

Some exchanges offer staking as a service — this is probably okay if the customers are accredited or institutional, and an excellent way to accumulate cease and desist letters from the SEC and state securities regulators if the customers are retail.

Anyone moving money — or, in FinCEN’s terms, “value that substitutes for currency,” including “convertible virtual currencies” — as a business in the US is required to comply with sanctions law. This is usually assumed to mean not validating transactions for sanctioned blockchain addresses listed by OFAC. US-based validators would be very foolish to flout this.

OFAC compliance in transaction processing doesn’t directly relate to the economics of staking in itself — US bitcoin miners would similarly be liable under law for processing transactions for sanctioned entities, even if OFAC hasn’t called them up yet.

Q: maybe a check-in on the enterprise blockchain pitch decks? is the same dead horse still being beaten? [Stephen Farrugia on Twitter]

Enterprise blockchain has gone back into hibernation. Corporate interest in non-cryptocurrency blockchain goes up and down with the price of bitcoin — lots of interest in 2017 and 2018, almost none in 2019 and 2020, and a sudden burst of interest in 2021 as the number went up.

The problem with enterprise blockchain is that it’s a completely useless idea. A blockchain doesn’t actually work any better than using a conventional database in any situation where you have a trusted entity who’s responsible for the system. If you’re a business, that’ll be yourself. Just use Postgres.

The main remaining interest in enterprise blockchain is inside banks. We’ve had many reports of bank fintech research units infested with coiners trying to do something — anything — that they can say is “blockchain.” Société Générale’s completely useless euro stablecoin is one recent example.

Q. Something on the way that Bitcoin Magazine and BitMEX bought commercial places on the Peregrine Mission One so they could say they’d “gone to the moon” … and the spacecraft is going to miss the moon. [BiFuriosa on Bluesky]

Private companies have of late been offering to send personal items — cremated remains, time capsules, and even crypto — to the moon. Astrobotic, which owns Peregrin-1, is one of them. 

In May, BitMEX and Bitcoin Magazine announced they were going to send a physical bitcoin to the moon via Astrobotic — that is, a metal medallion with a bitcoin private key engraved onto it. They declared that this would mark a “defining moment for bitcoin as we explore the possibilities of Bitcoin beyond planet Earth.” [BitMEX, archive]

Peregrin-1 made it into space earlier this month — but it never managed to land on the moon. So when it burned up on re-entry to Earth’s atmosphere, everything onboard burned up with it, including the time capsules, the ashes of more than 200 people, and the bitcoin. [Gizmodo]

Dogecoin fans had earlier funded a similar effort to send a physical dogecoin to the moon in 2015, also via Astrobotic. As of 2023, they were still trying to get it sent up. If the physical dogecoin had been onboard, it would have met the same fate. [Twitter, archive]

Sadly, even the moon hates crypto. 

Q. Why are people still falling for this nonsense? [Peter Nimmo on Mastodon]

Dude, they can get rich for free! Maybe.

Thankfully, fewer people are falling for the nonsense. Retail trade is one-eighth of what it was in the 2021 bubble. Most of the dollars boosting the price of bitcoin since 2017 have been fake. 

By the end of 2017, a billion USDT was sloshing around in the crypto markets; today in 2024, we’re coming up to 100 billion USDT. Bitcoin’s price is largely manipulated.

Crypto media — CoinDesk, The Block, Decrypt, and others — play a major role in promoting the nonsense. These outlets, owned and/or financed by crypto companies, are the public relations machines for the crypto industry. The finance press treats these sites as specialist trade press rather than fundamentally a promotional mechanism.

Crypto has also put big money into lobbying efforts, so we see senators like Cynthia Lummis, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Rand Paul shamefully repeating the propaganda. 

Crypto skeptics are a smaller group who try to warn people of the dangers of investing in crypto. So it’s important to send money to us. Instead of bitcoins, we spend it on useful things like wine to get through all this guff.

Q. Once Crypto blows over what will we salt our popcorn with? [EamonnMR on Mastodon]

We don’t expect crypto to ever disappear completely. We do expect the number to eventually go down to the point where fewer people pay attention.

Meme stocks blew out even harder than crypto did. The remaining devotees are like QAnon for finance, posting to Reddit with their theories of how much they’ll surely get for their deactivated BBBY shares when the Mother Of All Short Squeezes finally descends.

Now that the well of dumb crypto money has dried up, venture capitalists are pivoting to AI as the next big thing. The tech is running out of steam, though. But the power consumption is likely to be even worse than bitcoin mining by 2027, and the AI grifters are using the same excuses for it as the bitcoin grifters. [Digiconomist]

Suckers are eternal. As long as money exists, fraud and get-rich schemes will be with us. And we’ll have something to write about.

Image: Hans at Pixabay, CC-0 

Posted on by Amy Castor 4

Crypto collapse: SEC takes on Terraform and Coinbase, ETF fallout continues, Tether is for crime

Our latest roundup of everything that’s falling over is on David’s site. [David Gerard]

In this edition:

  • SEC wins a lot of their claims against Terraform
  • Coinbase motion to dismiss hearing, with yet more Beanie Babies. (“funding my new startup by selling Stock Babies which are an asset  just like a parcel of land, the value of which may reasonably  fluctuate.” — Andrew Molitor)
  • ETF nonsense: Collateralized Rugpull Obligations
  • Tether is for crime
Posted on by Amy Castor 0

You won’t believe the 21 million reasons bitcoin ETFs are dumb as heck and super-risky! Oh wait, of course you will

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard
  • Help our work: if you liked this post, please tell just one other person. It really helps!
  • You can also send money to our one-way ETFs! Here’s Amy’s Patreon and here’s David’s. For casual tips, here’s Amy’s Ko-Fi and here’s David’s.

Boy, those ETFs were the juice bitcoin really needed, eh? 

The SEC approved 11 bitcoin spot ETFs on Wednesday, January 10, with media widely reporting what a boon this would be for the coiners. Surely this would lure piles of fresh dollars into bitcoin!

Not quite. The bitcoin price held around $46,000 — but just for long enough for the whales to start cashing out.

What the crypto world needs to understand is that bitcoin ETFs are not bitcoins. They’re a traditional finance product with bitcoin flavoring.

Except for the risk — that bit is completely bitcoin.

Number go down

The first big post-ETF price drop came on Friday, January 12. Bitcoin slipped from $46,000 to $43,500 in two hours — only one hour after the day’s printing of a billion tethers was released. A few hours after that, another dump took the price from $43,500 to $41,000.

The bitcoin market is fake and in tethers. The retail securities market is real and in actual dollars. You can’t pump bitcoin ETFs with tethers.

After years of being severely discounted from the price of the bitcoins in the fund, Grayscale GBTC finally reached net asset value. This turned out to be not so great — it looks like long-frustrated GBTC holders are finally dumping now that they can. [CoinDesk; Bloomberg, archive]

Coinbase (Nasdaq: COIN) stock went down as well. It was up as high as $186 at the end of December. It dropped to $130.78 on January 12.

ETFs have put bitcoin on steroids! Asthmatic and with shrunken balls.

Bitcoins: not so great

Bitcoins are still an awful investment for ordinary people who aren’t true believers in Satoshi and just want to grow their dollars.

The ETF S-1 filings go into considerable detail on the risks — none of which should be news to anyone here.

The main risk the ETF trusts see is that the base asset is still a completely terrible investment. Crypto is insanely volatile. A pile of crypto companies went broke from being run by crooks — the filings go into some detail on this. Everyone hates bitcoin miners. The regulators, from the White House down, increasingly just despise everything about crypto. And very few people like bitcoin anyway.

Securities broker Vanguard thinks the bitcoin ETFs are such trash that they’re not only not offering these spot bitcoin ETFs — they’re withdrawing the crypto futures ETFs they presently offer. [Axios]

What happens if the ETF bitcoins are stolen?

Unlike a bitcoin futures ETF, a spot ETF is based on actual bitcoins — and these have to be stored somewhere.

Most of it, including $29 billion face value of GBTC bitcoin, is stored by Coinbase Custody. VanEck is storing their ETF coins at Gemini. Fidelity is storing their ETF coins at their own custody subsidiary.

So what happens if a hacker gets into the digital fortress and takes all the bitcoins?

In short: too bad. Sorry, your money is gone!

Coinbase Custody advised BlackRock that it has insurance covering up to $320 million losses of custodied crypto — but that’s for all its customers’ $144 billion (face value) of cryptos in custody. That’s a whole 0.2% coverage. [SEC]

The ETF trusts themselves do not have FDIC or Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) insurance.

The ETF trusts specifically disclaim liability for lost backing assets. Valkyrie, for example, says: “Shareholders’ recourse against the Trust, Trustee, Custodian and Sponsor under New York law governing their custody operations is limited.” [SEC]

Investors would likely sue anyway. BlackRock and Fidelity could cover such a loss, though it would sting. Grayscale would be utterly unable to cover it.

If Coinbase were to go bankrupt, it’s not clear legally if crypto stored in Coinbase Custody would belong to the individual customers or would be thrown into the bankruptcy estate!

The custodian just losing all the bitcoins is not a trivial risk — two crypto custodians, Prime Trust and Fortress, went bankrupt in 2023 just from losing customer coins.

At least Coinbase Custody would be unlikely to do what Prime Trust did and gamble remaining customer assets on the crypto markets to cover the hole. Probably.

Ask an expert

We spoke to Frank Paiano, who teaches finance and investing at Southwestern Community College, about what would happen if a bitcoin ETF’s backing assets vanished. [Frank Paiano]

He thinks that customers “will be fooled into thinking” that the ETF assets are protected, even though they absolutely are not. “That is mostly why Fidelity has set up their own trustee. I would guess that companies such as BlackRock would do the same.” (BlackRock is so far just using Coinbase.)

Loss of ETF-backing assets happens quite a lot, said Paiano. “A simple Internet search for ‘gold investments stolen’ yields several examples. Then there are the age-old anecdotes of people being duped into buying lead painted or plated with gold.”

Paiano thinks bitcoin ETFs are profoundly unwise investments: “prudent, long-term oriented investors should stay far away from these abominations”— but they’ll find customers.

“If there are foolish, greedy individuals willing to part with their hard-earned money, there will be scoundrels happy to oblige them.”

Other bitcoin ETF fallout

The day before the SEC announced its approval of 11 spot bitcoin ETFs, the official @SECGov Twitter posted a fake notice saying a bitcoin ETF was approved. SEC Chair Gary Gensler issued a statement on the fake tweet, saying that an unauthorized party got hold of the phone number connected to the account but didn’t get access to any SEC internal systems. [SEC]

What happens next?

The new narrative we’ve seen is that the real bitcoin pump is in 90 days when financial advisors are finally ready to push bitcoin ETFs on their customers, for some reason. Probably the halvening, or sunspots maybe.

We don’t expect the number to go up just from bitcoin ETFs existing — anyone who wanted bitcoins could already buy them, and “anyone” numbers one-eighth of what it did in the recent bubble.

We do expect downward pressure on the bitcoin price to continue from the GBTC holders who can finally cash out near par.

Tether pumps only work if nobody tries to cash out into the pumped-up price. Unfortunately, that only works as long as nobody wants real dollars. It turns out they do.

With these ETFs, bitcoin is the dog that caught the parked car.

Media stardom

David was quoted by Cointelegraph on bitcoin ETFs. A bitcoin ETF is a terrible idea, but we don’t think the threat model includes the issuers stealing the bitcoins. [Cointelegraph; Cointelegraph; Cointelegraph]

David spoke to Davar about bitcoin ETFs and our friends at Tether. (“Basket fund” is the local term for “ETF.”) [Davar, in Hebrew, Google translate]

David went on Logan Moody’s podcast The Contrarian just before the ETFs were approved to talk about the state of crypto as of early 2024. [YouTube]

Image: Grayscale Bitcoin Trust, artist’s impression.

Posted on by Amy Castor 3

Crypto collapse: Mt Gox payouts, Tether hooks up the feds, SEC says no to Coinbase, crypto media mergers

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

It’s not over until withdrawals are temporarily paused due to unusual market activity.

— Jacob Silverman

Tightening Tether’s tethers

Tether’s been under some regulatory heat after the reports of how useful USDT is for financing terrorists and other sanctioned entities. Even Cynthia Lummis, the crypto-pumping senator from Wyoming, loudly declared that Tether had to be dealt with.

The US government isn’t entirely happy with Tether’s financial shenanigans. But they’re really unhappy about sanctions violations, especially with what’s going on now in the Middle East. 

So Tether has announced that it will now be freezing OFAC-sanctioned blockchain addresses — and it’s onboarded the US Secret Service and FBI onto Tether! [Tether, archive; letter, PDF, archive]

Tether doesn’t do anything voluntarily. We expect they were told that they would allow this or an extremely large hammer would come down upon them.

There’s more to Tether’s criminal use case than sanctions violation. The most jaw-dropping chapter in Zeke Faux’s excellent book Number Go Up (US, UK) is when he traced a direct message scammer to a human trafficking operation in Cambodia that favored tethers as its currency. South China Morning Post follows up on this with an in-depth report on how Cambodian organized crime uses tethers. [SCMP]

Credit rating firm S&P Global rated eight stablecoins for risk. Tether and Dai got the lowest marks. S&P notes in particular the lack of information on Tether’s reserves. [press release; S&P; Tether report, PDF]

At least some of the claimed Tether backing in treasuries is held in the US with Cantor Fitzgerald — exposing Tether to US touchability. This has been known since February 2023, and was proudly confirmed in December 2023 by Cantor CEO Howard Lutnick: “I hold their Treasuries, and they have a lot of Treasuries. I’m a big fan of Tethers.” [Ledger Insights; Forbes]

Cointelegraph had a fascinating story on a company called Exved using tethers for cross-border payments from Russia! Then they deleted it, for some reason. Exved was founded by Sergey Mendeleev, who also founded the OFAC-sanctioned crypto exchange Garantex, which was kicked out of Estonia. Exved is working with InDeFi Bank, another Mendeleev venture. We’re not so sure the new OFAC-compliant Tether will be 100% on board with this. [Cointelegraph, archive; Telegram, in Russian; Protos]

SEC answers Coinbase’s prayers: “No.”

In July 2022 — just after crypto crashed — Coinbase wrote to the SEC proposing new regulatory carveouts for crypto.

The SEC took its sweet time responding. Eventually, Coinbase sued in April 2023 with a writ of mandamus, demanding a bureaucratic response. The court told the SEC to get on with it, or at least supply a date by which it would answer.

Finally, the SEC has responded: “the Commission concludes that the requested rulemaking is currently unwarranted and denies the Petition.” The SEC thinks existing securities regulations cover crypto securities just fine, and there’s no reason for special rules for Coinbase. [SEC rejection, PDF; Coinbase letter to court, PDF; Gensler statement]

Coinbase general counsel Paul Grewal welcomed the opportunity to challenge Coinbase’s dumb and bad proposal being turned down. [Twitter, archive]

4 (continued)

Binance founder and former CEO Changpeng Zhao will not be returning home to Dubai anytime soon. US District Judge Richard Jones ordered CZ to remain in the US until his sentencing on February 24. He can travel within the US, but he cannot leave. [Order, PDF] 

After being busted hard, Binance is still behaving weird. At the FT Crypto and Digital Assets Summit in London, the exchange’s new CEO Richard Teng refused to answer even basic questions, like where Binance is headquartered and whether it’s had an audit. “Why do you feel so entitled to those answers?” Teng said when pushed. “Is there a need for us to share all of this information publicly? No.” [FT]

CZ and Binance have been trying to dismiss the SEC charges against them. This is mostly loud table pounding, wherein Binance claims that what the SEC argued were securities are not really securities. [Doc 190, PDF, Doc 191, PDF]

France was the first country in Europe to grant Binance regulatory approval. State-endorsed blockchain courses for the unemployed and NFT diplomas helped push the country’s most vulnerable into crypto. Since the collapse of FTX and Binance’s $4.3 billion fine for money laundering, French President Emmanuel Macron’s relationship with CZ has fallen under scrutiny. [FT, archive]

London law firm Slateford helped to cover up Binance’s crimes and attempted to intimidate media outlet Disruption Banking from writing about Binance’s sloppy compliance hiring practices. (Disruption Banking told Slateford to get knotted and didn’t hear from them again.) [Disruption Banking]

Binance is finally removing all trading pairs against Great British pounds. [Binance, archive]

FTX: The IRS wants its money

FTX filed a reorganization plan in mid-December. The plan is 80 pages and the disclosure statement is 138 pages, but there’s a notable lack of detail on what happens next. None of the talk of starting a new exchange has made it into the current plan — this appears to just be a liquidation.

The plan treats crypto claims as their value in cash at the time of the bankruptcy filing on November 11, 2022, back when bitcoin was at $17,000 — less than half of what it is now.

Creditors will vote on the plan in 2024. The court must approve the plan before it is implemented. [Bloomberg, archive; Plan, PDF; Disclosure statement, PDF]

The IRS is demanding $24 billion in unpaid taxes from the corpse of FTX. John Jay Ray wants to know how the IRS came up with that ludicrous number — the exchange never earned anything near those amounts. The IRS originally wanted $44 billion, but brought the number down. Judge John Dorsey has told the IRS to show its working. [Doc 4588, PDF; Bloomberg, paywalled]

Three Arrows Capital

Three Arrows Capital was the overleveraged crypto hedge fund that blew up in 2022 and took out everyone else in crypto who hadn’t already been wrecked by Terra-Luna. After months of dodging culpability, co-founder Zhu Su was finally arrested in Singapore in September as he was trying to skip the country. 

Zhu was released from jail and appeared before the Singapore High Court on December 13, where he had to explain to lawyers for the liquidator Teneo what happened when 3AC went broke. The information will be shared with creditors. [Bloomberg, archive]

A British Virgin Islands court froze $1.1 billion in assets of Zhu and his co-founder Kyle Davies and Davies’ wife Kelly Chen. [The Block]

Teneo expects a 46% recovery rate for 3AC creditors on $2.7 billion in claims. [The Block]

Crypto media in the new Ice Age

Crypto news outlet Decrypt has merged with “decentralized media firm” Rug Radio. No, we’d never heard of them either. The two firms will form a new holding company chaired by Josh Quittner. Decrypt had spun out from Consensys in May 2022, just before everything crashed. It’s reportedly been profitable since then — though crypto sites always say that. [Axios; Axios, 2022] 

Forkast News in Hong Kong has merged with NFT data provider CryptoSlam and fired most of its staff. Forkast was founded in 2018 by former Bloomberg News anchor Angie Lau; it shut down editorial operations on November 30. [The Block] 

Crypto news outlets ran seriously low on cash in 2019 and 2020, just before the crypto bubble, and they’re struggling again. We expect more merges and buyouts of top-tier (such as that is in crypto) and mid-tier crypto outlets. We predict news quality will decline further.

Amy recalls the old-style crypto media gravy train and eating in five-star restaurants every night in Scotland and London while embedded with Cardano in 2017. Thanks, Charles! Nocoining doesn’t pay nearly as well, but these days crypto media doesn’t either. There’s probably a book in those Cardano stories that nobody would ever read.

Regulatory clarity

The Financial Stability Oversight Council, which monitors domestic and international regulatory proposals, wants more US legislation to control crypto. FSOC’s 2023 annual report warns of dangers from:

crypto-asset price volatility, the market’s high use of leverage, the level of interconnectedness within the industry, operational risks, and the risk of runs on crypto-asset platforms and stablecoins. Vulnerabilities may also arise from token ownership concentration, cybersecurity risks, and the proliferation of platforms acting outside of or out of compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

Yeah, that about covers it. FSOC recommends (again) that “Congress pass legislation to provide for the regulation of stablecoins and of the spot market for crypto-assets that are not securities.” [Press release; annual report, PDF]

IOSCO, the body of international securities regulators, released its final report on how to regulate DeFi, to go with its November recommendations on crypto markets in general. IOSCO’s nine recommendations for DeFi haven’t changed from the draft version — treat these like the instruments they appear to be, and pay attention to the man behind the curtain. These are recommendations for national regulators, not rules, but look at the DeFi task force — this was led by the US SEC. [IOSCO press release, PDF; IOSCO report, PDF]

London-based neobank Revolut is suspending UK crypto services — you can no longer buy crypto with the app — citing a new raft of FCA regulations, which go into force on January 8. [CityAM; CoinDesk]

Crypto exchange KuCoin has settled with New York. The NY Attorney General charged KuCoin in March for violating securities laws by offering security tokens — including tether — while not registering with NYAG. KuCoin has agreed to pay a $22 million fine — $5.3 million going to the NYAG and $16.77 million to refund New York customers. KuCoin will also leave the state. [Stipulation and consent order, PDF; Twitter, archive] 

Montenegro plans to extradite Terraform Labs cofounder Do Kwon to either the US or South Korea, where he is wanted on charges related to the collapse of Terra’s stablecoin. Kwon was arrested in Montenegro in March. Originally it looked like Montenegro was going to pass him off to the US, but the case has been handed back to the High Court for review. [Bloomberg, archive; Sudovi, in Montenegrin]

Anatoly Legkodymov of the Bitzlato crypto exchange, a favorite of the darknet markets, has pleaded guilty in the US to unlicensed money transmission. Legkodymov was arrested in Miami back in January. He has agreed to shut down the exchange. [Press release]

The SEC posted a new investor alert on crypto securities with a very lengthy section on claims of proof of reserves and how misleading these can be. [Investor.gov; Twitter, archive] 

Santa Tibanne

It’s been nearly ten years, but Mt. Gox creditors are reportedly starting to receive repayments — small amounts in Japanese yen via PayPal. [Cointelegraph; Twitter, archive] 

Some payouts are apparently bitcoin payouts — with the creditors not receiving a proportionate share of the remaining bitcoins, but instead the yen value of the bitcoins when Mt. Gox collapsed in February 2014. This means a 100% recovery for creditors! — but much less actual money.

There are still 140,000 bitcoins from Mt. Gox waiting to be released. If payouts are made in bitcoins and not just yen, we expect that claimants will want to cash out as soon as possible. This could have adverse effects on the bitcoin price.

Trouble down t’ pit

In the Celsius Network bankruptcy, Judge Martin Glenn has approved the plan to start a “MiningCo” bitcoin miner with some of the bankruptcy estate. He says that “the MiningCo Transaction falls squarely within the terms of the confirmed Plan and does not constitute a modification.” [Doc 4171, PDF]

Bitcoin miners are racing to buy up more mining equipment before bitcoin issuance halves in April or May 2024. Here’s to the miners sending each other broke as fast as possible [FT, archive] 

Riot Platforms subsidiary Whinstone sent its private security to Rhodium Enterprise’s plant in Rockdale, Texas, to remove Rhodium employees and shut down their 125MW bitcoin mining facility. The two mining companies have been brawling over an energy agreement they had made before prices went up. [Bitcoin Magazine]

More good news for bitcoin

The UK is setting up a crypto hub! ’Cos that’s definitely what the UK needs, and not a working economy or something. [CoinDesk]

Liquid is a bitcoin sidechain set up by Blockstream at the end of 2018. It was intended for crypto exchange settlement, to work around the blockchain being unusably slow. It sees very little use — “On a typical day, there are more tweets about Liquid than there are transactions on its network.” [Protos] 

A16z, Coinbase, and the Winklevoss twins say they’ve raised $78 million as part of a new push to influence the 2024 elections. [Politico] 

Little-known fact: coiners can donate to the PAC in tethers. All they have to do is send them via an opaque Nevada trust structure to hide the origins of the funds. And this is perfectly legal! [FPPC, PDF, p. 85, “nonmonetary items”]

Ahead of the SEC’s deadline to rule on a bitcoin ETF, Barry Silbert, CEO of Digital Currency, has quietly stepped down from the board of DCG subsidiary and ETF applicant Grayscale and is no longer chairman, according to a recent SEC filing. Silbert will be replaced by Mark Shifke, the current DCG senior vice president of operations. US regulators are suing DCG over the Gemini Earn program co-run by its subsidiary Genesis. [Form 8-K]

Ordinals are an exciting new way to create NFTs on bitcoin! ’Cos who doesn’t want that? The bitcoin blockchain immediately clogged when it was actually used for stuff. Now TON, the blockchain that is totally not Telegram’s, no, no no, has ordinals — and it’s getting clogged too. [The Block]

Image: Mark Karpeles with aggrieved bitcoin trader outside Mt. Gox in Tokyo in 2014.

Posted on by Amy Castor 1

Bitcoin goes up! Can 5 billion unbacked tethers kickstart a fresh crypto bubble?

Bitcoin is over $44,000! By complete coincidence, Tether has printed five billion USDT in the past month out of thin air as “loans.”

In its attempts to explain number go up, the mainstream press keeps repeating crypto talking points — a bitcoin ETF is coming soon, and all the crime is behind us now — without mentioning Tether! David and I break down what’s behind the current pump — and why the crypto talking points are absolute rubbish.  

This one is on David’s blog. [David Gerard]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

New York vs DCG/Genesis and Gemini: Kids, kids, you’re both ugly

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

  • Send us money! Here’s Amy’s Patreon, and here’s David’s. Sign up today!
  • If you like this article, please forward it to just one other person. Thank you!

The New York Attorney General is suing crypto investment fund Genesis, its parent company Digital Currency Group (DCG), and the Gemini crypto exchange for defrauding customers of Gemini’s Earn investment product. [Press release; complaint, PDF]

Earn put investors’ money into Genesis — where it evaporated.

The lawsuit also charges former Genesis CEO Soichiro (a.k.a. Michael) Moro and DCG founder and CEO Barry Silbert for trying to conceal $1.1 billion in crypto losses with an incredibly dubious promissory note.

New York is asking the court to stop all three companies’ business in “securities or commodities” in the state. That’s all but a death sentence — bitcoin is a commodity in the US.

The SEC was already suing both Gemini and Genesis over the Gemini Earn product because it looked an awful lot like a securities offering. Separately, Gemini sued DCG in July 2023 — and just last week, Gemini also sued Genesis to reclaim missing funds. [Adversary complaint, PDF]

What happened?

Three Arrows Capital (3AC) crashed on June 13, 2022, and blew a gaping hole in Genesis’ loan book. DCG scribbled an IOU to shuffle an imaginary $1.1 billion of value into Genesis reserves.

This financial styrofoam filler didn’t save Genesis, which ultimately halted all withdrawals on November 16, 2022, just days after FTX/Alameda declared bankruptcy. Genesis filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 19, 2023.

The NYAG says that Genesis and Gemini defrauded more than 230,000 Earn investors of more than $1 billion total, including at least 29,000 New Yorkers. New York says that thousands more lost money because of DCG’s actions.

The NYAG claims that:

  • Genesis and Gemini lied to investors about Earn and Genesis’ credit-worthiness;
  • Genesis lied to Gemini that it was solvent;
  • DCG and Gemini lied to the public, including investors, about the promissory note;
  • Earn is an unregistered security under New York’s Martin Act.

This is a complaint we recommend you read. We all knew some of what went on between Genesis, DCG, and Gemini, but this suit goes into great detail about what happened behind the scenes.

This is a civil complaint, not a criminal indictment — but the NYAG describes several crimes being committed, particularly by DCG, Genesis, Moro, and Silbert.

How Earn worked

Gemini, owned by Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss, and Genesis Capital, a subsidiary of DCG, partnered to launch the Gemini Earn program in February 2021 — just as bitcoin’s number was going up really fast. Crypto was a hot product!

Gemini and Genesis marketed Earn to the public as a “high-yield investment program” — which is just coincidentally a common marketing term used by Ponzi schemes. 

Earn promised to pay up to 8% yield. Ordinary investors could deposit their crypto via the Gemini exchange. You could get your money back anytime!

Earn was a pass-through fund to Genesis. Retailers put their crypto in Earn. Gemini then handed the funds off to Genesis, who then lent the money to institutional investors, notably crypto hedge fund 3AC in Singapore. Genesis was substantially a 3AC feeder fund — of which there were many.

When Earn investors wanted to withdraw their funds, Genesis had five days to return the principal and the interest, minus Gemini’s agent fee.

Gemini earned more than $22 million in agent fees for running Earn, plus more than $10 million in commissions when investors bought crypto on Gemini to put into Earn.

Paper thin

3AC was Genesis’ second largest borrower. 3AC had borrowed $1 billion of crypto at 8% to 15% interest, secured by $500 million of illiquid crypto tokens.

Genesis hadn’t received audited financial statements from 3AC since July 2020. But with interest rates like that, why worry — it’ll be fine, right?

It wasn’t fine. 3AC fell over on June 13, 2022, losing Genesis $1 billion. Babel Finance, another Genesis borrower, fell over on June 17, losing Genesis another $100 million — because in June 2022, everyone was falling over.

Genesis was $1.1 billion in the red — it didn’t have the funds to pay back Earn investors. Between mid-June and July 2022, Silbert and other DCG officers met with Genesis management to work out how to fill the hole in Genesis’ balance sheets — and what to tell counterparties such as Gemini.

One problem was that some of the collateral for 3AC’s loan was GBTC shares, issued by another DCG subsidiary, Grayscale — which Genesis couldn’t sell, due to restrictions on sales of stock by “affiliates” of the issuing company.

Silbert told the board of DCG that Genesis was anticipating a run on the bank if word got out. So DCG began casting about for financing. Silbert also suggested to the DCG board on June 14, 2022, that they “jettison” Genesis.

But DCG and Genesis decided instead to act like everything was fine. On June 15, Genesis told everyone its “business is operating normally.” Two days later, Genesis CEO Michael Moro posted in a tweet reviewed and edited by DCG: “We have shed the risk and moved on.” [Twitter, archive; Twitter, archive]

Everything was not fine. The 3AC hole meant that Genesis’ loss exceeded its total equity, and Genesis couldn’t pay out Earn investors. Genesis hadn’t “shed the risk and moved on” — it still had the gaping hole in its balance sheet. It was not “operating normally” — it was floundering in a panic.

Genesis was unable to find anyone to lend them the money they needed, so they had to find a way to paper the hole before the end of the quarter.

The solution: DCG would make a loan from its right pocket to its left pocket and count the loan as an asset.

(When Tether and Bitfinex tried to pull the exact same trick a few years earlier, the NYAG fined them $18.5 million and kicked them out of the state.)

So on June 30 — the last day of Q2 2022 — DCG gave its wholly-owned subsidiary Genesis a promissory note for $1.1 billion. DCG would pay it back in ten years at 1% interest.

Both Silbert and Moro signed off on the IOU. The note was, of course, not secured by anything.

DCG never sent Genesis a penny — the note was only ever meant to be a $1.1 billion accounting entry so that Genesis and DCG could tell the world that Genesis was “well-capitalized” and that DCG had “absorbed the losses” and “assumed certain liabilities of Genesis.”

None of this was true. DCG wasn’t obligated to pay anything on the note for 10 years. And Genesis was still out $1.1 billion of actual funds.

Michael Patchen, Genesis’ newly appointed chief risk officer, said in internal documents that the promissory note “wreaks havoc on our balance sheet impacting everything we do.” 

Genesis directed staff not to disclose the promissory note to Genesis’ creditors, such as Gemini. Many Genesis staff didn’t even know about the promissory note until months later.

DCG’s piggy bank

DCG made Genesis’ problems even worse by treating Genesis like its own personal piggy bank. 

In early 2022, DCG “borrowed” more than $800 million from Genesis in four separate loans. When $100 million of this came due in July, DCG forced Genesis to extend the maturity date — and DCG still hasn’t paid a penny of it to date.

A DCG executive told a Genesis managing director on July 25, 2022, that DCG “literally [did not] have the money right now” to repay the loan. Genesis had no choice — the managing director replied: “it sounds like we don’t have much room to push back, so we will do what DCG needs us to do.” DCG also dictated the interest rate for this loan.

Around June 18, 2022, DCG borrowed 18,697 BTC (worth $355 million at the time) from Genesis. It partially paid this back on November 10, 2022 — with $250 million worth of GBTC! — but this still left Genesis with no cash to pay back its own creditors. And it still couldn’t liquidate the GBTC. 

It’s hard to consider the deals between Genesis, DCG, and Grayscale as anything like arm’s length — it was a single conglomerate’s internal paper-shuffling.

On November 2, CoinDesk reported that FTX, one of the largest crypto exchanges, was inflating its balance sheet with worthless FTT tokens. The report brought FTX tumbling down, and FTX filed for bankruptcy on November 11, 2022.

Around November 12, 2022, Genesis sought an emergency loan of $750 million to $1 billion from a third party due to a “liquidity crunch.” Its efforts were unsuccessful. On November 16, Genesis halted redemptions.

If you owe Gemini a billion dollars, then Gemini has a problem

Gemini Earn investors were supposed to be able to get their funds back at any time. This meant that those funds had to be highly liquid. Gemini told investors it was monitoring the financial situation at Genesis. 

Gemini absolutely failed to do this. They lied to investors, and they hid material information. 

Gemini got regular financial reports from Genesis. Gemini’s internal risk analyses showed that Genesis’ loan book was undercollateralized for Earn’s entire operating existence. But Gemini told Earn customers that Genesis had more than enough money to cover their loans.

Starting in 2021, Genesis’ financial situation went from bad to worse. In February 2022, after analyzing Genesis’ Q3 2021 financials, Gemini internally rated Genesis capital as CCC-grade — speculative junk — with a high chance of default.

Gemini also found out that Genesis had a massive loan to Alameda — secured by FTT tokens! The same illiquid FTX internal supermarket loyalty card points that were discovered by Ian Allison at CoinDesk to make up about one-third of Alameda’s alleged reserves.

Even after Genesis recalled $2 billion in loans from Alameda, the crypto lender was still full of loans to affiliates, including its own parent company DCG. 

In June 2022, the crypto markets crashed and burned. But Gemini continued to reassure investors that it was safe to feed money to Genesis via Earn.

This was apparently fine when it came to someone else’s money, but according to the complaint: 

During this same period, Gemini risk management personnel withdrew their own investments from Earn. A Gemini Senior Risk Associate working on Earn withdrew his entire remaining Earn investment — totaling over $4,000 — between June 26, 2022, and September 5, 2022.

Likewise, Gemini’s Chief Operations Officer [Noah Perlman], who also sat on Gemini’s Enterprise Risk Management Committee, withdrew his entire remaining Earn investment — totaling more than $100,000 — on June 16 and June 17, 2022.  

This was when DCG tried to paper over the hole in Genesis’ balance sheet with a $1.1 billion IOU.

Gemini realized things weren’t good at Genesis, but it’s not clear that they realized how bad they were — not helped by Genesis lying to Gemini about their true condition.

From June to November 2022, Genesis would send Gemini false statements on their financial condition — for instance, saying that the DCG promissory note could be converted to actual cash within a year, when in fact, it was a 10-year note. 

Gemini didn’t tell investors that Genesis was in trouble. Instead, they thought they’d “educate clients on the potential losses” and “properly set clients’ expectations.”

When the Gemini board was advised of Genesis’ financial state in July 2022, one board member compared Genesis debt-to-equity ratio to Lehman Brothers before it collapsed.

Gemini tried and failed to extricate itself from Genesis. They just could not get the funds back. But they knew that Genesis operated as a closely controlled sockpuppet of DCG, and they wanted Silbert to make good on Genesis’ debt. 

As things at Genesis got worse, Gemini worked out how to break the news to Earn creditors.

On September 2, 2022, Gemini finally decided to terminate Earn. On October 13, Genesis formally terminated the Earn agreements and demanded the return of all investor funds. 

On October 20, 2022, Silbert met with Cameron Winklevoss of Gemini. Silbert said that Gemini was Genesis’ largest and most important source of capital — meaning that Genesis could not redeem Earn investors’ funds without Genesis declaring bankruptcy.

Gemini quietly granted Genesis multiple extensions to return investor funds.

On October 28, 2022, Silbert finally let Genesis tell Gemini the true terms of the promissory note — just two weeks before Gemini cut off withdrawals.

For some reason neither we nor the NYAG can fathom, Gemini cointinued to take investors’ money and put it into Earn right up to the end!

Customer service

Gemini didn’t do anything so upsetting for Earn investors as to tell them about Genesis’ unfortunate condition — even as Gemini’s own staff closed out their positions in Earn.

One customer wrote to Gemini on June 16, 2022, three days after 3AC collapsed, asking if any of their funds were with 3AC. Gemini didn’t answer the question, but replied with vague reassurances about Genesis’ trustworthiness.

Another wrote on June 27, 2022: “with other exchanges like Celsius and Blockfi I am concerned about Gemini. Does Gemini have any similar vulnerabilities? … liquidity vulnerabilities? … risky investments/loans that would risk my assets or cause Gemini to halt withdrawals?”

Gemini responded: “Gemini is partnering with accredited third party borrowers including Genesis, who are vetted through a risk management framework which reviews our partners’ collateralization management process.”

This investor was sufficiently reassured to send in another $1,000.

A third customer wrote on July 24, 2022, asking specifically if Gemini was involved in any of the “drama” around 3AC and if it impacted Earn. Gemini said they weren’t involved in anything regarding 3AC — even as the 3AC crash had in fact blown out Earn.

The consequences

The NYAG is asking the court that all three companies be permanently banned from dealing in “securities or commodities” in New York — e.g., bitcoin.

Some of the press coverage noted this provision — but didn’t notice that it would be a near death sentence for a crypto business. DCG’s profitable Grayscale business would have to leave New York or be sold off. Gemini would be kicked out of the state.

New York is also seeking restitution for the victims and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.

Also, they all get fined $2,000 each. It’s possible that bit of the General Business Law could do with an update.

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

Crypto collapse: Venture capital goes home, Coinbase, Tether backing, FTX sues Hollywood VCs, 3AC on the beach

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“My survey of three card monte tables suggests they’ve always got at least one patron but you won’t see anyone playing at the big casinos which just shows the system is rigged.”

— crossestman

Crypto’s not dead! Look, it’s still twitching

Crypto venture capital investments have gone full crypto collapse, from $21.6 billion in 2022 to just $0.5 billion so far in 2023. This Fortune article includes the funniest graph of the week: [Fortune, archive]

Investors are leaving the crypto sector without any plans to return. [Bloomberg] 

Crypto trading is at its lowest level since October 2020. The Block puts the volume for May 2023 at $424 billion. For comparison, May 2021 was $4.25 trillion and May 2022 was $1.4 trillion. [The Block]

Volume numbers are considerably less if you take into account that unregulated crypto exchanges are known for faking their volumes. Crypto trading is all but dead. We know this because exchanges run by normal finance guys don’t see any trading. [Bloomberg]

Traditional finance groups want to start their own crypto exchanges run in a non-clown-shoes manner. A nice ambition — but that was Gemini’s pitch and even they still had to resort to risky garbage. [FT] 

The Winklevoss twins marketed Gemini as an exchange that played by the rules — one that serious money people could trust. But after the failure of FTX and the Genesis bankruptcy — in which Gemini is the largest creditor — they lost that trust. Maybe they could pivot to AI? [Bloomberg] 

Crypto.com halted services for institutional traders in the US on June 21. The exchange cited “limited demand” as the reason. [news.bitcoin.com]

The rest of crypto is also desperate. Reddit founder Alexis Ohanian is still pushing play-to-earn games and touts Axie Infinity as a huge success. Gamers hate play-to-earn and think it’s vacuous horse hockey. [Twitter, archive]

Universe.xyz is the latest NFT market to shut down, taking all the images on the site with it. As more NFT markets shut down, your apes are in danger of going blank forever. [Twitter, archive]

TechMonitor asks: “Is crypto finally dead?” We should be so lucky. With quotes from David. [TechMonitor] 

Coinbase: We didn’t do it, nobody saw us, and it wasn’t even a thing

Coinbase has responded to the SEC’s complaint with 177 pages of chaff. [Doc 22, PDF]

Paragraph 2 makes the claim that in approving Coinbase’s original S-1, the SEC approved Coinbase’s business. Let’s quote again this line from the S-1, signed off by Brian Armstrong: [SEC]

Neither the Securities and Exchange Commission nor any other regulatory body has approved or disapproved of these securities or passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of this prospectus. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offense.

Coinbase argues that Congress is looking into cryptos, therefore existing laws don’t matter. Paul Grewal, Coinbase’s general counsel, has told Bloomberg how Coinbase’s big hope is that new laws will save their backsides. This is correct — Rep McHenry’s new crypto markets bill is indeed Coinbase’s only hope. [Bloomberg]

Coinbase claims that with this complaint, the SEC is working well outside its remit and that its ideas about whether crypto tokens are securities are entirely novel. Never mind the SEC’s repeated wins in court whenever a crypto issuer is dumb enough to take the matter that far. [Doc 23, PDF; CoinDesk]

Earlier, Coinbase filed a writ of mandamus demanding that the SEC consider its proposal for new crypto regulations. The SEC says it’ll have something to report within 120 days. Judge Cheryl Ann Krause expects a decision on Coinbase’s proposal from the regulator by October 11. [Doc 30, PDF; Doc 32, PDF]  

Tether: Yes! We have no Chinese commercial paper

CoinDesk finally got access to documents from the New York Attorney General related to Tether’s reserves from March 31, 2021. [CoinDesk; CoinDesk, PDF; CoinDesk, PDF; CoinDesk, PDF; CoinDesk, PDF; Bloomberg]  

The NYAG claimed that Tether had been lying about its reserves — which it had been. Tether and Bitfinex settled with New York for $18.5 million in February 2021.

The settlement required Tether to publish a breakdown of its reserves quarterly for two years. But what the public got to see in May 2021 were two skimpy pie charts, showing where Tether had parked its alleged $41 billion in backing reserves at the time. [Tether, archive]

CoinDesk then filed a Freedom of Information request for the fully detailed version of Tether’s report to the NYAG on its reserves.

Tether fought the release of the documents for two years. In February, they lost in court and decided not to go ahead with an appeal. So the NYAG sent Coindesk the documents on June 15. New York also sent the same documents to Bloomberg and Decrypt.

In June and July 2022, Tether vigorously denied that it held money in Chinese commercial paper — loans to Chinese companies which most money market funds avoid. It also said in September 2021 that it had no debt or securities linked to Evergrande, a cash-strapped Chinese real estate company. [Tether, 2022; Tether, 2022; CoinDesk, 2021]

Bloomberg called out Tether’s wider claims of no involvement in Chinese commercial paper as nonsense. [Bloomberg, 2021]

It turns out that Tether did hold Chinese commercial paper in 2021, and quite a lot of it. It held securities issued from banks around the world — but mainly China, including debt issued by the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China. ChainArgos took a close look at the funds and put together a spreadsheet. [Google Docs]

The Tether press releases on the FOIed docs are a hoot. Lots of table pounding. [Tether, archive; Tether, archive]

We give CoinDesk a bit of stick from time to time. But we also read the site every day and follow the livewire feed. They get all the credit for doggedly pursuing this one.

FTX versus the venture capitalists to the stars

John Jay Ray’s team at FTX seems to have found some more truly fascinating documents. FTX is suing venture capital firm K5 Global, its managers, Michael Kives and Bryan Baum, and various related entities to recover the $700 million that Sam Bankman-Fried put into the firm.

Kives worked at Creative Artists Agency from 2003 to 2018 as a Hollywood talent agent. He left in 2018 to found K5.

In February 2022, SBF attended a dinner party at Kives’ house, with A-list celebrities, billionaires, and politicians. He was deeply impressed with Kives’ “infinite connections” and even contemplated that Kives could work with FTX on “electoral politics.”

Less than three weeks later, SBF signed a “term sheet” agreeing to give Kives and Baum $125 million each personally and to invest billions of dollars into K5 over three years: 

The Term Sheet was little more than a cursory list of investment ideas, and repeatedly stated that the actual “mechanics” of these very substantial investments would be later worked out “in the long form documents.” 

SBF wired $300 million to K5 the next day. No due diligence was done on any of the deals — including $214.5 million for a 38% stake in MBK Capital LP Series T, whose gross asset value was just $2.94 million as of March 2022.

K5 were very close advisors. Kives and Baum joined FTX’s internal Slack chat. SBF reserved a room for them in his Bahamas luxury apartment. In May, Alameda transferred another $200 million to K5.

Sam didn’t worry too much about the fine details. In an August 2022 internal document, he wrote that “Bryan is ~100% aligned with FTX,” that “FTX is aligned with Bryan too,” and that “if there are significant artificial up-downs between FTX and K5 as entities, I’m happy to just true it up with cash estimates.”

SBF wrote that he was:

… aligned with Bryan and K5, and treats $1 to it as $1 to FTX even though we only own 33%, because whatever, we can always true up cash if needed, but also, who cares … There are logistical, PR, regulatory, etc reasons to not just merge K5 100% into FTX but I and Bryan will both act how we would if they were merged.

… Is Bryan an FTX employee, or a random 3rd party? The answer, really, is neither. The answer is that it’s sorta complicated and liminal and unclear. Bryan lives in the uncanny valley.

FTX and Alameda employees flagged K5’s “pretty bizarre” expenses at the time, such as “over $777k in design expenses” that had been billed to Alameda.

FTX wants the $700 million back as having been avoidable transfers. It may want even more money, as Ray’s team suspects that more interesting details will come out in discovery. FTX also wants K5’s claims in the bankruptcy disallowed until this matter is resolved. [Adversary Case, PDF]

More news from Chapter 11

Cameron Winklevoss tweeted yet another open letter to Barry Silbert of Digital Currency Group on July 4, demanding back Gemini Earn customers’ money. Winklevoss accuses DCG of “fraudulent behavior” and wants them to do the “right thing” and hand over $1.465 billion of dollars, bitcoin, and ether. If Silbert doesn’t pay up, Winklevoss threatens to sue on Friday, July 7. CoinDesk, which is owned by DCG, couldn’t get a comment from their own proprietor on the story. [Twitter, archive; CoinDesk]

After the deal for Binance.US to buy Voyager Digital fell through, Voyager gave up trying to sell itself and is liquidating. Here’s the liquidation notice. [Doc 1459, PDF]  

Celsius is finally converting its altcoins to BTC and ETH as it pursues its plan to relaunch with the auction-winning consortium Fahrenheit. [CoinDesk]  

If you have vastly too much time on your hands, here’s the full Celsius Network auction transcript — all 256 pages of it. [Doc 2748, PDF]

Customers of the bankrupt US branch of the Bittrex crypto exchange — which is being sued by the SEC — can withdraw those holdings that are clearly theirs … whatever that means. [CoinDesk]  

Three Arrows Capital: What Su and Kyle did next

Crypto was taken out in 2022 by a one-two punch of Terra-Luna collapsing in May and then crypto hedge fund Three Arrows Capital collapsing in June.

Other crypto firms had invested in Terra-Luna and 3AC because they paid the highest interest rates! Now, you might think that investment firms would know that high interest means high risk.

3AC’s two founders, Su Zhu and Kyle Davies, just shut their office door in Singapore in late May 2022 and skipped the country, leaving their staff to tell investors the bad news.

What did Zhu and Davies do next? They spent the summer traveling around Asia, went surfing, and played video games. Davies is currently in Dubai and Zhu is back living in Singapore. [NYT]

Zhu and Davies insist they must have done nothing wrong because no government has filed charges yet. Uh huh.

3AC’s creditors think Zhu and Davies have done one or two things wrong. Teneo, the liquidator trying to clean up the 3AC mess, wants the pair fined $10,000 a day for contempt, saying that Davies has failed to respond to a subpoena. [CoinDesk]

The pair are suing Mike Dudas, the original founder of crypto media outlet The Block, for defamation. In the US, LOL. They allege Dudas said nasty things about their new crypto venture OPNX, though the suit doesn’t say what allegedly defamatory claims Dudas made. We expect the 3AC boys to have some trouble demonstrating they have a reputation to malign. Stephen Palley is representing Dudas. [CoinDesk]

Regulatory clarity

In the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Bill has passed. One part of this gives the Treasury greater powers to regulate crypto, likely via the Financial Conduct Authority. We should expect more detailed regulations within a year. [CoinDesk]

This comes not before time. UK losses to crypto fraud increased more than 40% to surpass £300 million (USD$373 million), according to Action Fraud, the national reporting center for fraud and cybercrime. [FT] 

Europe’s MiCA is now law from the end of June 2023. It goes into application in one year for stablecoins and in 18 months for general crypto assets and virtual asset service providers. [EUR-Lex]  

The European Central Bank keeps talking about doing a CBDC. This is good news for crypto! Or maybe it isn’t: [ECB]

Policymakers should be wary of supporting an industry that has so far produced no societal benefits and is increasingly trying to integrate into the traditional financial system, both to acquire legitimacy as part of that system and to piggyback on it.

The CFTC Division of Clearing and Risk sent out a staff advisory to registered derivatives clearing organizations on May 30, reminding them of the risks associated with expanding the scope of their activities. It specifically addressed crypto. [CFTC]

When the CFTC points out that market shenanigans are illegal in crypto just like they are in regular commodities, keep in mind that Avi Eisenberg is finally going to trial for allegedly committing those precise market shenanigans in DeFi. These are real go-to-jail crimes. [Bloomberg; Schedule, PDF; Case docket]  

The Thailand SEC has banned crypto lending that pays returns to investors. It now also requires crypto trading firms to post the following warning: “Cryptocurrencies are high risk. Please study and understand the risks of cryptocurrencies thoroughly. because you may lose the entire amount invested.” [SEC Thailand, in Thai]

New York has settled with CoinEx after suing them in February for failing to register as a securities exchange. The company has to stop operating in the US — not just New York — return $1.1 million to investors, and pay $600,000 in penalties. [NYAG; Stipulation and consent, PDF]

The ETF trick will surely work this time

Guys, guys, the Blackrock and Fidelity bitcoin ETFs will change everything! They’re going to get surveillance of trading and market data from somewhere! This will surely answer all of the SEC’s previous objections to bitcoin ETFs! The market will be delighted!

… oh. The SEC has found these applications inadequate. [WSJ]  

Blackrock and Fidelity are going to try again with Coinbase as the exchange supplying market surveillance. [CoinDesk]  

But the trouble with monitoring at Coinbase is that Coinbase isn’t where the market is — the bitcoin market is at Binance. That’s where price discovery happens.

We expect these ETF applications to go no further than all the previous bitcoin ETF applications.

The good news for bitcoin continues its monotonous patter

Binance senior staff have been jumping ship. General counsel Han Ng, chief strategy officer Patrick Hillmann, and SVP for compliance Steven Christie all resigned this week. They specifically left over CZ’s response to the ongoing Department of Justice investigation. [Fortune]

Binance.US’s market share has dropped to 1%, down from a record 27% in April. Is Binance giving up on its US exchange? The market share nose-dived after the SEC sued Binance in June. [WSJ]  

Fortune favors the internal trading desk: Crypto.com has been caught trading directly against its own customers. Dirty Bubble spotted the job ads for a proprietary trading desk at the firm in November 2022, of course. [FT, archive; Twitter, archive]  

Russia is giving up on the idea of a unified state-run crypto exchange. Instead, it’s focusing on regulation for multiple exchanges. Russia is continuing to promote crypto as a way to evade sanctions for making international payments. When you’ve devastated your economy by embarking upon a very stupid war, that’s … a strategy? [Izvestia, Russian]

In crypto collapse news from the distant past, something’s happened in Quadriga! The government of British Columbia is seeking forfeiture of $600,000 in cash, gold bars, and Rolex watches that QuadrigaCX cofounder Michael Patryn has in a safe deposit box. The RCMP alleges the items are the proceeds of unlawful activity. [Vancouver Sun]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

Reggie Fowler, Bitfinex/Tether money mule, sentenced to 6 years in prison 

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard
  • If you like our work, become a patron! Here’s Amy’s Patreon, and here’s David’s. Sign up today! 

Arizona businessman and sports investor Reggie Fowler spent decades talking himself out of sticky situations. But in a Manhattan courtroom on June 5, reality finally caught up to him.

US District Judge Andrew Carter sentenced Fowler, who is 64 years old, to 6 years and 3 months in prison for his role in hiding cryptocurrency transactions on behalf of shadow banking operation Crypto Capital and the disappearance of hundreds of millions of dollars. Fowler will surrender in Phoenix at 10 a.m. on June 30, giving him three weeks to get his affairs in order and rehome his dog.

Inner City Press attended the sentencing. [Twitter; Inner City Press; SDNY press release]

Fowler has agreed to pay $53 million in restitution to the defunct Alliance of American Football (AAF), an alternative football league that he defrauded as one of its investors. Inner City Press tells us that the judge also ordered Fowler to forfeit the full $740 million prosecutors had asked for, dismissing Fowler’s argument that this was so high as to violate the 8th Amendment. [Order of restitution, PDF; Order of forfeiture of property, PDF]

Fowler’s crypto frauds were the beginning of the more recent frauds in the crypto space, and the failures of the Silvergate and Signature banks, prosecutors said in court.

“I have harmed the people of the AAF and my family,” sobbed Fowler. “I am embarrassed and ashamed.” Poor fellow.

Just a little off the top

Crypto Capital was a Panama-incorporated money transmitter that served as a shadow bank for many US and Canadian crypto exchanges, including Bitfinex and the failed QuadrigaCX — because they had enormous trouble getting proper banks to talk to them.

Throughout 2018, Fowler was Crypto Capital’s US contact. He set up a network of bank accounts in the US and abroad so that Crypto Capital could process payments for its customers without worrying about all those tedious anti-money-laundering laws. 

Fowler lied to the banks, telling them that the accounts were for his real estate business. His scheme ran internationally and received over $740 million just in 2018. Most of this was Bitfinex customer money. A “Master US Workbook” listed more than 60 bank accounts around the world, which totaled over $345 million by January 2019. [Decrypt]

Fowler didn’t worry too much about separating Crypto Capital or Bitfinex money from his own funds. He and his co-conspirators set up a “10% Fund,” skimming from client deposits for themselves.

In the original indictment, and again at today’s sentencing, prosecutors detailed “additional criminal conduct” Fowler seemed to be involved in — though he wasn’t charged on these.

Fowler allegedly tried many times to get bank loans using fraudulent bond certificates, valued in the billions, as collateral. He tried to use funds from the Crypto Capital scheme as collateral for loans. He was caught with $14,000 in sheets of counterfeit $100 notes right there in his office.

Fowler was arrested in Chandler, Arizona, on April 19, 2019.

Prosecutors piled on more charges in a superseding indictment in February 2020 after they discovered Fowler had been using Crypto Capital money to fund the AAF. That funding fell through after the Department of Justice seized $68 million from Fowler’s bank accounts at HSBC in late 2018.

Fowler, who had fumbled an opportunity for a plea deal in January 2020, pleaded guilty to all five counts against him in April 2022, throwing himself at the mercy of the court. He has remained out of jail since his initial arrest on $5 million bail. 

A respectable businessman of flawless repute

Fowler’s lawyer Ed Sapone wrote a letter to the judge on April 10 asking for clemency for his client — that is, no jail time at all.

Sapone argued that Fowler had lived a hard life, growing up in the South without parental support, and had never broken the law before. At least not in any way that landed him behind bars. [Doc 124, PDF]

Never mind that Fowler was a fully-grown 59-year-old man at the time of his crimes with a long career as a (cough) sharp businessman behind him.

Sapone also neglected to mention that Fowler had been sued 36 times in the past, mainly for just not paying people — and had even stiffed his previous lawyers in this very case for $600,000. [ESPN, 2005] 

In a sentencing submission, prosecutors said that they didn’t appreciate that Fowler had blown $200,000 gambling in casinos since his guilty plea, rather than using those funds to pay back his victims. [Doc 125, PDF]

Prosecutors also noted that in December 2016, Fowler was stopped at the Canadian border with items associated with a “black money scam” — a scheme where a con artist claims to have stacks of US bills dyed black to avoid detection. The bills will come clean if you just purchase this expensive “special chemical.”

Hard work and perseverance

Fowler’s story reads like an episode of American Greed — where money seduces and power corrupts.

Before his path crossed that of Crypto Capital, Fowler’s main business was Spiral Inc. — a holding company for about a hundred different businesses, including ice rinks, car washes, and a foam food tray manufacturer company. Most of the businesses were located between Arizona and Colorado.   

Fowler was also a pilot and owned two jets — a Cessna Citation CJ2 and a CJ3, which he flew for business and loaned out.

He touched many lives including friends in the sports world and those who depended on him for their livelihood. Because Amy wrote about Fowler regularly, people who knew him contacted her. Sources described Fowler as well-read, charming, and a “fantastic salesperson, overbearing and confident.” He was not a gambler, at least not before his indictment, said a source. He never drank and worked out at the gym religiously.

What Fowler was not good at, however, was shedding businesses that were dogs — like his “Shammy Man” carwashes in Arizona, which he co-owned with a partner who served time in federal prison — or putting money into the ones that were doing well.

His firm Styro-Tech in Denver was making money hand over fist, but Fowler couldn’t seem to invest in better equipment and he was always hiring illegal immigrants cheap. “He could never pay anybody what they were worth,” said one source. “I don’t know how many times he got caught hiring illegals.”

Football obsessed

Fowler was a football player in his youth and remained an obsessive fan. His obsession with the game played no small part in his downfall.

He kept a Cincinnati Bengals helmet in his office and gave people the impression that he had played professionally for the Bengals — though he had only attended training camp.

In 2005, Fowler tried to purchase the Minnesota Vikings from Red McCombs in a $600 million deal. “He was 100 percent committed to getting it done,” McCombs said. “He was very straightforward. He said, ‘I am going to buy your football team.’” Fowler would have been the NFL’s first Black owner. [LA Times, 2005]

But the deal led to financial scrutiny, and the Star Tribune uncovered several outright lies in Fowler’s resume, so Fowler pursued a limited partnership instead. The cash he put up for the 3% ownership in the Vikings got him into financial trouble. [Minnesota Public Radio, 2005]

Things went from bad to worse, and Fowler went deeper into debt. He refinanced Spiral in 2006, landing him $65 million in debt. The credit crisis followed in 2008, and Spiral never recovered. By 2013, the company was in receivership, and Fowler lost control of all his businesses. By October 2014, Fowler no longer had a stake in the Vikings. [Resolute, 2022; Star Tribune, 2014]

At some point over the following years, a debt-saddled Fowler crossed paths with the people at Crypto Capital — Oz Yosef and his sister Ravid. The Yosefs were both later indicted for their part in Fowler’s fraud, but remain at large.

Crypto had an interesting year in 2017. Bitfinex, the largest crypto exchange at the time, lost its ties to the traditional banking system when its Taiwanese banks were cut off from correspondent banking by Wells Fargo. Short of real dollars, and trying to recover from a $72 million hack in 2016, Bitfinex and its sister company, stablecoin issuer Tether, began pumping out tethers at a pace unlike anything before — frequently with no dollars backing them at all. (Just like the salty nocoiners told you at the time.)

Fueled by these unbacked fake dollars pouring into the crypto markets, the price of bitcoin climbed to new highs. A year later, Fowler found himself in control of bank accounts with hundreds of millions of dollars flowing through them. And then football called to him again. 

AAF: the Fyre Festival of football

Alternative football leagues have a long history of dismal failure. In 2017, TV producer Charles Ebersol came up with an idea for a springtime football league that would be a feeder for the National Football League.

Somehow “millions” of fans would have an interest in watching football after the Super Bowl. The Alliance of American Football would even come with a killer app that promised to change sports gambling as we know it.

Ebersol and AAF co-founder Bill Polian, an NFL executive, attracted some seed capital. In June 2018, Willie Lanier, a former Super Bowl champion, introduced Ebersol to Fowler. Fowler offered to be a lead investor, committing $170 million — a $50 million line of equity and a $120 million line of credit. Prosecutors wrote in their letter to the court:

During a June 2018 meeting with AAF executives, including AAF co-founder Charlie Ebersol, Fowler showed the AAF corporate team printouts of bank account information purporting to show that Fowler had hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign bank accounts. Fowler would not let anyone take the printouts after the meeting. Fowler told Ebersol that Fowler’s wealth, which he said was largely in cash, came from real estate holdings and an aviation business that built drones in Germany for U.S. Government contracts. During an October 2018 meeting, one of Ebersol’s associates took a picture of a bank account printout that Fowler presented. That printout showed roughly $60 million in an HSBC account. 

That HSBC account would be one of the accounts that was frozen by the Department of Justice in that very month.

Ebersol claims in an affidavit that he did his due diligence on Fowler — though clearly he did not. All Eberson would have had to do was look up all the multiple lawsuits against Fowler. Peter Thiel also invested in AAF through his Founders Fund.

The league kicked off in February 2019 — with eight teams and more than 400 players — but after eight weeks of play, the dream unraveled when Fowler missed a $28 million payment  because all his money had been frozen. [Affidavit, PDF; CNBC, 2018]

The AAF disintegrated into the football version of the Fyre Festival. They missed payroll in the first week one, blaming it on a computer glitch. Players had been booted out of their hotels and had to pay cash for their flights back home.

Another investor, Tom Dundon, took over the league, but he soon gave up throwing money into the pit as well. The AAF declared bankruptcy on April 17, 2019 — and multiple lawsuits against its founders ensued. [Twitter, archive; Twitter, archive; Sports Illustrated]

End of the linebacker

What can we learn from Reggie Fowler? Mostly that pigs get fat, but hogs get slaughtered.

Fowler spent decades doing sharp business that didn’t quite get him in trouble with the law. Then he got in a bind and let his hubris do the thinking for him. Like so many in crypto, he found out that this works until it doesn’t.

By the time he gets out of jail, Fowler will be 70. In the four years between his arrest and today’s sentencing, he spent his time just going to work every day. We predict he’ll get out of jail and just get back into running businesses until the day he drops. Hopefully less flagrantly illegal ones.

Posted on by Amy Castor 1

Crypto collapse: Treasury comes after DeFi, SEC comes after crypto exchanges, stablecoin bill, FTX first interim report

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“Please god let FTX go back into business, take a lot of money from crypto rubes, then collapse and lose everything again. Please let there be people who lost money in two separate FTX collapses.”

– Ariong

The Treasury brings good news for DeFi

The US Treasury released its “Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance.” The 42-page report examines DeFi from the perspective of anti-money laundering and sanctions laws. [Press release; Report, PDF] 

This report is not about consumer protection — it’s about national security, sanctions busting, and terrorist financing. The Treasury is not happy:

“The assessment finds that illicit actors, including ransomware cybercriminals, thieves, scammers, and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) cyber actors, are using DeFi services in the process of transferring and laundering their illicit proceeds.

… In particular, this assessment finds that the most significant current illicit finance risk in this domain is from DeFi services that are not compliant with existing AML/CFT obligations.”

The report makes clear: blockchain analysis is not sufficient for KYC/AML. Calling something “decentralized” or a “DAO” doesn’t absolve you of responsibility. And almost everything in DeFi falls squarely in the ambit of existing regulation.

How’s regulatory clarity for crypto? Just fine, thank you:

“Through public statements, guidance, and enforcement actions, these agencies have made clear that the automation of certain functions through smart contracts or computer code does not affect the obligations of financial institutions offering covered services.”

The report recommends “strengthening U.S. AML/CFT supervision and, when relevant, enforcement of virtual asset activities, including DeFi services, to increase compliance by virtual asset firms with BSA obligations” and “enhancing the U.S. AML/CFT regulatory regime by closing any identified gaps in the BSA to the extent that they allow certain DeFi services to fall outside of the BSA’s definition of financial institution.”

Nicholas Weaver tells us the report “should be thought of as being as serious as a heart attack to the DeFi community, as this represents the US government regulation at its most serious. Indeed, the report can be summarized in a sentence: ‘If you want to continue to OFAC around, you are going to find out.’”

The SEC brings good news for Coinbase and DeFi

SEC chair Gary Gensler is fed up with Coinbase blatantly trading unregistered securities and not registering with the SEC as a proper securities exchange. So he’s going to update the rules.

The SEC has reopened the comment period for a proposal, initially issued in January 2022, that would update the definition of an “exchange” in Rule 3b-16 of the Exchange Act. [SEC press release; Fact sheet, PDF; Gensler statements]

Gensler’s comments are laser-targeted at Coinbase — and also DeFi:

“Make no mistake: many crypto trading platforms already come under the current definition of an exchange and thus have an existing duty to comply with the securities laws.”

He reiterates that “the vast majority of crypto tokens are securities” — the SEC’s position since 2017 — so “most crypto platforms today” meet the definition of a securities exchange. He adds:  

“Yet these platforms are acting as if they have a choice to comply with our laws. They don’t. Congress gave the Commission a mandate to protect investors, regardless of the labels or technology used. Investors in the crypto markets must receive the same time-tested protections that the securities laws provide in all other markets.”

A regulatory framework for casino chips

On Saturday, The US House Financial Services Committee published an as-yet-untitled discussion draft bill for regulating stablecoins a few days before a hearing on the topic on Wednesday, April 19. [Discussion draft, PDF; hearing agenda]

The bill refers to stablecoins as “payment stablecoins.” This is utterly hypothetical. Nobody uses stablecoins to buy things. They’re chips for gambling on speculative assets in the crypto casinos.

This bill was a sudden surprise for a lot of people — but it appears to be a version of a draft bill that Senate Banking Committee Ranking Member Pat Toomey (R-PA) was circulating last year. [Stablecoin TRUST Act, 2022]

The bill divides stablecoin issuers into banks and nonbanks. Credit unions and banks that want to issue stablecoins would need approval from the financial regulator they fall under‚ the National Credit Union Administration, the FDIC, or the OCC. Non-bank stablecoin issuers would fall under the Federal Reserve.

For this bill, USDC or Pax Dollars, under the Fed, might pass muster. But Tether would be kicked out of anything touching the US because they wouldn’t be able to meet the transparency or liquidity requirements.  

All stablecoins that circulate in the US would need to be backed by highly liquid assets — actual dollars and short-term treasuries — and redeemable within one day. That doesn’t leave much room for the issuers to turn a profit by putting the deposits in longer-term investments.

Custodia is not a bank under the Bank Holding Act, so for this bill, it would also be considered a non-bank. This bill would derail Custodia’s lawsuit against the Federal Reserve and the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City to try to force a Fed master account out of them.

The bill also calls for a moratorium on new algorithmic stablecoins until a study can be conducted.

Finally, the bill includes a request for federal regulators to study a central bank digital currency (CBDC) issued by the Fed. As we noted previously, FedNow would make a CBDC completely superfluous.

Hilary Allen, a professor of law at American University Washington College of Law, points out important shortcomings in the stablecoin bill. She argues that the bill is stacked in favor of stablecoins, and notes that the bill’s payment stablecoin definition could be a way of avoiding SEC jurisdiction. And while the bill calls for monthly attestations, it doesn’t say anything about full audits for stablecoin reserves. [Twitter]

FTX’s first interim report reads like Quadriga

John Jay Ray III, FTX’s CEO in bankruptcy, released his first interim report on the control failures at FTX and its businesses. Ray documents a shocking level of negligence, lack of record keeping, and complete disregard for cybersecurity at FTX. [Doc 1242, PDF]

The report confirms what we’ve been saying all along: all crypto exchanges behave as much like Quadriga as they can get away with. A few highlights:

  • FTX Group was managed almost exclusively by Sam Bankman-Fried, Nishad Singh, and Gary Wang. The trio had “no experience in risk management or running a business,” and SBF had final say in everything.
  • SBF openly joked about his company’s reckless accounting. In internal docs, he described Alameda as “hilariously beyond any threshold of any auditor being able to even get partially through an audit,” and how “we sometimes find $50m of assets lying around that we lost track of; such is life.”
  • FTX kept virtually all of its assets in hot wallets, live on the internet, as opposed to offline cold wallets, where they would be safe from hackers. 
  • FTX and Alameda also kept private keys to billions of dollars in crypto-assets sitting in AWS’s cloud computing platform.
  • SBF stifled dissent with an iron fist. Ex-FTX US president Brett Harrison quit after a “protracted argument” with Sam over how FTX US was run. Sam cut Harrison’s bonuses, and when “senior internal counsel instructed him to apologize to Bankman-Fried for raising the concerns,” Harrison refused.

Ray and his team have so far recovered $1.4 billion in digital assets and have identified an additional $1.7 billion they are in the process of recovering. (We’re still waiting for him to ask for money back from The Block, but maybe that’s coming.)

In other FTX news, Voyager and FTX and their respective Unsecured Creditors’ Committees have reached an agreement on the money FTX paid to Voyager before FTX filed bankruptcy that FTX wants to claw back now — $445 million in cash will go into escrow while things are sorted out. [Doc 1266, PDF]

Terraform Labs did nothing* wrong

South Korean prosecutors have seized 414.5 billion won ($312 million) in illegal assets linked to nine Terraform Labs execs. None of the assets tied to Do Kwon have been recovered. Kwon converted everything to BTC and moved the funds — worth an estimated 91.4 billion won ($69 million) — to offshore exchanges. [KBS, Korean]  

Who crashed UST in May 2022? Terraform Labs seems to have played no small part. In the three weeks leading up to the collapse, Terraform dumped over 450 million UST on the open market. [Cointelegraph]

Crypto mining: the free lunch is over

A bill limiting benefits and tax incentives for crypto miners in Texas unanimously passed a Senate committee vote and now it’s in the chamber. The bill was sponsored by three Republican state senators. Even they’re sick of the bitcoin miners. [SB 1751, PDF; CoinDesk; Fastdemocracy]

Bitcoin mining doesn’t create jobs — so Sweden has ended the 98% tax relief it gave data centers, including crypto miners. Crypto is outraged. [CoinDesk]

More good news for exchanges

The downfall of peer-to-peer bitcoin exchange Paxful is a comedy goldmine. Paxful cofounders Ray Youssef and Artur Schaback originally blamed Paxful’s closure on staff departures and regulatory challenges — but now they’re turning against each other in court.

As an example of their good judgment, in 2016, the pair drew police attention when they were spotted in Miami aiming an A15 rifle off their penthouse balcony for photo purposes. Former employees allege “favoritism, erratic dismissals, lavish spending on travel and reports of routine cannabis usage on the job by Youssef himself.”

Paxful’s business model was based on price-gouging fees on gift cards, according to one former employee. You want 10 euros worth of bitcoin? That’ll be 20 euros worth of gift cards. Coincidentally, money launderers are usually quite happy to pay fees on the order of 50%. Schaback thinks Paxful is still a viable enterprise. [CBS, 2016; CoinDesk]

As you might expect, OPNX, the new exchange for tokenized crypto debt run by the founders of the failed Three Arrows Capital and CoinFLEX, has gotten off to a feeble start. Trading volume in the first 24 hours was $13.64. [The Block]

The Winklevoss twins made a $100 million loan to Gemini. The move came after Gemini had informally sought funding from outside investors in recent months without coming to any agreements. We can’t find if the loan was in actual dollars or in crypto — or if it was just an IOU. [Bloomberg] 

Binance relinquished the financial services license for its Australian derivatives business, Oztures Trading, after the Australian Securities and Investments Commission said they were likely to suspend it. Customers have until April 21 to close their accounts. [ASIC] 

Who were the unnamed “VIP” traders on Binance mentioned in the CFTC suit? Jane Street, Tower, and Radix. [Bloomberg] 

The Mt. Gox payout window has opened! Slowly. [Mt Gox, PDF; The Block]

Cryptadamus thinks that Crypto.com’s Canadian bank accounts are frozen. [Mastodon]  

Good news for bitcoin

The Ethereum Shanghai upgrade went through on April 12. You can now withdraw your staked ether! As we predicted, there wasn’t a rush for the exits. [CoinDesk]

Bitfinex money mule Reggie Fowler will be sentenced on April 20. His lawyer wrote a lengthy letter to the judge asking for clemency — no jail time — because Fowler lived a hard life and never did anything wrong before. Nothing he was busted in court for, anyway. [Letter, PDF]

Michael Saylor’s MicroStrategy has bought yet more bitcoin, digging itself ever deeper. The company purchased an additional 1,045 BTC for $23.9 million, or an average price of $28,016, between March 23 and April 4. [8-K filing]

Tether got its tendrils into the US dollar system via Signet — former Signature Bank’s real-time payments system. Tether instructed crypto firms to send dollars to its Bahamas-based banking partner Capital Union Bank via Signet. We’re not clear on whether this violated the New York settlement — though if they lied about who they were, it broke banking law. [Bloomberg] 

Cross River Bank, the banking partner of Coinbase and Circle, built its business on buy-now-pay-later (BNPL) and pandemic loans. What could go wrong? [Dirty Bubble] 

With its firm commitment to quality cryptocurrency journalism, CoinDesk is hot on getting into generating its hopium space-filler using AI text generators. [CoinDesk] 

Media stardom

“Ukraine wants to fund its post-war future with crypto” — with quotes from David. [Techmonitor]

“A lot of ordinary people who got into crypto just lost everything in various ways or lost chunks of it,” Gerard said. “And this is a lot of  why I think retail investors should just keep the hell away from crypto.” [Business Insider]  

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

Crypto collapse: Silvergate implosion continues, Signature Bank, Tether lied to banks, Voyager, Celsius

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“I like the Bernie Madoff test: does this have a higher return than Bernie Madoff promised? If so, it’s probably a scam!”

— HappyHippo

Media stardom

Amy wrote about why Bitcoin would rather continue contributing to the destruction of the planet than switch to proof of stake. [MIT Technology Review]

Amy was also quoted in Cointelegraph talking about stablecoins, mostly BUSD. [Cointelegraph]

David did a fun podcast with C. Edward Kelso back in November, about FTX exploding and the ongoing forest fires in the world of pretend nerd money. He also did a video in November with El Podcast. [Anchor.fm; YouTube]

Silvergate’s goose continues cooking

What’s next for crypto’s favorite bank? Will a team of FDIC agents storm Silvergate? The market is expecting an unfriendly resolution. The bank’s stock (NYSE:SI) is 95% down on its one-year price and is still being heavily shorted.

We wrote up Silvergate’s current problems on Thursday. One of the many ways that Silvergate screwed itself over was by putting cash deposits into long-term treasuries. When their panicky crypto customers needed their money, Silvergate had to sell bonds at a loss of $1 billion in Q4 2022. If they had just bought one-month T-bills, they would have been better off — but those don’t pay as much interest. 

Silvergate has paid back its $4.3 billion loan from FHLB-SF, though. [American Banker]

What we still don’t know is who pressured Silvergate to pay back the loan immediately. It’s utterly unclear why they had to liquidate a chunk of mildly underwater securities to pay off FHLB-SF instead of rolling over the advances.

How did Silvergate end up in this situation in the first place? Greed. A banking charter is a literal license to print money. But that wasn’t enough for them. So Silvergate CEO Alan Lane, who joined the bank in 2008, got into cryptocurrency because crypto was an under-served customer base. But Silvergate didn’t stop to ask themselves why it was under-served. Anyway, look at all this free money!

Worse than that, Silvergate de-diversified — they got rid of those tawdry and tedious retail deposits and mortgages that the bank had focused on since the 1980s. This left them at the mercy of the sector crashing, or one large customer collapsing.

Frances Coppola said: “The problem is not the business model, it’s the customers. If your customers are volatile, you’re at risk of runs. And if your customers are fraudsters, you’re at risk of lawsuits.” [Twitter]

On Friday afternoon, Silvergate made a “risk-based decision” to shut down its inter-crypto-exchange payments network, the Silvergate Exchange Network (SEN). [Silvergate website, archive]

This was a major part of Silvergate’s business. The SEN allowed real-time transfers of real money, any time of day or night, which crypto companies loved. It helped Silvergate attract billions of dollars in deposits from crypto exchanges and stablecoin issuers.

Signature Bank’s similar Signet platform is still up and running, for some reason. 

Moody’s just downgraded Silvergate’s credit rating for borrowing from B3 to Ca. This is Moody’s second-lowest grade: “highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of recovery in principal and interest.” [Bloomberg; Moody’s, PDF]

MicroStrategy has a loan to pay off to Silvergate — or its successor — by Q1 2025. “For anyone wondering, the loan wouldn’t accelerate b/c of SI insolvency or bankruptcy,” says MicroStrategy. [Twitter]

The MicroStrategy loan is not delinquent — and it has nothing to do with Silvergate’s present crisis. But this loan, and similar loans to bitcoin miners, are part of the thinking that got Silvergate here. If you’re making loans secured by bitcoins at bubble prices, then you’re an idiot.

Signature Bank, crypto’s tiny lifeboat 

There were two banks critical to US crypto. Silvergate on the West Coast and Signature Bank in New York. With the potential collapse of Silvergate, that means $750 billion per year in USD transfers between crypto exchanges is gone. Now it’s all on Signature.

Signature Bank’s 10-K for 2022 is out. [Business Wire; 10-K, PDF] 

Crypto was one-quarter of deposits to Signature in Q3 2022. When FTX crashed in November, crypto companies were caught short and had to withdraw their dollars in a hurry.

Signature could weather this rush because they were diversified, unlike Silvergate. They then claimed in December, and later in their 10-K, that they were totally trying to get out of crypto anyway. The January letter from the Fed, the FDIC, and the OCC warning banks to stay away from crypto probably helped push this opinion along.

(We wonder slightly where all these crypto exchanges are going to get US dollar banking now. If you have any thoughts, let us know!) 

In 2022, Signature’s deposits declined $17.54 billion or 16.5% to 88.59 billion. Most of that ($12.39 billion) was crypto deposits leaving the bank. At the end of last year, the bank’s crypto asset deposits totaled $17.79 billion, or 20% of its deposits. 

Unlike Silvergate, Signature doesn’t lend money to the crypto industry, nor do they have loans secured with crypto. Their relationship with crypto clients is only US dollar deposits and their Signet platform.

But Signature’s stock price (NASDAQ:SBNY) is being dragged down with Silvergate’s. SBNY is 64% down on its one-year price. 

Tether (again)

The Wall Street Journal got hold of some Tether emails. Tether “intermediaries” used faked companies and shell accounts in 2018 to skirt the Bank Secrecy Act and move money for terrorists. Oops. [WSJ]

One of those intermediaries was a major USDT trader in China. On a list of several accounts created for use by Tether and Bitfinex, another account was in Turkey and was allegedly used to launder money raised by Hamas. 

Elsewhere, the sentencing of Tether/Bitfinex US money mule Reggie Fowler has been adjourned again. It’s now scheduled for April 20 at 3:30 p.m. ET. [Twitter]

Voyager Digital: a terminally stupid loan to the cool kids at 3AC

Voyager Digital went broke because a single unsecured loan to Three Arrows Capital was over a quarter of their loan book, and then 3AC went bust. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee has prepared a report on Voyager’s loan practices in general, but especially that one fatally stupid loan. [Committee Report, PDF] 

Voyager’s rewards program was run at a substantial loss — it was “primarily implemented as a marketing tool.” So Voyager implemented the lending program to fund its rewards program.

Evan Psarapoulos, Voyager’s chief commercial offer, told Ryan Whooley, the company’s treasury director “we have to beef up the team and onboard/lend to riskier borrowers.”

So Voyager ran a super risky lending program. Just in 2022, 3AC, Celsius, and Alameda Research each borrowed more than 25% of Voyager’s total assets at various times. If 3AC hadn’t taken down Voyager, it would have been someone else.

Voyager’s risk committee met through 2022, though Voyager executives didn’t believe the committee had the power to overturn decisions by Psarapoulos or CEO Steve Ehrlich.

Various borrowers sent varying amounts of information to be able to borrow from Voyager. Genesis sent audited financials. Galaxy sent unaudited financials. Celsus and BitGo sent balance sheets. Wintermute sent income statements.

But 3AC sent only a single-sentence statement of their net asset value and had a half-hour phone call with Voyager. Here is the complete text of the letter from 3AC that let them borrow a quarter of Voyager’s assets:

AUM Letter PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

Three Arrows Capital Ltd. (the “Company”)

1-January-2022

To Whom It May Concern,

We confirm the following for Three Arrows Capital Ltd as at 1-January-2022 in millions of USD.

NAV 3,729
On behalf of Three Arrows Capital Ltd.

[signed]

Kyle Davies

Director

Voyager sought out a relationship with 3AC in particular because of “the prestige that 3AC had at the time in the industry.” So 3AC could set its terms. It only wanted to borrow without providing collateral, and, incredibly, it refused to provide audited financial statements.

Psarapoulos figured 3AC was safe because Genesis had lent to 3AC and Voyager thought Genesis’ diligence process was robust. Ehrlich said refusing to provide financials was “not uncommon for hedge funds.”

Voyager’s first loan to 3AC was on March 8, 2022. Two months later, Terra-Luna collapsed.

Tim Lo from 3AC told Voyager in May that 3AC had lost only $100 million in the Terra-Luna collapse. But on June 14, 2022, Lo told Psarapoulos that 3AC directors Zhu Su and Kyle Davies had disappeared, and things were “in bad shape.”

Voyager recalled all its loans. 3AC returned no assets. On June 24, 2022, Voyager issued a notice of default. 3AC entered liquidation on June 27. Voyager filed for Chapter 11 on July 6.

In other Voyager bankruptcy news, Judge Michael Wiles said the SEC had asked him to “stop everybody in their tracks” with its claims that Voyager’s internal VGX token may have been a security. The SEC needs to explain its claim and how to address its concerns. [Reuters]

The Department of Justice, the FTC, New Jersey, and Texas object to wording in Voyager’s latest proposed confirmation order that might purport to restrict government action against Voyager. [Doc 1134, PDF; Doc 1135, PDF; Doc 1136, PDF]

Celsius Network

NovaWulf put in a bid to start a new Celsius company with actual lines of business and issue shares to Celsius creditors. This is now the official Stalking Horse bid. NovaWulf hopes to get the new company up and running by June 2023. We think the plan is a hope-fueled bet on crypto bubbling again, but it’s this or liquidation. [Doc 2150, PDF; Doc 2151, PDF]

Celsius, the UCC, and the Custody ad-hoc group want the court to let them put to creditors a settlement that would get Custody holders “72.5% of their eligible Custody Assets on the effective date of the Debtors’ Plan.” [Doc 2148, PDF]

A 60-day stay, with further discovery, has been agreed upon in the KeyFi v. Celsius suit and countersuit. [Stay order, PDF]

Celsius is moving to compensate cooperating witnesses for their time and effort — both their past help to the examiner and further help Celsius may need going forward — in the cause of recovering money for creditors. [Doc 2147, PDF]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

FTX Bahamas vs. John Jay Ray, Bankman-Fried pleads not guilty, DoJ seizes FTX assets

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

i wonder how many times someone’s managed to hack in to a bitcoin exchange and found there wasn’t any money there and just left

— Boxturret, SomethingAwful

FTX vs the Bahamas

There’s a turf war going on between the FTX Digital Markets (FTX DM) liquidation in the Bahamas and the FTX Trading Ltd bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. We wrote about it earlier, along with some of the fishy stuff going on in the Bahamas.  

The Securities Commission of the Bahamas (SCB) filed their liquidation for FTX DM, a small subsidiary of FTX Trading, just one day before John Jay Ray III filed for Chapter 11 on behalf of FTX. Sam Bankman-Fried helped the SCB get in before Ray by waiting until the wee hours of November 11 to hand control over to Ray. Now the SCB feels it is entitled to FTX assets so that the liquidators can distribute them to creditors of FTX DM — whoever those might eventually turn out to be. [PwC]

The Bahamas side seems to be working on the theory that FTX DM was the operating center of the FTX companies. But FTX DM wasn’t even incorporated until July 22, 2021. It lay dormant for nearly a year and didn’t start operating in any manner until May 13, 2022. Note that’s a few days after the Terra-Luna collapse — FTX and Alameda were already utterly screwed by the time FTX DM was used for anything, suggesting that that may have been part of SBF’s reason to activate it.

The SCB pissed off Ray even further when, on December 29, they valued the FTX funds they seized late in the night on November 11 — in violation of the Chapter 11 stay — at $3.5 billion. This is mostly a pile of FTT tokens, whose market value is way less than $3.5 billion. FTX says the assets were worth just $296 million — “assuming the entire amount of FTT could be sold at spot prices at the time.” [SCB press release, PDF; FTX press release]

Christina Rolle, SCB executive director, said the Commission sought control of the crypto held by FTX after SBF and FTX cofounder Gary Wang told them about “hacking attempts overnight” — a perfect justification to seize the assets. Her affidavit, filed with the Supreme Court of the Bahamas, confirmed that SBF and Wang were behind the transfers on November 11 and 12. [Affidavit of Christina R. Rolle, PDF]

U.S. Federal prosecutors are looking into the $370 million hack — or “hack.” [Bloomberg]

Rolle also said that Tether gave the SCB 46 million tethers (USDT). SCB had asked Tether to freeze some USDT held by FTX DM or FTX Trading Ltd (it’s not clear which entity), then create 46 million fresh USDT and send it to SCB: 

76. Additionally, the Commission sent instructions for the transfer of approximately US $46 million Tether tokens to a secured wallet under the control of the Commission. These Tether tokens were not transferred to the Commission’s wallet but, after a meeting with Tether representatives, the Commission agreed that Tether, in light of the Chapter 11 proceedings, would maintain a freeze over the Tether tokens until ownership of the tokens is resolved.

This sounded odd to us — a “meeting with Tether representatives”? Coincidentally, the Bahamas Attorney General, Ryan Pinder, used to work for Deltec Bank, the bank associated with Tether.

The SCB then put out a press release on January 3 accusing Ray of “material misstatements” and having a “cavalier attitude to the truth.” They claim Ray is “promoting mistrust of public institutions in the Bahamas.” Well, yes, he is. [LinkedIn]

The joint provisional liquidators (JPLs) handling the FTX DM liquidation in the Bahamas have been pushing for access to substantial amounts of FTX data. Ray and his lawyers are working to make sure that never happens. Ray’s team has submitted piles of evidence pointing to the Bahamas government acting in bad faith.

FTX has filed an incendiary objection to the JPLs’ motion to compel the turnover of electronic records. This is a 37-page must-read rant: [FTX objection, PDF]

10. Finally, the stunning press release issued late yesterday, on December 29, 2022, by the Commission, along with certain related materials, is a game changer. The press release (and the supporting affidavit of the Executive Director of the Commission) boldly admits that the Commission violated the automatic stay in taking certain of the Debtors’ digital assets and then recklessly values the assets taken at $3.5 billion. As described in more detail below, yesterday’s disclosures demonstrate conclusively that the JPLs and the Commission are cooperating closely to do an end run around this Court and chapter 11. In a situation where maximizing recoveries for creditors should be the primary goal of all concerned, one can only wonder why.

We expect Ray isn’t wondering at all. He believes that “an elaborate and intentional game is being played” by the JPLs, the SCB, and the Bahamas government. As FTX says in their objection: “The fact that the founders left the Debtors more closely resembling a crime scene than an operating business cannot be ignored.”

FTX lawyer James Bromely filed a 675-page declaration, presenting exhibits to support their case. FTX financial advisor Edgar Mosley at Alvarez & Marsal also filed a 185-page declaration loaded with exhibits. [Bromely declaration, PDF; Mosley declaration, PDF]

The Mosley declaration details what business FTX Digital Markets actually did. FTX DM seems to have been Sam’s local partying fund:

17. The Debtors’ records reflect that $15.4 million for “Hotels & Accommodation” was paid primarily to three hotels in The Bahamas: the Albany ($5.8 million), the Grand Hyatt ($3.6 million), and the Rosewood ($807,000). The $6.9 million for “Meals & Entertainment” was paid primarily to Hyatt Services Caribbean ($1.4 million), Six Stars Catering ($974,000), and to three other catering and delivery services ($2.3 million in total).

18. The Debtors’ records reflect that in the first three quarters of 2022, FTX DM had total operating expenses of approximately $73 million, including over $40 million labeled “other expenses.”

19. The Debtors’ records reflect that FTX DM’s 2022 income statements show that FTX DM made no disbursements in connection with transaction, engineering or product expenses.

The newly formed Unsecured Creditors’ Committee in the U.S. chapter 11 also objects to the Bahamas motion. “These requests are sweeping and appear to be based on the faulty theory advanced by the JPLs that FTX DM was actually the nerve center of the FTX enterprise.” [Committee objection, PDF]

Just seizing some assets, don’t mind us

There was a scheduling conference in the Delaware FTX bankruptcy hearing on January 4. This wasn’t expected to be interesting — but Department of Justice Attorney Seth Shapiro made a surprise appearance over Zoom to let Judge Michael Dorsey know that the DoJ has been seizing assets.

SBF held a 7.6% stake in day trading brokerage Robinhood. He admitted to borrowing from Alameda in April and May to purchase the shares, in an Antigua court affidavit shortly before his arrest. [CoinDesk; affidavit, PDF]

SBF pledged the Robinhood shares to multiple companies as loan collateral. Who was getting the shares in the bankruptcy was a point of some contention. Now the DoJ has seized the shares.

Various bank accounts connected to the FTX Digital Markets (Bahamas) case and the JPLs motions for provisional relief, and the money in them, have also been seized. “We didn’t just want the court to read that in the papers filed by Silvergate and Moonstone” (FTX’s banks), said Shapiro. The DoJ also seized some cryptocurrency, though Shapiro didn’t say who from — the banks? The DoJ is working things out with the parties.

Shapiro told Judge Dorsey that the bank accounts had been seized with a view to “a criminal or asset forfeiture proceeding at some point down the line, in the Southern District of New York, to which entities could file claims.”

Shapiro said: “We either believe that these assets are not the property of the bankruptcy estate or that they fall within the exceptions under sections 362(b)(1) and/or (b)(4) of the bankruptcy code.” 362(b) is about criminal proceedings. [LII]

The Bahamas JPLs, who were also hoping for the contents of these bank accounts, are in touch with the DoJ.

Sam did nothing* wrong

Sam Bankman-Fried stood before U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan on January 3 and pleaded not guilty to all eight counts against him. SBF actually flew to New York for his arraignment and had to squeeze through a mob of reporters to enter the courthouse. The judge set a tentative trial date of October 2. [Twitter; Twitter thread; NYT]

Sam thinks he’s too smart, rich, and pretty to go to jail. He just needs to explain things properly to the people in charge, and it’ll all be fine. 

SBF’s not-guilty plea doesn’t necessarily mean a trial will happen. SBF and his lawyer Mark Cohen are likely just buying time so they can negotiate a better deal with the prosecutors. We very much doubt the case will go to trial, or that Sam’s parents would be able to foot the legal bill if it did.

More funds mysteriously moved out of Alameda wallets on December 27, mainly illiquid altcoins being swapped for ETH and BTC. Over $1 million in funds were sent through crypto mixers, according to crypto intelligence firm Arkham. [Twitter; Decrypt]

This isn’t the work of a liquidator. Sam says it wasn’t him, even though Sam, FTX co-founder Gary Wang, and FTX director of engineering Nishad Singh were the only ones who had access to the keys. Reddit user Settless notes that SBF had previously claimed to own these addresses: “The pattern is similar — the wallet receives funds and swaps them via no-KYC exchange to launder the funds.” [Twitter; Reddit]

The U.S. isn’t happy about this movement of crypto. During SBF’s arraignment in Manhattan, the prosecutors asked the court to add a new condition to the bond: that Sam be prohibited from accessing or transferring any FTX or Alameda assets. Judge Kaplan agreed. 

Molly Crane-Newman from the NY Daily News said: “SBF became animated when prosecutors successfully requested that the judge prohibit him from accessing or transferring FTX assets — furiously writing notes to his attorneys on a legal pad and pointing to them with a biro.” [Twitter]

The judge also agreed to the redaction of names and addresses of Sam’s two additional bail signers — who he may not have actually found yet. The press has until January 12 to file any objections to this. Matthew Russell Lee of Inner City Press has already filed an application to unseal the names. [Motion, PDF; Twitter; Application to Unseal]

Two of SBF’s associates, Caroline Ellison and Gary Wang, have already pleaded guilty in the hopes of getting a lesser sentence. John Reed Stark ordered and posted their plea agreements and hearing transcripts. [LinkedIn; Ellison plea, PDF; Ellison agreement, PDF; Wang plea, PDF; Wang agreement, PDF]

* except all the things he may possibly, hypothetically, have done wrong

Other perfectly normal happenings in FTX

North Dimension, the company that FTX customers were unknowingly sending their actual U.S. dollars to, was a fake online electronics retailer. North Dimension has two accounts at Silvergate Bank. [archived website; NBC News]

The assorted shenanigans with FTX likely explain why Silvergate Bank (NASDAQ: SI) has 54% of its shares sold short. Smart investors know how this will end. [Fintel]

John Reed Stark discusses FTX investors getting hosed on CNBC Squawkbox. [YouTube]

“Beyond Blame: The philosophy of personal responsibility has ruined criminal justice and economic policy. It’s time to move past blame” — by Barbara H. Fried. Now, you might say that if Sam’s circumstances are to blame for his apparent crimes, then Barbara happens to be one of those circumstances. [Boston Review, 2013]

Someone made an NFT with actual artistic value. We’ve used it as the feature image for this article. [OpenSea]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

Crypto collapse: Binance is not so fine, FTX Delaware vs FTX Bahamas, Celsius, Voyager, Gemini, Tether

due to a mistake in the internal reporting system, it didn’t tell him that he’d taken all the customers’ money and given it to his hedge fund to gamble with

— Qwertycoatl on SomethingAwful

When your auditor quits, that’s bad

Binance is broke. It’s got the same problem as the rest of crypto — the assets are imaginary, but the liabilities are real.

Remember the 2 billion BUSD bailout fund for distressed crypto enterprises that Binance announced in November? Bitfinex’ed suggested it was for a hole in Binance’s accounts — and now we’re seeing that Binance is sure behaving like there’s a huge hole in their books.

But Binance got an audit! Well, not an audit as such. But it was done by accountants who sometimes audit other things!

The “proof of reserves,” issued by Paris-based accounting firm Mazars, specifically disclaims being anything meaningful. But it makes sure to use the word “proof.”

The report didn’t address any of the tricky bits — it didn’t include non-crypto liabilities, it didn’t assess the effectiveness of internal financial controls, and it didn’t actually vouch for the numbers. Michael Burry: “The audit is essentially meaningless.” [Mazars, archive; WSJ; Twitter, archive] 

Mazars has been issuing these “proofs of reserves” for Crypto.com and Kucoin as well. But now Mazars has abruptly halted all work for crypto firms — and scrubbed all mention of such work from its website. This is Mazars running like hell to get as far away from the bomb as possible before it goes off. [Bloomberg]

Meanwhile, users have been taking their cryptos off Binance and going home. Binance outflows hit $6 billion in the week Mazars halted its work for crypto. [FT]

Binance cut off USDC withdrawals again, claiming a “wallet upgrade.” It just looks a bit like a “wallet inspector.” [Twitter] 

CZ went on CNBC Squawk Box to reassure everyone that everything is fine … though he didn’t seem as at ease as he usually does:

CZ: “We are financially okay.”

Rebecca Quick: “Can you have a 2.1 billion withdrawal?”

CZ: “We will let our lawyers handle that.”

CZ was asked why he wouldn’t engage a Big Four auditor to pick up where Mazars left off. CZ said most of these big firms “don’t even know how to audit crypto exchanges.” Andrew Ross Sorkin then pointed out that Coinbase has a Big Four auditor, Deloitte. Quick rolls her eyes at the end of CZ’s stumbling explanation (0:26 in the Twitter link). [YouTube; Twitter]

Why Binance may not have as much money as they want you to think

When FTX bought out Binance’s share in the company, Binance got paid $2.1 billion in funny money. CZ told Squawk Box that “it was all in FTT tokens, which are now worthless.” [Twitter]

70% of Binance’s reserves are in BUSD, Tether, and BNB — the last of which is their internal exchange token, akin to supermarket loyalty card points, in the style of FTX’s FTT.

The BNB token has crashed in the past week, from $290 to $240, according to Coingecko. 

Keep in mind that BUSD on Binance is internal magic beans, and absolutely not the same as Paxos dollar-backed BUSD. If Binance thinks it could get away with cashing in the bridged BUSD at Paxos, that’s $2 billion of actual US dollars Binance could secure for itself.

BUSD on Binance is on their own BNB blockchain, formerly known as Binance Smart Chain — a very hacked-up fork of the Geth software for Ethereum. The idea is to have a platform that runs the Ethereum Virtual Machine, lets you rug pull, and so on. This “blockchain” features transactions that seem to parachute assets into the system from space with no verifiable history. Data Finnovation digs into the weird bits. “It’s probably not fair to call this a ‘blockchain’ anymore.” [Twitter, archive]

And there’s still no verifiable evidence that tethers can actually be cashed in for dollars — even if you’re Binance.

Sounding smart doesn’t mean you are smart

Confidence men are called that because they can say the most outlandish things and not bat an eye. CZ has mostly come across in media as fundamentally being on the ball.

But remember that Sam Bankman-Fried projected being smart as well — until we got a look inside FTX, and saw how incredibly stupid every single smart guy in FTX really was. 

After Reuters published multiple reports of money laundering at Binance — including Binance letting Iran cash out bitcoins in violation of international sanctions — the U.S. Justice Department is “split” over charging Binance with money laundering. The split seems to be whether to charge them now or later: “Some of the at least half dozen federal prosecutors involved in the case believe the evidence already gathered justifies moving aggressively against the exchange and filing criminal charges against individual executives including founder Changpeng Zhao, said two sources.” The DoJ has discussed various plea deals with Binance’s lawyers. The investigation has been going on since 2018. [Reuters]

Binance was also slashing staff in late November. [Twitter, archive]

It’s only a matter of time before Binance starts freezing withdrawals — just like FTX, Voyager, Celsius, and so many other crypto exchanges in the last seven months.

Who can bail out Binance? Only Tether is left. Perhaps some new crypto exchange will pop up and achieve improbable volumes in a remarkably short time. There should be some Jane Street wunderkind on hand to front the operation.

Strange things in the Bahamas 

The FTX liquidation proceedings in the Bahamas are distinctly odd and in direct conflict with FTX’s Chapter 11 proceedings in the U.S. [Bloomberg]

FTX froze withdrawals on November 8. The Bahamas government placed FTX Digital Markets, FTX’s Bahamas subsidiary, into liquidation on November 10. And John Jay Ray III, who took over as CEO of FTX Trading, filed for Chapter 11 in the US on November 11.

The joint provisional liquidators (JPLs), the three men in charge of liquidating FTX Digital Market’s assets, now want dynamic access to FTX systems — they don’t want just lists of specific data, they want to be able to go fishing through the system themselves.

Ray, who cut the JPLs off from the system on November 12, is saying “no way.” He and his team are pissed because of all the pillaging of FTX that occurred after FTX froze withdrawals.

FTX objected to the Bahamas motion saying there was no urgency and the other side was being utterly uncooperative: [Objection, PDF]

“Debtors have made repeated overtures to JPLs and Commission to meet and those overtures were met with avoidance and obfuscation. The JPLs and the Commission have refused to provide responses to Debtors’ questions about the assets ‘secured’ by the Commission. Instead, the JPLs file baseless motions seeking extraordinary relief on an unnecessarily truncated timeframe.”

Ray thinks FTX cofounders Bankman-Fried and Gary Wang, the JPLs, and the Bahamas Securities Commission are all in cahoots. He told Congress: [Twitter, archive]

“The process in the Bahamian islands is not a transparent process. We have opened up the ability to share everything we have with the Bahamian government, similar to how we share with other liquidators around the world not only in this case but in other cases. It’s meant to be a very cooperative situation. The pushback that we’ve gotten is sort of extraordinary in the context of bankruptcy. It raises questions, it seems irregular to me, there are lots of questions on our part, and obviously, we’re investigating.”

James Bromley, one of FTX’s attorneys in the bankruptcy, has filed a declaration with rancorous correspondence between FTX and the Bahamas liquidators attached as exhibits. [Declaration, PDF]

Judge Michael Dorsey, who is presiding over the Chapter 11 proceedings in Delaware, told lawyers for the JPLs and Ray to try to find a middle ground. (His job is to be a referee, after all.) If they can’t work things out, they’ll be facing off in an evidentiary hearing tentatively scheduled for January 6, 2023. [Doc 197, PDF; Doc 203, PDF] 

So that you can understand FTX’s concerns, here’s a rundown of all the questionable stuff that’s happened so far:

On November 9, the day after FTX froze withdrawals, SBF told Bahamas attorney general Ryan Pinder that he would open withdrawals for Bahamian customers. Pinder previously worked at Deltec Bank — Tether’s banker since 2018 — but we’re sure that hasn’t influenced his decision-making, probably. [Doc 203, PDF]

From November 10 to 11, roughly 1,500 individuals, who claimed to be Bahamian residents, withdrew $100 million in crypto from FTX. Every other FTX customer in the world remained locked out of the system.

SBF said the Bahamas Securities Commission had told him to let the local customers in. The BSC denied this. [Twitter, archive]

SBF later told Tiffany Fong that he let the locals get their cryptos out because “you do not want to be in a country with a lot of angry people in it.” Could he have had in mind, not a mob, but particular individuals who might have had very robust opinions about not getting their cryptos back? [YouTube]

Separately from these withdrawals, at least two actors accessed FTX systems and withdrew another $477 million — hours after Ray filed for Chapter 11 on November 11. They also minted new FTT tokens. [Elliptic]

Ray and his lawyers say that SBF and Wang, who, acting on orders from the Bahamas Security Commission, minted FTT and transferred funds to a cold wallet under the control of the Commission. Ray still hasn’t figured out who the other actor was, but he’s working on it.

The JPLs have been tight-lipped as to what assets the Commission seized or how the assets were transferred.

There’s also the issue of the $256 million that FTX spent on 35 properties in the Bahamas — including land for a massive headquarters that never got built. The Bahamas regulators want to claim the properties back and they want the sale of the properties administered locally. Ray is likely to push back on this as well. [CNBC]

It’s hard to say for sure what’s going on here. We are beginning to suspect that FTX was a money-laundering chop shop, with some crypto businesses on the side. This would further suggest possible bribery of some local authorities. But the dots aren’t yet joined up.

Rats turn on each other

After four days, SBF has decided that Bahamas prisons aren’t so great, and he would rather be in a nice U.S. jail instead. [Reuters] 

Ryan Salame, co-chief executive of FTX Digital Markets, is the first FTX insider on record as spilling the beans on SBF. He told the Bahamas Security Commission on November 9 that FTX customer funds had been used to cover losses at Alameda Research. [Doc 225, PDF, page 34; FT, archive]

In 2021, Salame was a budding megadonor to U.S. Republican Party candidates — in step with SBF donating to Democratic candidates. Salame took out a $55 million loan from FTX, paid cash for a $4 million home in Maryland, and was buying up restaurants in Lenox, a town in Western Massachusetts. [NYT]

We’re not saying that’s what he used it for — but restaurants are notorious as a vehicle for laundering dubious cash.

Total donations by FTX to US politicians seem to be about $89 million when you trace all the darkish money as best as possible. [Institute for New Economic Thinking] 

$73 million of those political donations are at risk of being clawed back in the bankruptcy proceedings. [Bloomberg]

The correct regulator for crypto is the Department of Justice

Molly White live-tooted the Senate hearing on FTX and summarized it in her newsletter. [Mastodon; Substack] 

Here are all of the written testimonies. [Senate Housing Committee, PDFs] 

John Jay Ray III wants to sell FTX subsidiaries, starting with LedgerX, FTX Japan, and FTX Europe AG. [Doc 233, PDF]

FTX now has an official creditors’ committee of nine firms or individual investors, including crypto trading firm Wintermute. They still need to pick counsel, which should happen any day now. One of the first matters they will be weighing in on is a proposal to redact personal information rather than publishing a full list of creditors. [Doc 231, PDF]

When the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan invested in FTX, it asked the company a slew of questions related to their financial affairs — but received answers only to a few of them. OTPP put in $95 million anyway. [Globe and Mail, archive] 

How a crypto exchange can inveigle itself into the banking system — and how FTX seems to have done this with its Farmington equity purchase. Buy a bank, convert to a Federal Reserve member bank, notify the Fed that you’re going into digital assets and you’ve determined it’ll all be fine and you’re totally going to set up risk management. “If you’re lucky, your bank won’t be examined for a year or two. By then, you might have cranked up quite a dumpster fire.” [American Banker; Wall Street on Parade]

Canada has tightened crypto regulation even further in the wake of FTX. Client cryptos must be stored with a custodian and have no margin or leverage for Canadian customers. Non-Canadian platforms with Canadian customers will also be required to follow these rules. The Ontario Securities Commission had already refused FTX permission to operate in the province, but other provinces didn’t — and many Canadian FTX customers got caught up in the bankruptcy. [Leader Post]

Eliezer Yudkowsky, the AI risk guy who named “Effective Altruism,” advises his fellow Effective Altruists to take the FTX money and run. For the sake of charity, you understand. Others mention that clawbacks in bankruptcy exist — but ehh, it’ll probably be fine, right? [Effective Altruism forum, archive]

David spoke on CBC on Tuesday about FTX. It went pretty well. “TWO AND TWO MAKES FOUR! GRAVITY WORKS! MAGIC DOESN’T HAPPEN!” [Twitter; Yahoo News]

Celsius and Voyager

There’s no interesting news in the Celsius Network or Voyager Digital bankruptcies. Looking through the filings, it’s all procedural sports ball and not matters of real import. Everyone’s on holiday and nothing is going to happen until January. Perhaps Celsius won’t have run out of cash by then.

The next report of the examiner on Celsius was supposed to be out in December — but the court still hasn’t resolved the question of who investigates whether Celsius was Ponziing, which is the big bomb here.

Voyager is just sitting around and giving money to expensive bankruptcy professionals. Binance was talking about buying Voyager’s assets — but frankly, that’s a deal we suggest the creditors not take. They only just escaped being caught up in FTX’s bankruptcy.

Celsius has filed a motion to commence a $7.7 million clawback action against Voyager, as well as an extension of time to file a claim against Voyager’s estate. The Voyager Unsecured Creditors’ Committee is reviewing Celsius’ motion with the intention to object. [Twitter, archive]

Bankruptcy professionals will cost Celsius $115 million in the three months leading up to mid-February. [Doc 1676, PDF] 

Gemini

Crypto broker Genesis owes the Gemini exchange $900 million. Gemini has now formed a creditors’ committee to recoup the funds from Genesis and its parent DCG. [FT]

Did you know that 80% of the current market cap (613 million) of Gemini’s dollar stablecoin GUSD was printed in the weeks before the FTX collapse? Even odder, one unlabeled wallet appears to have minted 460 million GUSD. [Twitter, archive] 

On September 30, 2022, Gemini sought to incentivize GUSD adoption by increasing GUSD deposits to MakerDAO’s PSM (peg stability mechanism). MakerDAO was unimpressed. [The Defiant] 

Tether

Tether’s accountant, BDO Italia, is reconsidering whether it wants to do crypto attestations. “In common with several other professional service firms, we are currently evaluating our approach to this sector and the work we undertake for our clients.” Tether only hired them in August. [WSJ, paywalled]

In the lead-up to FTX going down, CZ from Binance was very upset that SBF appeared to be destabilizing Tether’s peg with … a mere $250,000 trade. We know this because there’s a secret chat group for the exchanges to conspire, er, sort out issues. SBF also put screenshots from these chats into the Congressional Record in his bizarre written testimony before the hearing, which he didn’t manage to attend. [WSJ; Forbes]

The secret ingredient is still crime. Police in China have arrested a gang who laundered $1.7 billion via crypto, including Tether — even after Beijing’s crackdown on crypto. [CNBC]

Other crypto firms who are fine

Three Arrows Capital (3AC)’s liquidator Teneo estimates 3AC’s assets at $1 billion as of July. That’s $37 million of actual money, $238 million in cryptos, $22 million in NFTs, and $502 million in venture and other investments. A lot of those “assets” are obviously imaginary. 3AC’s liabilities, which are extremely real, are over $3 billion. [The Block]

Grayscale wanted to turn GBTC into an exchange-traded bitcoin fund. The SEC said “LOL, no.” Grayscale sued claiming unequal treatment compared to the bitcoin futures ETFs, and even questioning whether the SEC had the right to decide against its ETF proposal. Now the SEC has written a 73-page response to Grayscale’s dumb lawsuit. [SEC, PDF]

Argo Blockchain Plc, a UK-incorporated bitcoin miner, has had trading in its shares suspended by the Financial Conduct Authority. The company is planning to file for bankruptcy. [Twitter; Bloomberg]

MicroStrategy is still going down the toilet. Bitcoin prices fell well below the “low watermark” for carrying value in Q3 2022. The company will likely face a new record digital-asset impairment charge in Q4. [Marketwatch] 

Dump on retail managed: Coinbase founder Brian Armstrong no longer holds any Coinbase stock. But he’s very bullish on crypto, he wants to make clear! [Protos] 

Image: Robyn Damianos for the Wall Street Journal

Posted on by Amy Castor 7

Celsius hearings, December 5: Whose stablecoins are these? KERP bonuses, new deadline for restructuring plan

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard
  • Send us money! Our work is funded via our Patreons — here’s Amy’s, and here’s David’s. Your monthly contributions help greatly!

The Celsius Network bankruptcy held two hearings on Monday, December 5. The first was to establish ownership of Earn accounts and see if Celsius can sell $18 million in stablecoins. The second was an omnibus hearing, dealing with multiple motions. Amy sat through six tedious hours of this, so you wouldn’t have to. [Agenda, PDF; Agenda, PDF]

A Chapter 11 bankruptcy generally has two outcomes: a bankruptcy sale (known as a “363 sale”) and the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Celsius wants to find a buyer for this ransacked corpse. But first, they have to decide who owns what. They can only sell what’s theirs to sell. The morning hearing was bitter arguments about the spare change in the stiff’s pockets.

Celsius is burning cash at a furious rate. They have no idea how to even coherently propose an ongoing business. So they need to keep finding new ways to keep up the farce and pay tens of millions in advisor and professional fees per month.

The word “liquidation” came up a few times in the first hearing. This ice cube is melting fast.

Whose are the stablecoins?

Celsius wants permission to sell $18 million in stablecoins to pay for ongoing business operations. The stablecoins are held in Earn accounts — Celsius’ main product. You would deposit cryptos and be paid interest on them.

But do the stablecoins belong to the bankruptcy estate or do they belong to the individual Earn account holders? This is what Judge Martin Glenn needs to decide.

Celsius will be out of cash to pay ongoing bills — payroll, vendors, and expensive professionals for the bankruptcy — by late February or early March. The burn rate for Chapter 11 legal costs and professional fees is $15 million to $20 million per month. Celsius needs a cash injection by January or March 2023 the latest. [Doc 1328, PDF]

Interim CEO Chris Ferraro says that right now, the bitcoin mining business is cash positive (which surprises us) — but that too will need a cash infusion by March 2023. 

Celsius (the debtors) and the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (UCC) think the stablecoins belong to the bankruptcy estate, which would give them the right to sell the coins for cash. But the account holders want their personal money back.

The stablecoins that Celsius wants to sell add up to $18,111,551. That’s 16,549,259 USDT, 1,119,089 NCDAI, 360,743 BUSD, and some shrapnel. Alvarez & Marsal’s Robert Campagna, Celsius’ restructuring advisor, admitted that the stablecoins buy them just a month of continued operations.

“If we sell $18 million now and have access to cash, we can always buy stablecoins again later,” said Campagna. LOL, like Celsius is going to have cash later. But anyway.

If Celsius is allowed to sell the stablecoins, the funds will not be used to cover the bitcoin mining operations. [Doc 1325, PDF]

So what happens after they burn through their stablecoins? Other sources of money include the settlement with Prime Trust, worth around $17 million — but Prime Trust will refund in crypto, not cash. Celsius also hopes for $44 million from the potential sale of Celsius’ custody solution GK8 to Galaxy Digital. GK8 is an Israeli firm that Celsius bought in November 2021 for $115 million. So they’ll take a 60% loss.

Other options to keep the business afloat include intercompany loans and debtor-in-possession financing — but those carry their own risks, Ferraro said. “They require us to post collateral and risk that coins would not be returned if the coins drop in value.” 

What company is going to lend money to Celsius? What collateral? What bank? What?

What did I just sign?

The terms of service for the Earn product changed a lot — in ways that contradicted what Celsius founder Alex Mashinsky had told customers.

Celsius updated its terms eight times between 2018 and September 2022, asking customers to accept changes each time by clicking a box. If they didn’t click on the box, they couldn’t access their coins.

Later versions of the terms, such as version six, more clearly asserted that Celsius owned the deposited cryptos — as is normal with any bank or investment firm, who then have a liability to the depositors. Even as Mashinsky said things that sounded like the investors owned their deposits.

Many small creditors objected that they weren’t aware of the important changes, or that they didn’t even agree to the changed terms.  

More than 90% of Earn account holders signed off on version six of the terms of service, per court filings. These customers held the majority of the coins in the Earn program.

Oren Blonstein, Celsius’ chief compliance officer, was called to the stand. Here are his original and supplementary declaration. [Doc 1327, PDF; Doc 1584, PDF]

Blonstein spent his time at Celsius administering the company’s compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act — money laundering law.

The state attorneys — Layla Milligan for Texas and Karen Cordry for multiple other states — went in hard on Blonstein.

Blonstein told Milligan that they tracked customer activity including acceptance of the terms of use.

This is an amazing interchange between Milligan and Blonstein (as quickly noted by Amy, please excuse errors):

Milligan: To your knowledge, was the business ever in compliance with money transmission laws? 

Blonstein: My understanding is based on a discussion with money transmission laws. 

Milligan: But you are not aware if the company was in compliance with state or federal securities laws?

Blonstein: Yes, correct. 

Cordry closely questioned Blonstein on how they flagged the change of terms — if the changes were ever called out to the customers. Judge Glenn asked Blonstein if the change of ownership in particular was brought to the customers’ attention.

Blonstein admits they didn’t flag the changes, but the customers had to tick the box and agree before they could proceed. Nor was the prior version of the terms available for a customer to compare them.

But Blonstein didn’t think any of this was a substantive issue: “I viewed the wording on the Earn program as you are giving coins to the company to use.”

The stablecoins will likely go to the estate

Despite the arguments over ownership of the stablecoins, Judge Glenn was leaning toward putting them into the bankruptcy estate — because that’s what the terms said, and that’s what you’d expect of an investment product.

Judge Glenn seemed skeptical of the terms meaning anything other than that Celsius owned the coins and had a liability to the depositor. “It was a lending platform, so they had to deploy the assets. There wasn’t a commitment to pay back specific assets.”

It wasn’t like Celsius would use the money to gamble in a “slot machine in Monte Carlo” — they’d use it to pay the bills, noted the judge.

He was also more comfortable if the stablecoins were converted to actual dollars anyway, given how crazy crypto is right now: “The dollars will frankly be safer than crypto.”

Shara Cornell for the US Trustee and Layla Milligan for Texas were not happy. Celsius had not complied with state regulations. The terms of service may have been an illegal contract, and thus void, Milligan argued. 

Judge Glenn responded that ownership of Earn cryptos had been a “gating issue” (an obstacle to recovery) ever since Celsius filed for bankruptcy in July 2022. “They didn’t only just spring this on anyone.”

Celsius had failed hard at compliance, but any buyer would have to comply with regulations — and if Celsius had broken securities laws, “you’ll get your pound of flesh against them,” he told Milligan.

Judge Glenn said that he wouldn’t rule on the stablecoins this week. But we think he’s going to let Celsius sell the coins. Matt Levine at Bloomberg concurred — because not having the money to pay back a liability is what “bankruptcy” means. [Bloomberg]

KERP motion

Celsius employees have been running away screaming. In early 2022, the company had over 900 employees. They are now down to 167 employees. Attrition is a real problem. 

In the afternoon omnibus hearing, Judge Glenn approved Celsius’ Key Employee Retention Plan (KERP) to give out up to $2.8 million in bonuses to 59 key employees, so they don’t quit. Previously, he had denied the motion because Celsius and their lawyers had blacked everything pertinent out. [Doc 1426, PDF; Bloomberg]

You can’t really say no to a KERP if a company is trying to stay a going concern. We know very well that Celsius is a shambling zombie — but while it’s in Chapter 11, the judge probably has to treat it otherwise. 

Celsius lawyers also need to look into who transferred crypto within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. Those employees will not get bonuses.

Most of the KERP payments will be no more than $75,000. Salaries for the KERP employees range from $25,000 to $425,000.

Celsius will totally come up with a plan, honest

Next, Judge Glenn agreed to grant Celsius’ motion to extend exclusivity  — the exclusive right to come up with a new business plan — until February 15.  

After a Chapter 11 filing, you normally have 120 days to come up with a bankruptcy plan. Celsius still doesn’t have a plan. Judge Glenn said that this is not unusual for large companies. The court can extend the period of exclusivity, though the total period with extensions cannot exceed 18 months.

Once that exclusivity period is up, any party in the bankruptcy can introduce their own reorganization plan. There are already some plans being floated by Celsius creditors. More court time — and bankruptcy estate money — will then be spent discussing all the plans.

Kirkland’s Patrick Nash, appearing for Celsius, wanted to avoid such a free-for-all. Celsius is working to sell the GK8 custody business, and they are working with the UCC on a reorganization they can both agree on. The US Trustee also agreed on extending exclusivity. 

Judge Glenn concurred that lifting exclusivity now would lead to a free-for-all. He worried that a pile of new plans would be “a crushing load on my chambers.” Remember, he has to actually read all these hundreds of pages of legal filings.

The judge can see that Celsius is a melting ice cube and it’s just consuming money. But Celsius has to come up with something. He granted the motion.

For Celsius, this is just a game that they have to play to keep shambling forward and paying themselves from creditor funds. 

Celsius v. Stone et al. 

Jason Stone of KeyFi was Celsius’ DeFi trading guy. Stone is suing Celsius for non-payment. Celsius has countersued, calling Stone incompetent and a thief.

Later in the hearing, Judge Glenn denied a motion by KeyFi and Stone to dismiss Celsius’ counterclaims. [Doc 17, PDF]. 

Stone is being represented by Kyle Roche, formerly of Roche Freedman. He is now in his own practice. Roche is not an eloquent courtroom speaker. He rambles interminably, and Judge Glenn was getting noticeably annoyed at him.

Roche said that Celsius’s claim should be dismissed because the issue is a contractual dispute, and Stone was authorized to transfer the assets in dispute to KeyFi under an asset purchase agreement. Celsius argued that Stone was not a party to the cited APA.

Judge Glenn said he would be denying the motion for now. He told the parties to complete discovery before a scheduled January hearing on Celsius’ motion for a preliminary injunction in the dispute — and he didn’t want them dragging their feet.

Roche said he had collected 150,000 documents as part of discovery. Glenn asked when Roche would produce the documents. Roche said that he had been busy because his grandmother died.

Prime Trust

Judge Glenn approved the settlement with Prime Trust, returning $17 million in cryptos to Celsius that Prime had been holding since the two stopped doing business in June 2021. [Doc 20; PDF]  

Celsius gets cryptos, not the actual dollars it needs to pay the bankruptcy professionals — hence why they want to sell the stablecoins to pay the bills.

Next time

We’ll be writing up the December 7 hearing on who owns the Custody and Withhold accounts and the December 8 hearing on the GK8 sale. Send Amy money for eardrops! [Agenda, PDF; Agenda, PDF]

Posted on by Amy Castor 3

Crypto collapse: BlockFi even deader, crypto miners going broke, Sam will not shut up, Binance and Tether are fine

the wonderful thing about bitcoin is that ‘sorry i was too dumb to do things properly so it all collapsed’ is not only a feasible explanation but historically likely

— Boxturret on SomethingAwful

Shut up, Sam

If you may be in legal trouble, any lawyer has one piece of advice: stop talking. If you’ve just filed a high-profile bankruptcy with maybe billions of dollars missing: stop talking. If you’ve got prosecutors sniffing around your activities: stop talking.

Sam Bankman-Fried never got the memo, or he did and threw it in the trash. In reference to his lawyers, he told Tiffany Fong: “they know what they’re talking about in an extremely narrow domain of litigation. They don’t understand the broader context of the world.” [YouTube; Twitter]

Despite producing reams of potential “evidence” that could one day be used against him, SBF will talk to any reporter, anywhere, any time of day. On Wednesday, November 29 he spoke on an NYT DealBook panel. On Thursday, November 30, he spoke to Good Morning America.

He loves the camera. But he still can’t tell you where the money went.

In the DealBook interview with Andrew Ross Sorkin, SBF said he “never tried to commit fraud,” and he didn’t knowingly commingle $10 billion in customer funds. He frames the whole matter as he seemingly lent Alameda customer funds from FTX as a risk management problem that got out of hand. Well, it sure did that. [Video; Transcript] 

George Stephanopoulos from Good Morning America, who actually flew to the Bahamas to talk to SBF, was a lot tougher on him. SBF again denied “improper use of customer funds,” saying he failed at oversight. “You said one of your great talents in a podcast was managing risk.” “That’s right.” “Well, it’s obviously wrong.” [GMA; Twitter]

As Lying for Money author Dan Davies points out, prosecutors just have to show that SBF intentionally deceived clients as to what was happening to their money. When you tell people their money is segregated and it’s not, that’s fraud. “The offence was committed the minute it went in the wrong account.” [Twitter]

If you ignore your lawyer because you’re smarter than everyone, no lawyer is going to work with you. Martin Flumenbaum at Paul Weiss already dumped SBF. We’re hearing unconfirmed rumors that David Mills, his father’s colleague at Stanford, who was advising SBF, is also refusing to work with him further. [Semafor; Twitter]

A lot of FTX employees bailed after the company filed for bankruptcy. But a few have soldiered on — likely so they can nail SBF, who screwed them over about as much as he screwed over all of his customers and investors. While SBF is telling his side of the story to reporters, FTX employees are leaking emails. NYT wrote about the absolute chaos that FTX lawyers and execs endured in wresting power away from the deluded SBF in the wee hours of November 11. [NYT]

If Sam’s lawyer had jumped in front of the camera and ripped Sam’s larynx out with his bare hands, he could reasonably bill it as extremely valuable and important legal services to his client.

Extremely predictably, there goes BlockFi 

In January, there were three big crypto lenders — Celsius, Voyager, and BlockFi. Now all three are bankrupt, and our emails are clogged with new bankruptcy filings.

After weeks of frozen withdrawals, BlockFi filed for voluntary Chapter 11 on November 28 in New Jersey. [Petition, PDF; bankruptcy docket on Kroll; CNBC; press release]

BlockFi was already a dead firm walking. They were dead after Three Arrows blew up in May. FTX kept BlockFi’s head above water with a $400 million credit facility — but then FTX imploded. [Twitter] 

The New Jersey firm doesn’t just have more liabilities than assets — a lot of the assets are missing too. All of BlockFi’s cryptos were in FTX. They were using FTX as their crypto bank.

BlockFi has over 100,000 creditors. Assets and liabilities range between $1 billion and $10 billion. There’s $1.3 billion in unsecured loans outstanding and $250 million in customer funds locked on the platform.

BlockFi has $256.5 million cash on hand — after selling their customers’ crypto:

In preparation for these chapter 11 cases, BlockFi took steps to liquidate certain of its owned cryptocurrency to bolster available cash to fund its business and administrative costs. Through the process, BlockFi was able to raise $238.6 million of additional cash, for a total unencumbered cash position as of the Petition date of $256.5 million.

Ankura Trust is BlockFi’s largest unsecured creditor to which it owes $729 million. Ankura is typically brought in to represent the interest of others in bankruptcy. If so, who are those creditors? We’d love to know.

FTX US is BlockFi’s second-largest unsecured creditor, with a $275 million stablecoin loan. This is the credit facility that SBF “bailed out” BlockFi with in June.

BlockFi’s fourth-largest unsecured creditor is the SEC — BlockFi still owes $30 million of its $50 million in penalties from February. The total settlement was $100 million, with half owed to the SEC and half owed to state regulators. [SEC; Twitter]

All the other creditors’ names are redacted. Very crypto.

BlockFi is entangled in FTX in multiple ways. BlockFi had a $680 million loan to SBF’s Alameda Research. This was collateralized by SBF’s personal shareholding in popular day-trading broker Robinhood — just days before FTX filed for bankruptcy. BlockFi is suing SBF for his stake in Robinhood. It doesn’t help that SBF was shopping his Robinhood shares around as collateral after he’d pledged them to the BlockFi loan. [Filing, PDF; Complaint, PDF; Bloomberg] 

Crypto miners — we told you so

We set out in detail in August this year how publicly traded bitcoin mining companies were always going to leave their lenders and investors as the bag holders.

We predicted that the miners would default on billions of dollars in loans, leaving the lenders with worthless mining rigs and unsaleable piles of bitcoins. They would then go bankrupt — with all the paperwork in order.

The miners depreciated their mining rigs over five years — and not the 15 months they should have — to make their companies look like better investments.

And miners are now defaulting on their rig-backed loans. Lenders — New York Digital Investment Group, Celsius, BlockFi, Galaxy Digital, NYDIG, and DCG’s Foundry — are getting stuck with worthless e-waste. [Bloomberg]

Iris Energy (IREN) faced a default claim from its lender NYDIG on $103 million “worth” of mining equipment. The company’s miners aren’t making enough money to service their debt. So Iris defaulted! And NYDIG now owns some obsolete mining rigs. [SEC filing, Global Newswire; Coindesk; CoinTelegraph]

Shares in Argo Blockchain (ARBK) dropped 40% after the firm announced that its plans to raise $27 million by selling shares were no longer happening. [Twitter; Decrypt]

Core Scientific hired law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges and financial advisors PJT Partners to help figure out ways to stave off bankruptcy. The options include exchanging existing debt for equity or additional debt, asset sales, equity, or debt financing. They’re gonna go bankrupt — because that was always the exit strategy. [The Block]

Binance goes shopping

In the financial crisis of 2008, when banks were dropping like flies, some big banks would buy smaller banks that had healthy books — so they could patch the holes in their own books. Bigger and bigger shells to hide the Ponzi under. 

Crypto is doing the same. FTX was buying up, and planning to buy up, small bankrupt crypto firms to try to hide the hole in its own books. And Binance, the largest crypto exchange, just bought Sakuro Exchange BitCoin (SEBC), a Japanese exchange that is already licensed with the country’s Financial Services Agency. [Binance; Bloomberg]

Japan learned its lesson early. Tokyo-based Mt. Gox, one of the first big bitcoin exchanges, blew up in 2014. Japan went on to become one of the first countries to regulate crypto exchanges with a licensing system. Crypto exchanges in Japan are required to keep customer assets separate, maintain proper bookkeeping, undergo annual audits, file business reports, and comply with strict KYC/AML rules. They are treated almost like banks! [Bitcoin Magazine]

Binance tried to set up operations in Japan in 2018, after getting kicked out of China — but Japan’s FSA told Binance they needed to play by the rules and apply for a license or pack their bags. [Bitcoin Magazine]

Binance’s bogus bailout fund 

Binance announced a $2 billion “industry recovery fund” to prop up all of the other flailing crypto firms that have been struggling since FTX blew up. They claim that 150 crypto firms have applied for a bailout. [Bloomberg] 

Binance has its own stablecoin, BUSD, that it claims is run by Paxos and Binance, “and is one of the few stablecoins that are compliant with the strict regulatory standards of NYDFS.” The crypto bailout fund is $2 billion in BUSD.

BUSD is a Paxos-administered dollar stablecoin. Each BUSD is backed by an alleged actual dollar in Silvergate Bank, and attested by auditors. (If not actually audited as such).

That’s true of BUSD on the Ethereum blockchain. It’s not true of BUSD on Binance.

BUSD on Binance is on their internal BNB (formerly BSC) blockchain, bridged from Ethereum. It’s a stablecoin of a stablecoin. Binance makes a point of noting that Binance-BUSD is not subject to the legal controls that Paxos BUSD is under. We’re sure it’ll all be fine if there are any issues, which there totally won’t be. [Binance] 

Treating FTX’s claims about other crypto firms as confessions would have given you pretty detailed correct answers — it was all projection. FTX was accusing others of what they were doing themselves. You should look at what Binance has been saying the same way.

We’re going to go so far as to assert that Binance is a hollow shell too, and the bailout fund is most likely for a hole in its own books.

Every one of the crypto companies accounts for their value in dollars by calculating their mark-to-market value. “We have a billion dollars of $CONFETTI!” Even if they couldn’t get $10,000 in actual money for it.

All of crypto is bankrupt if you account for the crypto assets at realizable value rather than mark-to-market. Realizable value depends on the inflow of actual dollars into crypto — and that inflow has plummeted because the retail suckers went home. 

All crypto companies are Quadriga. Pull back the curtain and you’ll see Celsius/FTX-style non-accounting, a Google spreadsheet if you’re lucky, and incompetence. Such utter blithering didn’t-understand-the-question incompetence. It’s been this way since 2011.

Tether is fine, you FUDster

Tether has been issuing tethers by lending out its USDT stablecoin, rather than exchanging the USDT one-to-one for dollars (LOL).

As of Tether’s attestation for September 30, 2022, 9% of USDT are loans to Tether customers. Tether claims these are collateralized — but they won’t say who the borrowers are or what the collateral is. [Tether; WSJ, paywalled]

In their long-winded response to the WSJ writeup, Tether blames …. the media. [Tether]

We know from the CFTC settlement in October 2021 that Tether was issuing USDT to its big customers with a kiss and a handshake. Now they’re admitting it publicly.

Other crypto exchanges/firms in trouble

CoinDesk’s report on the hole in Alameda’s balance sheet and Alameda’s close ties to FTX did so much damage to the crypto industry — and to Coindesk’s parent company Digital Currency Group — that the news site has attracted take-over interest. [Semafor] 

CoinDesk did not blow apart the crypto industry. This was an unexploded bomb that was set up in May.

It was all going to explode eventually as soon as someone looked inside the box. As CZ told The Block’s Larry Cermak in 2019: “some things are better left unsaid.” [Twitter] 

Japanese social media company Line is shutting down Bitfront, a US-based crypto exchange that it launched in 2020. They said the closure was unrelated to “certain exchanges that have been accused of misconduct.” [Announcement; Bloomberg]

AAX exit scam completed. Hong Kong-based exchange AAX froze withdrawals on November 13, and its executives quietly slipped away as opposed to filing bankruptcy — social media pages removed, LinkedIn profiles deleted. Sources tell us that employees have been laid off and the founders are nowhere to be found. [Hacker News; AAX]

John Reed Stark: Since the FTX debacle, Big Crypto’s SEC hit pieces and talking points calling for “regulatory clarity” are pure pretense and subterfuge, intended to distract and dissemble the truth — that the crypto-emperor has no clothes. [Duke FinReg Blog] 

Image: Sam talking on GMA

Posted on by Amy Castor 3

Reggie Fowler, Bitfinex/Tether’s US money man, seeks 6-month sentencing delay

After a series of delays that have plagued his case since he was first indicted in April 2019, Reggie Fowler was supposed to be sentenced on Sept. 13. (His sentencing was originally scheduled for Aug. 30.)

This Tuesday, a Manhattan District Judge was to decide how many years the 63-year-old Fowler, who is charged with bank fraud, money laundering, and running an unlicensed money transmitting business, would spend behind bars. Likely, the rest of his life, given bank fraud alone carries a max imprisonment of 30 years. This would have meant that Fowler was enjoying his last weekend as a free man.

But on a Saturday night — three days before sentencing — Fowler’s lawyer Ed Sapone wrote to Judge Andrew Carter asking for a six-month adjournment. Sapone said that he (not his client) has been ill and still needs time to gather material relevant to the sentencing: [letter]

“I recognize that this is an unusually lengthy adjournment request. I have been suffering with a serious medical condition that is requiring invasive medical treatments. In addition, a significant amount of information and material relevant to an analysis under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) must be obtained from financial institutions, entities, and individuals located in Europe. The requested adjournment will afford me the opportunity to gather the relevant material and prepare a sentencing submission for the Court’s consideration, while addressing my medical condition.” 

Sapone said that US prosecutors were okay with the request. 

Fowler is the ex-football guy and Arizona businessman tied to hundreds of millions of dollars of missing Tether and Bitfinex money. He is accused of setting up a network of shadow banks so crypto exchanges could skirt the traditional banking system. Fowler told the banks that the accounts were for his real estate business. He is also accused of funding a sports league with money that wasn’t his.

After fudging a plea deal that likely would have meant only spending five years in custody, Fowler was supposed to head to trial in May 2022. But in another surprising last-minute twist, he decided to enter a guilty plea and throw himself at the mercy of the court.  

My only guess as to why he did this is that trials are incredibly expensive and by this time, Fowler was down to one lawyer: Sapone. His previous legal team ditched him in 2021, saying their client owed them $600,000 and had been stringing them along for months with promises of “the check’s in the mail.”

I’ll be curious to hear what Judge Carter says, but given the government has no objection to Sapone’s request for adjournment, I suspect he will say, “sure whatever.” Fowler is currently living in Chandler, Arizona, free on bail. 

Update: Judge Andrew Carter has approved the motion. Reggie Fowler’s sentencing hearing has been adjourned until March 14, 2023, at 12 p.m. ET. [Order]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

CBC Radio interview: Could crypto investments become virtually worthless?

Last week, I spoke with CBC Radio One, a national business radio show in Canada. Paul Haavardsrud interviewed me. The show went live on Sunday. [Cost of Living]

Paul was a great host. He let me do most of the talking! Paul wants to know why crypto is crashing. I tell him it’s because the money is all gone. He asks, “Well, where did it go?” Excellent question!

Naturally, that led me to bring up Tether. I also explained that while bitcoin’s value may never drop completely to zero, it could become a lot more difficult to trade if liquidity dries up.

The show repeats on Tuesday, June 28, at 11:30 a.m. NT in most provinces. 

If you want to learn more about why the crypto bubble is bursting, read “How 2020 set the stage for the 2021 bitcoin bubble,” by myself and David Gerard, along with “The Latecomer’s Guide to Crypto Crashing.”

Posted on by Amy Castor 1

How 2020 set the stage for the 2021 bitcoin bubble

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard
  • Be sure to subscribe to our Patreon accounts — Amy’s is here; David’s is here.

We often get asked by reporters: “Why are crypto markets crashing?” The short answer is because there’s no money left, and no more coming in. The long answer is more complicated.

Bitcoin peaked at $64,000 in April 2021 and again at $69,000 in November 2021. Many of the network effects that drove the price of bitcoin to those heights were put into place in 2020.

The same network effects are now working in reverse. Markets take the stairway up and the elevator down.

The 2017 bubble was fueled by the ICO boom and actual outside dollars entering the crypto economy. Bitcoin topped out just below $20,000 in December 2017.

The crash that followed over the next 12 months was like air being slowly let out of a balloon — much like the 2014 deflation after Bitcoin’s prior 2013 peak. ICO and enterprise blockchain promoters tried to keep going through 2018 like everything was fine, but the party was clearly over.

In contrast, the 2022 crash is like a wave of explosive dominoes all crashing down in rapid succession. How did we get here?

A long, cold crypto winter

Let’s start in early 2020. It was the crypto winter. Bitcoin’s price had spent two years bobbling up and down from infusions of tethers, and traders on BitMEX rigging the price to burn margin traders. (And, allegedly, BitMEX itself burning its margin traders.) [Medium, 2018]

But the dizzying price rises were peculiarly bloodless. There was little evidence of fresh outside dollars from retail investors — the ordinary people. The press would write how bitcoin had just hit $13,000 — but they’d also call people like us, and we’d tell them about Tether.

Throughout 2019 and into 2020, crypto pumpers were desperately trying scheme after scheme — initial coin offerings, initial exchange offerings, bitcoin futures, selling to pension funds — to lure in precious actual dollars and get the party re-started.

Then Corona-chan knocked on the door.

Act I, Scene I: Pandemic Panic

On March 13, 2020, the US government declared a pandemic emergency. The panic drove down stocks and crypto. Investors sold everything and flew to the safest, hardest form of money they could find: the US dollar! Bitcoin dropped from $7,250 to $3,858 over the course of that day.

It was an edge-of-the-cliff moment for bitcoin. Any further drop could force liquidations and create a ripple effect across dozens more crypto projects. For bitcoin miners, the price of bitcoin was now below the cost of mining.

Worse, only two months away was the bitcoin “halvening” — an every-four-year event when the number of bitcoins granted in each freshly-mined block halves. If bitcoin dropped too low in price, the miners wouldn’t be able to pay their enormous power bills. The crypto industry desperately needed to push bitcoin’s price back before May.

Tether spins up the printing press

Tether, launched in 2014, is an offshore crypto company that issues a dubiously backed stablecoin of the same name. Tether works like an I.O.U. — Tether supposedly takes in dollars and issues a tether for each dollar held in reserve. Since Tether has never had an audit, nobody knows for sure what’s backing tethers. The company has an extensive history of shenanigans — see Amy’s Tether timeline.

The issuance of tethers in March 2020, was 4.3 billion, but that’s when the Tether printer kicked into overdrive — minting tethers at a clip nobody had ever seen before. 

Tether minted 4.4 billion tethers in April 2020 — crypto’s version of an economic stimulus package. By May, Bitcoin reached $10,000, just in time for the halvening.  

Once the price of bitcoin goes up, though, there’s no way to turn off the Tether printing press. It has to keep printing. If the price of bitcoin goes down, people will sell, creating an exodus of real dollars from the system. So Tether kept printing, pushing the price of bitcoin ever skyward. 

In May, June, and July 2020, Tether issued a combined total of 3 billion tethers. In August, when the price of bitcoin reached $12,000, Tether issued another 2.6 billion tethers. In September, when bitcoin slid below $10,000, Tether issued another 2.2 billion tethers. 

By the end of 2020, Tether had reached a market cap of 21 billion. The printer kept going. In 2021, Tether pumped out 60 billion more tethers. By May 2022, Tether’s market cap had reached 83 billion. Bitcoin’s price peaks in April 2021 ($64,000) and November 2021 ($69,000) both coincided with an influx of tethers into the market. 

You can’t just redeem tethers. Only Tether’s big customers — it has about ten of them — can redeem. You can try to sell your tethers on an exchange. But you can’t just go up to Tether to redeem them for dollars. There were no redemptions of tethers, ever, until May and June 2022 — the present crash.

Curiously, Tether’s reserve as declared to New York in April 2019 contained $2.1 billion of actual money — cash and US Treasuries. But Tether’s reserve attestation as of March 31, 2021, still contained just $2.1 billion of cash and treasuries!

This suggests that the rest of the reserve over that time was made up of whatever worthless nonsense Tether could claim was a reserve asset — loans of tethers, cryptocurrencies, and dubious commercial paper credited at face value rather than being marked to market.

Dan Davies, in his essential book Lying for Money, marks this as the key flaw in frauds of all sorts: they have to keep growing so that later fraud will keep covering for earlier fraud. This works until the fraud explodes.

Tether marketcap, CoinGecko

GBTC’s ‘reflexive Ponzi’

Grayscale’s Bitcoin Trust (GBTC) played a huge role in keeping the price of bitcoin above water through 2020. It offered a lucrative arbitrage trade, an exploitable inefficiency in markets, that a lot of big players went all-in on.

GBTC was an attempt to wrap Bitcoin in an institutionally compatible shell. All through 2020 and into 2021, GBTC was trading at a premium to bitcoin on the secondary markets. Accredited investors would acquire GBTC at net asset value — some large proportion being in exchange for direct deposits of bitcoins, not purchases for cash, although all the accounting was stated in dollars. After a six-month lock-up, the accredited investors would sell the shares to the public at a 20 percent premium, sometimes more. Rinse, repeat, and that’s a 40 percent return in a year. 

GBTC functioned like a “reflexive Ponzi.” When Grayscale bought more bitcoin for the trust, that drove up the price of bitcoin, which pushed up the GBTC premium, which resulted in investors wanting more GBTC and Grayscale issuing more shares. 

Grayscale ran a national TV advertising campaign at the time, targeted at ordinary investors. The ads warned that disaster was imminent, inflation would eat your retirement, and bitcoin was better than gold — so you should buy bitcoin. Or, this shiny GBTC, which was implied to be just as good! [YouTube, 2019]

In a bull market, retail investors didn’t mind paying a premium — because the price of bitcoin kept going up. The market treated GBTC as if it was convertible back to bitcoins, even though it absolutely wasn’t. [Adventures in Capitalism]

Grayscale ultimately flooded the market with GBTC. When an actual bitcoin ETF became available in Canada, GBTC’s premium dried up. Since February 2021, GBTC has been trading below the price of bitcoin. As of March 2022, the trust holds 641,637 bitcoins. And they’re staying there indefinitely — leaving GBTC holders locked in on an underwater trade.

The rise of decentralized finance

Decentralized finance, or DeFi, didn’t directly pump the price of bitcoin in 2020. But DeFi was one of the stars of the 2021 bubble itself, and eventually caused the bubble’s disastrous explosion. All of the structures to let that happen were set up through 2020.

DeFi is an attempt to put traditional financial system transactions — loans, deposits, margin trading — on the blockchain. Regulated institutions are replaced with unknown and unregulated intermediaries, and everything is facilitated with smart contracts — small computer programs running on the blockchain — and stablecoins.

All through 2019 and 2020, DeFi was heavily promoted as offering remarkable interest rates. At a time of low inflation, this got coverage in the mainstream financial press. Here’s the diagram the Financial Times ran, depicting DeFi as a laundromat for money: [FT, paywalled, archive] 

The key to DeFi is decentralized exchanges, where you can trade any crypto asset that can be represented as an ERC-20 token — such as almost any ICO token — with any other ERC-20 token.

DeFi also lets you take illiquid tokens that nobody wants, do a trade, assign them a spurious price tag in dollars, then say they’re “worth” that much. This lets dead altcoins with no prospective buyers claim a price and a market cap, and attract attention they don’t warrant. If you put a dollar sign on things, then people take that price tag seriously — even when they shouldn’t.

You can also create a price for a token that you made up out of thin air yesterday and use DeFi to claim an instant millions-of-dollars market cap for it. 

This was the entire basis for the valuation of Terraform Labs’ UST and luna tokens — and people believed those “$18 billion” in UST were trustworthily backed by anything.

You can also use those tokens you created out of thin air as collateral for loans to acquire yet more assets. An unconstrained supply of financial assets means more opportunities for bubbles to grow, and more illiquid assets that you can dump for liquid assets (BTC, ETH, USDC) when things go wonky.

By September 2020, five hundred new DeFi tokens had been created in the previous month. DeFi hadn’t hit the mainstream yet — but it was already the hottest market in crypto. [Bloomberg]

The problem was that in 2020, to use DeFi you had to know your way around using the actual blockchain. Retail investors, and even most institutional investors, haven’t got the time for that sort of dysfunctional nonsense.

Retail was more attracted to the “CeFi” (centralized DeFi) investment firms, such as Celsius and 3AC, offering impossible interest rates. These existed in 2020 but didn’t gain popularity until the following year when the bubble had started properly.

A new grift: NFTs 

By late 2020, crypto promoters were searching for a new grift to lure in retail money, one that would have broader mainstream appeal. They soon found one. 

NFTs as we know them got started in 2017, with CurioCards, CryptoPunks, and CryptoKitties. NFT marketing had continued through the crypto winter — in the desperate hope that ordinary people might put their dollars into crypto collectibles.

The foundations of the early 2021 burst of art NFTs were laid in late 2020, when Vignesh Sundaresan, a.k.a. Metakovan, first started looking into promoting digital artists, such as Beeple — whose $69 million JPEG made international headlines for NFTs in March 2021, and officially kicked off the NFT boom. 

Late 2020 also saw the launch of NBA Top Shot, the only crypto collectible that ever got any interest from buyers other than crypto speculators. Top Shot traders were disappointed at how incredibly slow Dapper Labs was at letting them withdraw the money they’d made in trading — and became some of the first investors in the Bored Apes.

Coiner CEOs 

By late 2020, several big company CEOs started promoting the concept of bitcoin on the company dime. These included Jack Dorsey at Twitter, Dan Schulman at PayPal, and Michael Saylor at business software company MicroStrategy.

In October 2020, Saylor revealed his company had bought 17,732 bitcoins for an average of $10,000 per coin. Over the next 18 months, Microstrategy would plow through its cash reserves and take on debt to funnel more money into bitcoin, spending $4 billion in the process. Buying MSTR shares become the newest way for retail investors to bet on bitcoin. Saylor also put himself forward as bitcoin’s latest prophet and crazy god.

PayPal set up bitcoin trading in 2020, though only as a walled garden, where you couldn’t move coins in or out. Still, it made gambling on crypto more accessible to retail investors. 

Bitcoin miners start ‘hodling‘

By late 2020, we suspect there was very little actual cash in crypto. But bitcoin needed to continue its upward ascent. 

The biggest tip-off that the fresh outside dollars had stopped flowing was when bitcoin miners stopped selling their coins. Bitcoin miners mint 900 new bitcoins per day. They typically sell these to pay their energy costs — power companies don’t accept tether — and buy new mining equipment, which becomes obsolete every 18 months. At $20,000 per bitcoin, that would equate to $18 million, in actual dollars, getting pulled out of the bitcoin ecosystem every day.

In October 2020, Marathon Digital (MARA), one of the largest publicly traded miners, stopped selling its bitcoins. They took out loans, which allowed them to buy their equipment and hold their bitcoins. Marathon even bought additional bitcoins!  

Borrowing against mined bitcoins, and not selling them, reduced selling pressure on bitcoin’s price in dollars. US-based miners used this model heavily from July 2021 onward — taking low-interest loans from their crypto buddies, Galaxy Digital, DCG, and Silvergate Bank. Although, in 2022, the loans started running out and they had to start selling bitcoins.

This also set Marathon up for potential implosion when energy prices went up and the price of bitcoin dropped in 2022. Marathon is presently losing $10,000 on every bitcoin they mine. 

Easy money?

2020 was a weird year of market panics, bored day traders, and easy money — for some.

The Federal Reserve dealt with the pandemic panic by showering the markets with stimulus money. At the retail end, $817 billion was distributed in stimulus checks (Economic Impact Payments), $678 billion in extended unemployment, and $1.7 trillion to businesses, mostly as quickly-forgiven loans. [New York Times]

Bored day traders, stuck at home working their email jobs and unable to go out in the evening, got into trading stocks on Robinhood as the hot new mobile phone game. Car rental firm Hertz, a literally bankrupt company, whose stock was notionally worth zero, started going up just because Robinhood users thought it was a good deal. Instead of crypto becoming a more regular investment like stocks, the stonks* had turned into shitcoins.**

What isn’t clear is how much of this money found its way to the crypto market. At least some of it did. A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland noted: “a significant increase in Bitcoin buy trades for the modal EIP amount of $1,200.” This increased BTC-USD trade volume by 3.8%! [Cleveland Fed]

But the trades only seemed to raise the price of bitcoin by 0.07%. And the dollars in question were only 0.02% of the money distributed in the EIP program.

* A cheap and nasty equity stock; the term comes from a meme image. [Know Your Meme]
** We are sorry to tell you that this is literally a technical term in crypto trading.

The final push over the line

A lot of channels into crypto were put into place in 2020. But the last step was to pump the price over the previous bubble peak of $20,000.

With that bitcoin number achieved, the press would cover the number going up — because “number go up” is the most interesting possible story in finance. That would lure in the precious retail dollars that hodlers needed to cash out.

The push started in late November, with deployments of tethers to the offshore exchanges. On December 18, 2020 — exactly three years after the previous high — bitcoin went over $20,000 again. And that’s when a year and a half of fun started.

Posted on by Amy Castor 3

The Latecomer’s Guide to Crypto Crashing — a quick map of where we are and what’s ahead

Since November 2021, when Bitcoin hit its all-time high of $69,000, the original cryptocurrency has lost 70 percent of its face value. And when Bitcoin falters, it takes everything else in crypto down with it. 

The entire crypto space has been a Jenga stack of interconnected time bombs for months now, getting ever more interdependent as the companies find new ways to prop each other up.

Which company blew out first was more a question of minor detail than the fact that a blow-out was obviously going to happen. The other blocks in the Jenga stack will have a hard time not following suit. 

Here’s a quick handy guide to the crypto crash — the systemic risks in play as of June 2022. When Bitcoin slips below $20,000, we’ll officially call that the end of the 2021 bubble.

Recent disasters

TerraUSD collapse — Since stablecoins — substitutes for dollars — are unregulated, we don’t know what’s backing them. In the case of TerraUSD (UST), which was supposed to represent $18 billion … nothing was backing it. UST crashed, and it brought down a cascade of other stuff. [David Gerard; Foreign Policy; Chainalysis Report]

Celsius crumbles — Celsius was the largest crypto lender in the space, promising ridiculously high yields from implausible sources. It was only a matter of time before this Ponzi collapsed. We wrote up the inevitable implosion of Celsius yesterday. [David Gerard]

Exchange layoffs — Coinbase, Gemini, Crypto.com, and BlockFi have all announced staff layoffs. Crypto exchanges make money from trades. In a bear market, fewer people are trading, so profits go downhill. Coinbase in particular had been living high on the hog, as if there would never be a tomorrow. Reality is a tough pill. [Bloomberg; Gemini; The Verge]

Stock prices down — Coinbase $COIN, now trading at $50 a share, has lost 80% of its value since the firm went public in June 2021. The company was overhyped and overvalued.

US crypto mining stocks are all down — Bitfarms ($BITF), Hut 8 Mining ($HUT), Bit Digital ($BTBT), Canaan ($CAN), and Riot Blockchain ($RIOT). Miners have been borrowing cash as fast as possible and are finding the loans hard to pay back because Bitcoin has gone down.

UnTethering

Crypto trading needs a dollar substitute — hence the rise of UST, even as its claims of algorithmic backing literally didn’t make sense. What are the other options?

Tether — We’ve been watching Tether, the most popular and widely used stablecoin, closely since 2017. Problems at Tether could bring down the entire crypto market house of cards.

Tether went into 2020 with an issuance of 4 billion USDT, and now there are 72 billion USDT sloshing around in the crypto markets. As of May 11, Tether claimed its reserve held $83 billion, but this has dropped by several billion alleged “dollars” in the past month. There’s no evidence that $10.5 billion in actual dollars was sent anywhere, or even “$10.5 billion” of cryptos.

Tether is deeply entwined with the entire crypto casino. Tether invests in many other crypto ventures — the company was a Celsius investor, for example. Tether also helped Sam Bankman-Fried’s FTX exchange launch, and FTX is a major tether customer.

Tether’s big problem is the acerbic glare of regulators and possible legal action from the Department of Justice. We keep expecting Tether will face the same fate as Liberty Reserve did. But we were saying that in 2017. Nate Anderson of Hindenburg Research said he fully expects Tether execs to end the year in handcuffs. 

Other stablecoins — Jeremy Allaire and Circle’s USDC (54 billion) claims to be backed by some actual dollars and US treasuries, and just a bit of mystery meat. Paxos’ USDP (1 billion) claims cash and treasuries. Paxos and Binance’s BUSD (18 billion) claims cash, treasuries, and money market funds.

None of these reserves have ever been audited — the companies publish snapshot attestations, but nobody looks into the provenance of the reserve. The holding companies try very hard to imply that the reserves have been audited in depth. Circle claims that Circle being audited counts as an audit of the USDC reserve. Of course, it doesn’t.

All of these stablecoins have a history of redemptions, which helps boost market confidence and gives the impression that these things are as good as dollars. They are not. 

Runs on the reserves could still cause issues — and regulators are leaning toward full bank-like regulation.

Sentiment

There’s no fundamental reason for any crypto to trade at any particular price. Investor sentiment is everything. When the market’s spooked, new problems enter the picture, such as: 

Loss of market confidence — Sentiment was visibly shaken by the Terra crash, and there’s no reason for it to return. It would take something remarkable to give the market fresh confidence that everything is going to work out just fine.

Regulation — The US Treasury and the Federal Reserve were keenly aware of the spectacular collapse of UST. Rumour has it that they’ve been calling around US banks, telling them to inspect anything touching crypto extra-closely. What keeps regulators awake at night is the fear of another 2008 financial crisis, and they’re absolutely not going to tolerate the crypto bozos causing such an event.

GBTC — Not enough has been said about Grayscale’s Bitcoin Trust, and how it has contributed to the rise and now the fall in the price of bitcoin. GBTC holds roughly 3.4 percent of the world’s bitcoin.  

All through 2020 and into 2021, shares in GBTC traded at a premium to bitcoin on secondary markets. This facilitated an arbitrage that drew billions of dollars worth of bitcoin into the trust. GBTC is now trading below NAV, and that arbitrage is gone. What pushed bitcoin up in price is now working in reverse.

Grayscale wants to convert GBTC into a bitcoin ETF. GBTC holders and all of crypto, really, are holding out hope for the SEC to approve a bitcoin ETF, which would bring desperately needed fresh cash into the crypto space. But the chances of this happening are slim to none.

The bitcoins are stuck in GBTC unless the fund is dissolved. Grayscale wouldn’t like to do this — but they might end up being pressured into it. [Amy Castor]

Whales breaking ranks — Monday’s price collapse looks very like one crypto whale decided to get out while there was any chance of getting some of the ever-dwindling actual dollars out from the cryptosystem. Expect the knives to be out. Who’s jumping next?

Crypto hedge funds and DeFi

Celsius operated as if it was a crypto hedge fund that was heavily into DeFi. The company had insinuated itself into everything — so its collapse caused major waves in crypto. What other companies are time bombs?

Three Arrows Capital — There’s some weird stuff happening at 3AC from blockchain evidence, and the company’s principals have stopped communicating on social media. 3AC is quite a large crypto holder, but it’s not clear how systemically intertwined they are with the rest of crypto. Perhaps they’ll be back tomorrow and it’ll all be fine. [Update: things aren’t looking good. 3AC fails to meet lender margin calls.] [Defiant; Coindesk; FT]

BlockFi — Another crypto lender promising hilariously high returns. 

Nexo — And another. Nexo offered to buy out Celsius’ loan book. But Nexo offers Ponzi-like interest rates with FOMO marketing as well, and no transparency as to how their interest rates are supposed to work out.

Swissborg — This crypto “wealth management company” has assets under management in the hundreds of millions of dollars (or “dollars”), according to Dirty Bubble Media. [Twitter thread]

Large holdings ready for release

Crypto holders have no chill whatsoever. When they need to dump their holding, they dump.

MicroStrategy — Michael Saylor’s software company has bet the farm on Bitcoin — and that bet is coming due. “Bitcoin needs to cut in half for around $21,000 before we’d have a margin call,” Phong Le, MicroStrategy’s president, said in early May. MicroStrategy’s Bitcoin stash is now worth $2.9 billion, translating to an unrealized loss of more than $1 billion. [Bloomberg]

Silvergate Bank — MicroStrategy has a $205 million loan with Silvergate Bank, collateralized with Bitcoin. Silvergate is the banker to the US crypto industry — nobody else will touch crypto. Silvergate is heavily invested in propping up the game of musical chairs. If Silvergate ever has to pull the plug, almost all of US crypto is screwed. [David Gerard]

Bitcoin miners — Electricity costs more, and Bitcoin is worth less. As the price of Bitcoin drops, miners find it harder to pay business expenses. Miners have been holding on to their coins because the market is too thin to sell the coins, and borrowing from their fellow crypto bros to pay the bills since July 2021. But some miners started selling in February 2022, and more are following. [Wired]

Mt. Gox — at some point, likely in 2022, the 140,000 bitcoins that remained in the Mt. Gox crypto exchange when it failed in 2014 are going to be distributed to creditors. Those bitcoins are going to hit the market immediately, bringing down the price of bitcoin even further.

Feature image by James Meickle, with apologies to XKCD and Karl Marx.

Don’t forget to subscribe to our Patreon accounts. Amy’s is here and David’s is here. We need your support for stories like this!

Posted on by Amy Castor 2