• By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“Every single one of these news updates from the slow motion implosion of the great fake tech money pyramid scheme is like reading headlines that say: ‘Man confused as to why his clothing caught fire after dousing self with kerosene.’ Every one.”

— A Shiny Blue Thing

CZ: “4”
SEC: “Fore!”

A day before the SEC sued Coinbase, the agency also filed a suit against Binance, the world’s largest offshore crypto casino, and its affiliate Binance.US. Binance founder Changpeng Zhao, better known as “CZ,” was also named in the suit. 

CZ tweeted “4,” which means he is dismissing the complaint as “FUD, fake news, attacks, etc.” If you have a single-digit shorthand for this sort of thing, you may already be in trouble. [Twitter, archive; Twitter, archive]

The 136-page complaint, filed in the District of Columbia on June 5, outlines 13 charges. Unlike the Coinbase suit, this one alleges fraud. The complaint comes with nearly 100 exhibits, some of which are incendiary. [Press release, Complaint, PDF; Docket]

CZ has his hands full these days. The US Department of Justice is currently investigating Binance over money laundering. In March, the CFTC filed its own enforcement action against Binance and CZ — which Binance has until July 27 to respond to. [CFTC docket]

The SEC complaint covers some of what’s in the CFTC complaint. But there’s a pile of new stuff. This is a huge amount to cover, so we’ll be doing it over a few posts.

The SEC complaint

The lawsuit is against Binance Holdings Limited, BAM Trading Services Inc., BAM Management US Holdings Inc., and Changpeng Zhao. (BAM Trading runs Binance.US; BAM Management is a holding company that owns BAM Trading.) Summons were served to listed company addresses and to an address for CZ in Malta. [defendant list, PDF]

The SEC comes out of the gate loud:

This case arises from Defendants’ blatant disregard of the federal securities laws and the investor and market protections these laws provide.

Among the accusations:

  • Binance and BAM Trading both operated as unregistered securities exchanges, broker-dealers, and clearing agencies, while raking in $11.6 billion in revenue. 
  • Binance’s own BNB and BUSD tokens are securities, as are 10 other tokens listed for trading on Binance.US.
  • Binance lending products (Simple Earn and BNB Vault) and Binance.US staking products are also securities.
  • CZ claimed BAM operated separately from its offshore parent and had its own leadership. In practice, he firmly controlled BAM and the US platform’s customer assets.
  • Binance secretly enabled US-based high-value “VIP” customers to trade on its non-US platform. 
  • BAM defrauded company investors of $200 million by lying to them about non-existent controls against abusive trading on the platform.
  • CZ funneled customer funds to Sigma Chain, a trading entity that he owned.
  • Sigma Chain inflated the trading volume on the US site through wash trading — because the Binance trading engine let anyone trade with themselves.
  • Binance and CZ commingled billions in customer funds on Binance.US and sent them to market maker Merit Peak, also owned by CZ.

The SEC wants Binance and BAM permanently enjoined from doing any of this ever again, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with interest, civil money penalties, and equitable relief.

The SEC has also sought to freeze customer assets on Binance.US — specifically to protect US customers from CZ and Binance.com. 

Tai Chi: A plan to evade regulation

CZ launched Binance in July 2017 to rapid popularity. He evaded accountability from the start, moving his headquarters from China to Japan to Malta.

Per the complaint, CZ denies that Binance has an office at all: “Wherever I sit is the Binance office. Wherever I meet somebody is going to be the Binance office.”

A month after launching in China, Binance revealed that the US and China together made up nearly half of its customer base. [Binance, archive]

But how to keep the ball rolling? Crypto trading was banned in China in 2019. It continued online through foreign exchanges until September 2021, when China declared all cryptocurrency transactions illegal.

CZ needed US customers — especially “VIP” ones — but not US regulation. So, starting in 2018, he worked on how to surreptitiously evade US securities laws. As his chief compliance officer Samuel Lim admitted: “we do not want [Binance].com to be regulated ever.” [Doc 17-5, PDF]

The trouble was, as Lim put it to fellow Binance employee Alvin Bro: “we are operating as a fking unlicensed securities exchange in the USA bro.”

Lim was keenly aware of the hazards of US law enforcement:

there is no fking way in hell i am signing off as the cco for the ofac shit

theres a certain point where money is totally useless, and that is making a declaration to the USA that you are clean

when shanghai is totally cowboy

there is no fking way we are clean

i have zero visibility on our VIP clients

ZERO

the strategy of bnb is to survive for 2 years and f off

and in this 2 yrs try ur bestest to not land in jail

An unnamed “consultant” who ran “a crypto asset trading firm in the United States” suggested options to CZ and his team. One option was low-risk: settle the regulators’ concerns in an orderly manner. But if they went that route, they might be shut out of the US market entirely for months or years. The second option was risker, but more profitable: create a separate US entity that would head off the regulators.

The consultant suggested engaging with the SEC on how to comply but “with no expectation of success and solely to pause potential enforcement actions.” The new entity would “become the target of all built-up enforcement tensions” and “reveal, retard, and resolve built-up enforcement tensions.”

The new entity would also give Binance better access to US dollars without Binance.com needing its own banking relationships.

Binance would still need to insulate the new entity from US enforcement: “Key Binance personnel continue to operate from non-US locations to avoid enforcement risk” and “Cryptocurrency wallets and key servers continue to be hosted at non-US locations to avoid asset forfeiture.”

This was the “Tai Chi plan,” first reported in Forbes in October 2020. Binance filed a defamation suit against Forbes for this report, though they withdrew it a few months later. Binance then tried to buy equity in Forbes in a SPAC deal that later fell through — though this didn’t hold Forbes back from going in hard against Binance. The SEC complaint includes the original Tai Chi documents. [Forbes, 2020; Doc 17-2, PDF; Doc 17-3, PDF]

CZ opted to go ahead with the Tai Chi plan. Binance.US launched in July 2019, run by a separate entity, BAM Trading. Binance announced it would begin restricting US customers from transacting on Binance.com and they should use the US site instead.

CZ’s sockpuppets

Binance.US was a supposedly independent US affiliate of Binance.com, run by BAM Trading, incorporated in Delaware. In practice, CZ reportedly ran BAM himself with an iron hand.

Catherine Coley and Brian Books — “BAM CEO A” and “BAM CEO B” in the complaint — sang like birds to the SEC. Brooks detailed to the SEC how CZ was not merely the chairman of BAM, but exercised CEO-level close control.

Even BAM’s accountants cautioned their client that the lack of information around money movements “makes it very difficult to ensure the Company is fully collateralized at specific points in time.”

Only two people — CZ and another person, Guangying Chen, who nobody seems to admit much about — controlled all of the flows of cash and cryptos.

Coley and her team were extremely unhappy after reading the Forbes article on the Tai Chi plan:

As BAM CEO A [Coley] explained to the Binance CFO shortly after the article was released, BAM Trading employees “lost a lot of trust with the article” and “the entire team feels like they’ve been duped into being a puppet.”

The SEC wants to freeze Binance.US funds

The SEC was very concerned about the status of Binance.US customer funds all through early 2023 and couldn’t get straight answers out of BAM or Binance.com as to where the funds were held and who controlled the purse strings.

On June 6, the SEC filed a motion seeking an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Binance and BAM. Customer assets at Binance.US are largely controlled by non-US entities, and Binance has allegedly siphoned a pile of cash out of BAM. Motions like this are what the SEC does when it suspects huge fraud.

The SEC specifically wants to let Binance.US customers withdraw their funds, but not allow Binance to transfer money outside the US. [SEC press release; Doc 4, PDF; Memorandum of law, PDF]

A hearing on the matter is set for Tuesday, June 13 at 2:00pm. It’s expected that Judge Amy Berman will rule on the day as to whether to put the TRO into place.

Where’s the US money?

The SEC’s investigation into Binance and Binance.US started on August 17, 2020 — before Forbes told the world about the Tai Chi plan. [Doc 12, PDF]

The first SEC contact with BAM was a December 17, 2020, subpoena for documentation of BAM’s control of Binance.US crypto assets.

The SEC requested more information in September 2022. BAM finally answered in February 2023, but “its answers were not reassuring.”

BAM had a “wallet custody agreement” such that Binance would custody Binance.US crypto — the part of the Tai Chi plan where the crypto would be held outside the US. BAM told the SEC that the wallet custody agreement “was never operationalized.”

The SEC sent Binance Holdings Limited (Binance.com) a Wells notice, indicating that an enforcement action was imminent, on February 21. BHL responded on March 15 that “BHL does not, and has not, served as the custodian of the digital assets on Binance.US.” [Doc 19-13, PDF]

But the SEC already knew this was not true — based on information it had gotten from Signature Bank, conversations with former BHL and BAM employees, and reports to BAM from BAM’s auditor Armanino. 

In the two weeks leading up to filing the June 5 complaint, the SEC was still trying to resolve the custody issue — with “numerous written and oral exchanges concerning custody of Binance.US Platform customers’ assets and, more importantly, who is in ultimate control of those assets.” [Doc 19-15, PDF; Doc 19-16, PDF]

BAM now “disputes its own auditor’s conclusion of past Binance custody over customer assets” (emphasis SEC’s) and “admits that Zhao and Binance continue to possess substantial control over at least some of BAM Trading’s crypto assets.”

BHL and CZ have not been helpful:

Zhao’s attorneys have continued to maintain that Zhao is not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States — despite setting up a crypto trading platform in the United States that has made hundreds of millions from trading with U.S. customers, and despite his beneficial ownership of accounts held at banks in the United States through which billions of dollars flowed to some of his foreign domiciled companies like Merit Peak and Sigma Chain.

As recently as June 4, BHL was begging the SEC not to freeze BAM assets. [Doc 19-14, PDF]

The Binance money funnel

Binance is a network of shell companies. These entities hypothetically have different roles, but in practice, money flows between them in vast amounts — mostly via transfers between the entities’ accounts at Silvergate Bank, and some at Signature. We know this because Silvergate, Signature, and FedWire told the SEC all about it. [Doc 21, PDF]

How much money are we talking about? Sachin Verma, an SEC forensic accountant, says:

At times the amounts being credited and debited during a single month amounts to movement of more than a billion dollars.

… On January 1, 2023, eight Binance/Zhao-owned companies had $58.7 million on deposit. During that same time frame, $840 million was deposited into, and $899 million was withdrawn, from those accounts

Binance could and did transfer funds without BAM’s knowledge. At one point, while she was CEO, Coley had to ask where $1.5 billion in daily transfers was coming from — neither she nor her team had the access needed to verify them. 

Coley also had to ask why on earth $17 million in BUSD was moving from Merit Peak (Binance) to Sigma Chain (Binance) via BAM, and where Merit Peak got the money from. [Doc 19-2, PDF]

The billions of dollars flowed in from Binance.US customers, through the various Binance companies’ checking accounts, into a Merit Peak account, to Paxos Singapore (for $21.6 billion of BUSD between 2019 and 2021), and out to … somewhere:

Binance Holdings Limited and Binance Capital Management show large deposits and withdrawals from and to Signature accounts for some Zhao-owned companies, and hundreds of millions of dollars have been transferred.

Per the SEC’s request to freeze Binance.US assets:

During 2022, a U.S. bank account for Swipewallet (beneficially owned by Zhao) sent $1.5 billion offshore in foreign exchange, or “FX,” wires … Between January and March 2023, multiple Binance accounts wired more than $162 million offshore for further credit of a foreign account belonging to the company beneficially owned by the Binance Back Office Manager.

That manager was Guangying Chen.

CZ ran billions of dollars through Silvergate every month. None of it ever stayed in one place for long — all the accounts were just checking accounts where money sat for a moment before being shuffled under another shell.

Unlike Sam Bankman-Fried, CZ seems from all this to have had the good sense to stash away billions of dollars in actual money. He also purchased a home in Dubai in 2021 — a coincidentally non-extradition jurisdiction. 

Where did the money end up? Where’s CZ keeping the dollars? Following the money trail is confusing — which appears to be the point.

It’s not clear whether Silvergate filed suspicious activity reports on all these dubious transfers. They certainly should have.

__________________

Also read:

SEC sues Binance, part 2

SEC sues Binance, part 3

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