Tag: Signature

FTX: John Jay Ray files second interim report, sues Daniel Friedberg

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

Me: [turning to guy at gas station] so the polycule was mostly in the dark about the fraud. SBF had back door access
Guy: [pulling out taser from under seat] is that right

— Ed Zitron

“Attorney-1” was a bad boy

John Jay Ray III, the CEO of FTX in bankruptcy, has released a second interim report detailing how FTX skirted bank secrecy laws and commingled funds — and how an FTX lawyer, “Attorney-1,” served as Sam Bankman-Fried’s fix-it and hatchet man. [Report, PDF]

(We covered the first interim report, which came out in April, here.)  

“Attorney-1” is very obviously Daniel Friedberg, who was FTX’s compliance officer and Alameda’s general counsel. A day after Ray released the interim report, FTX filed suit against Friedberg, alleging malfeasance in the course of his duties. The complaint details many of the same incidents in the report. [WSJ; redacted complaint, PDF]

In 2008, Friedberg was a colleague of Stuart Hoegner at Ultimate Bet, where the pair helped cover up a multi-million-dollar scandal in which the site cheated its players. Hoegner now works for Tether, a dubious stablecoin issuer. 

SBF hiring Friedberg should have been the first clue that FTX.com was a massive fraud. 

Friedberg resigned around the time the FTX Group filed for bankruptcy. Weeks later, he met with the FBI, the DOJ, and the SEC and told them he wanted to cooperate with any investigations.

There’s an interesting line in the interim report:

The Debtors have identified on Attorney-1’s hard drive a final copy of the false written testimony that Bankman-Fried provided to Congress.

FTX has access to the hard drive from Friedberg’s computer. Did Friedberg just leave the evidence behind when he quit FTX? Or did he willingly hand over his laptop to FBI agents? This hard drive seems to have had all sorts of interesting documents on it.

Friedberg hasn’t been charged with any crimes as yet — but based on Ray’s report and the ensuing lawsuit, we wouldn’t be surprised if there’s a sealed indictment out there waiting for him.

Following the money

FTX owes $8.7 billion in customer funds — over $6.4 billion of which is cash and stablecoins. According to Ray, Friedberg lent a helping hand when FTX executives “used commingled customer and corporate funds for speculative trading, venture investments, and the purchase of luxury properties, as well as for political and other donations designed to enhance their own power and influence.”

Ray details what he found about various FTX accounts and the flows of cash in and out of them. Tracking money flows was “extraordinarily challenging”:

… from the inception of the FTX.com exchange, the FTX Group commingled customer deposits and corporate funds, and misused them with abandon … Commingling and misuse occurred at their direction, and by their design.

Ray and his team have recovered $7 billion in “liquid assets” so far, which is astounding — though we’re not sure how liquid the crypto component of that will be in practice, or how much is unsaleable FTT tokens.

The report does not include FTX in Japan, Cyprus, or Singapore — areas where funds were properly segregated by law. It also does not address FTX.US, which Ray says is still under investigation. 

No, no, it’s research 

FTX lied to banks — a lot. Alameda Research had “research” in its name so that it could get bank accounts without immediately being flagged for enhanced due diligence as a money services business. FTX couldn’t get banking, so they used Alameda bank accounts to receive customer cash, right from the start. 

But banks started asking inconvenient questions. When “Bank-1” — likely either Signature or Silvergate — asked why FTX was sending money to Alameda, an Alameda employee told them that “customers occasionally confuse FTX and Alameda” but that all wires through the account were to settle trades with Alameda.

This was false. In just 2020, one of Alameda’s accounts received more than $250 million in deposits from FTX customers and more than $4 billion from other Alameda accounts that were funded in part by customer deposits, says the report.

When banks started rejecting wires to Alameda accounts, FTX set up North Dimension so it could continue to funnel money to FTX. Friedberg and SBF told “Bank-1” that North Dimension was a crypto trading firm with substantial operations. In fact, it was an empty shell with no employees or operations.

Friedberg also engaged his old law firm to create a fake corporate register for North Dimension for the bank: “Specifically, after Bank-1 asked for a copy of the register, Attorney-1 directed a law firm to create a register.”

Time travel by document

In 2021, FTX Trading Ltd was planning to go public. As part of the paperwork for that, it needed an audited financial statement.

The problem was that from April 2019 when FTX.com first launched until the end of August 2020, FTX.com customers had been sending cash deposits to Alameda bank accounts. FTX needed to cover up the fact that they were just using Alameda to move customer and company funds around without any agreement to do so.

So in January 2021, Friedberg had his old law firm draft a “cash management agreement” to explain why Alameda held FTX cash. Friedberg created from this a fake “Payment Agent Agreement.”

FTX usually signed documents with DocuSign to provide an electronic record. In this case, to avoid a DocuSign timestamp, SBF wet-signed the document on behalf of Alameda and FTX on April 16, 2021 — backdated to 2019 “for the sole purpose of providing it to an external auditor.”

How did Ray’s team know the document was backdated? They found the original document file on Friedberg’s hard drive:

While metadata reflects that Attorney-1 created the Payment Agent Agreement on April 12, 2021, and that the executed version was last modified on April 16, 2021, the agreement purports to have an “Effective Date” of June 1, 2019 —nearly two years earlier.

The IPO never happened — but the fake document did help the FTX companies get more funding from “potential investors in connection with its $400 million Series C financing that closed in January 2022.”

Sam the philanthropist

SBF was famous for his Effective Altruism. He used FTX funds by preference:

The Debtors have been able to identify certain transactions that appear clearly to have been funded in part with commingled customer deposits. These include political and “charitable” donations, venture investments and acquisitions, and the purchase of luxury real estate for senior FTX Group employees in the Bahamas.

Sam’s charitable donations got a bit esoteric. The FTX Foundation gave one guy $300,000 to “Write a book about how to figure out what humans’ utility function is” — a question that LessWrong rationalist philosophy needs to answer so as to construct the perfect superintelligence to rule over us all. And that hopefully won’t turn out to be Roko’s basilisk. [LessWrong, PDF, 2004]

The Foundation gave someone else $400,000 to make YouTube videos to promote LessWrong rationalism and Effective Altruism.

Closer to home, the Foundation gave $20 million to the Guarding Against Pandemics PAC, which was run by Sam’s younger brother Gabe Bankman-Fried.

FTX sues Friedberg

Friedberg’s malfeasance was egregious enough that FTX  is suing him for “damages caused by breaches of fiduciary duties, legal malpractice, and other wrongdoing, and to recover fraudulent transfers.” 

The suit also alleges Friedberg paid off whistleblowers rather than deal with the compliance issues they raised.

Friedberg worked at FTX from 2017 until its collapse in 2022, the last 22 months of that as general counsel at Alameda and chief compliance officer at FTX. Joe Bankman, SBF’s father, pushed Sam to hire Friedberg and keep him “in the loop … so we have one person on top of everything.”

FTX paid Friedberg millions of dollars in salary and bonuses, and tens of millions in crypto — a $300,000 salary at FTX.US, a $1.4 million signing bonus, an 8% equity stake in FTX.US, and a $3 million payment from Alameda. 

Plaintiffs want compensatory damages to be determined at trial, disgorgement of all of Friedberg’s compensation including the cryptos, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.

Chief noncompliance officer

Friedberg’s putative job as chief compliance officer was to make sure the proper checks and balances were in place to prevent fraud, commingling of funds, and other wrongdoings. Per the complaint, he didn’t do any of that. Instead, “Friedberg actively participated in and facilitated such misconduct.”

Money was funneled to FTX insiders and booked as “personal loans” — which were never repaid, and which there was never any serious discussion of paying — “despite Friedberg’s false statement to the outside accountants that interest was paid quarterly on the loans.”  Friedberg was involved in more than $2 billion in such “loans.”

Friedberg also encouraged the use of Signal for corporate messaging, preferably set to make messages disappear.

Ray is still appalled at how bad FTX’s accounting was:

Those entities that did produce financial statements used QuickBooks, Google documents, Slack communications, Excel spreadsheets, and other inadequate means for measuring the level of assets and liabilities held by the FTX Group. Entries in QuickBooks were often made months after transactions occurred, rendering real-time financial reporting and risk management impossible.

Hush money

Friedberg served as SBF’s fixer. He paid off whistleblowers and “retained” whistleblowers’ attorneys — that is, he paid them off too. 

In November 2019, FTX and Alameda were hit with a class action lawsuit that accused the companies and their executives of racketeering and market manipulation. [Docket; Decrypt, 2019]

The lawsuit doesn’t name “Plaintiff’s Attorney-1” — but this is clearly Pavel Pogodin, who set up Bitcoin Manipulation Abatement for the sole purpose of filing crypto class actions.

Alameda said at the time: “The troll has no evidence of any wrongdoing, and will not further discover any — because there was no wrongdoing to discover evidence of.” [Medium, 2019]

Nevertheless, Friedberg took the suit seriously enough that he paid Pogodin off. (The details are redacted.) The suit was dismissed in December 2019.

As a California Bar member of flawless repute, Pogodin is happy to be paid not to do anything. He sent a letter in January 2022 threatening further possible action against FTX. Friedberg offered him “$1.6 million and $50,000 paid on a monthly basis.”

In sum, Friedberg arranged for the FTX Group to pay Plaintiffs’ Attorney-1 $3,320,000 through July 2022. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs’ Attorney-1 provided no actual legal services to the FTX Group after signing the engagement letter.

An FTX.US employee on a $200,000 salary was fired after less than two months. She sent a demand letter in December 2021 claiming that “Alameda [was] nothing more than an extension of FTX, used to bolster investor confidence in FTX projects, and in turn drive up the prices of projects FTX had developed or invested in itself” and let employees insider-trade.

Friedberg gave this employee an “extraordinary settlement” (redacted in the filing) — and made a $12 million deal to retain Whistleblower-1’s attorney. Their only work for FTX was a three-page memo.

In early 2022, an attorney working at FTX for less than three months discovered that Alameda owned North Dimension. He flagged to Friedberg that North Dimension accounts were being used to fund FTX customer withdrawals and that Alameda didn’t have the proper money transmitter licenses.

Friedberg promptly fired him. The complaint details how the attorney was paid a large (redacted) severance package.

Other FTX news

John Ray’s team has so far racked up $200 million in fees — and the fee examiner thinks this is quite reasonable. Gotta pay the undertaker: [Bloomberg; summary report, PDF] 

Without question, the fees incurred to date are remarkable, but so is the professionals’ performance. The Fee Examiner has been struck by the creativity, professionalism, and personal sacrifice of the Retained Professionals who sprung into action in November to begin transforming a smoldering heap of wreckage into a functioning Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession.

Over in the criminal case, SBF moved to dismiss 10 of the 13 charges against him. Judge Lewis Kaplan has told SBF to get knotted: “The Court has considered all of the arguments of the parties. To the extent not addressed herein, the arguments are either moot or without merit.” [Doc 136, PDF; Doc 148, PDF; Doc 149, PDF; NYT; Doc 167, PDF] 

Sam wants to blame his troubles on Fenwick & West, the law firm used by FTX and Alameda, who apparently told him that all the hamfistedly obvious crimes he did were all totally legal. The DoJ and FTX objected, and Judge Kaplan has again told Sam to get knotted: “Neither Fenwick nor the FTX Debtors are part of the ‘prosecution team,’ and the government has no obligation to produce materials that are not within its possession, custody, or control.” [Bloomberg; Doc 150, PDF; Doc 151, PDF; Doc 151-1, PDF; Doc 156, PDF; Doc 159, PDF; Doc 166, PDF]

Over at Lightcone, who build and run LessWrong and the Effective Altruism Forum: “Funding is quite tight since the collapse of FTX.” They’re asking the users for $3 million to $6 million over the next year. [LessWrong]

Posted on by Amy Castor 5

Do Kwon arrested, White House hates crypto, Coinbase Wells notice, SEC charges Justin Sun, Signature sold, FTX Bahamas party fund returns

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“hello I am Don’t Kwoff, yes I may look like Do Kwon with a fake moustache and wig but rest assured I am a completely separate person.”

— Boxturret

Deploying more capital — steady, lads

Do Kwon, co-founder of Terraform Labs and creator of the failed UST/luna cryptocurrency pair that took down the rest of crypto when it collapsed, was arrested in Montenegro on March 23. Kwon was detained at Podgorica Airport with falsified documents. [Twitter; CoinDesk; YNA, in Korean]

Also arrested was Han Chang-Joon, Terraform’s former chief financial officer. The two were sitting in a private plane bound for Dubai when authorities nabbed them. They used forged travel documents from Costa Rica and also had documents from Belgium and South Korea on them. Three laptops and five mobile phones were also seized. [Pobjeda, in Montenegrin; DLNews]

Kwon was wanted by South Korea for violating capital market rules (by stealing everyone’s money). South Korea had also issued a “red notice” via Interpol, asking global law enforcement for help finding him. Kwon has been tweeting, talking to reporters, and insisting he was not on the run since September.

After South Korea stripped him of his passport, Kwon was suspected of being in Serbia. He was likely trying to flee the region before authorities caught up to him. [YNA, 2022, in Korean]

Here’s a video of Kwon and Chang-Joon leaving the Montenegrin court in handcuffs. [Twitter, video]

In February, the SEC charged Kwon with securities fraud over the UST/luna/Anchor Protocol scam.

Following Kwon’s arrest in Montenegro, the US Department of Justice also charged him with conspiracy to defraud, commodities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to engage in market manipulation. [Complaint, PDF] 

Dark Brandon has had it with your blockchain malarkey

The 2023 Economic Report of the President is out, with Chapter 8 devoted exclusively to digital assets: “This chapter primarily examines crypto assets, whose proponents have been relearning the lessons from previous financial crises the hard way.” [White House, PDF, pp 237-272]

This chapter lays out the Biden administration’s policy toward crypto. It is strident, as you’d expect just after a huge disaster like FTX. This is the no-coiner view coming from the highest levels of power.

Crypto bros and their pet politicians have long claimed that if you overregulate crypto, you’ll kill innovation. The White House is saying that, for all the promises and hot air, there is no innovation here — so the path is clear to regulate the hell out of you. 

The chapter begins with crypto’s promises. Crypto assets could be investment vehicles. Crypto could offer money-like functions. Crypto could enable fast digital payments. Crypto could increase financial inclusion. Crypto assets could improve the US’s current financial structure.

“Could” is a word that means “doesn’t.” The report contrasts crypto’s claims with “the reality of crypto assets” — in which crypto falls flat in every instance.

Crypto is mostly used for speculative trading, the report states. The reason tokens are volatile is that many “do not have a fundamental value.” Bitcoin was supposed to be a hedge against inflation — but “as inflation increased globally in the second half of 2021 and in 2022, the prices of crypto assets collapsed, proving them to be, at best, an ineffective inflation hedge.” 

The report also goes through bitcoin’s failure as money — in part because you can’t have something both serve as a speculative asset and as money: “the riskier an asset is, the less likely it can effectively serve as money.”

Crypto’s main role in finance is to create new and ever-riskier derivatives with poor regulation. That’s where the “innovation” is. This carries a tremendous risk of economic contagion. The other innovative financial use cases are ransomware and money laundering.

Stablecoins are subject to run risk — just like a bank run — which could “lead to disruptions in the markets for the reserve assets and reduce the market value of the issuer’s remaining reserves because the sales of the reserve assets put further downward pressure on the prices of remaining reserves.” 

The report doesn’t miss the horrors of crypto mining either: massive energy waste, e-waste, and noise pollution. “Evidence suggests that cryptomining has substantial costs for local communities and has few, if any, attendant benefits.”

Blockchain, or digital ledger technology (DLT), isn’t magic either. It’s stupendously inefficient for supply chains — if the blockchain bit even does anything. Helium, the fraudulent wireless network project, was an a16z-funded token pump-and-dump.

DLTs are at best experimental. They could be of economic value in the future! Which means they aren’t at all in the present. A private, centralized blockchain is just a clunky, slow database.

One bit of actual news from the report: FedNow, the Fed’s new instant payment service due in July, shoots the idea of a US CBDC through the head, despite all of CBDC’s ill-specified hypothetical potential — “the benefits of circulating digital money after FedNow is launched may be minimal.”

Crypto could be all manner of fabulous things. It just isn’t actually any of those things in practice.

Crypto cannot be allowed to break laws in the pursuit of hypothetical tech-magic benefits — “regulators must apply the lessons that civilization has learned, and thus rely on economic principles, in regulating crypto assets.”

Coinbase guesses wrong about Earn

The SEC has sent Coinbase a Wells notice — a threat that action is imminent. This notice is about the current version of the exchange’s Earn product — the one that Coinbase said in its 10-K earnings call was definitely not a security, probably.

Coinbase’s previous Earn product got a Wells notice before launch, in September 2021. Coinbase didn’t post the notice itself that time — they blustered, then folded. But they posted the notice this time. [blog post; Wells Notice, PDF; 8-K]

Rarely do companies receiving a Wells notice make those notices public. The last crypto firm to disclose a Wells notice was Canadian chat app Kik in 2018, as it geared to do battle with the SEC over whether its KIN token was a security. The SEC sued. Kik went to court, and the judge ultimately ruled against Kik.

Paul Grewal, Coinbase’s chief legal officer, complains that Coinbase spoke to the SEC more than thirty times. Sure — but it turns out that if you sit down with a cop and tell him all the bad things you’re doing, he might be taking notes, and then he might tell you to stop doing the bad things.

Matt Levine thinks the SEC wants Coinbase to stop trading in securities at all, and possibly just go away: [Bloomberg]

If Bernie Madoff came to the SEC and said “if you want a higher class of more trustworthy Ponzi schemes, you will need to write a few new rules adapting the disclosure regime to Ponzi schemes,” the SEC would have said “no we absolutely do not want that, we want much less Ponzi scheming, and we certainly do not want to give our approval to Ponzi schemes by writing rules for them.” One gets the sense the attitude to crypto is similar.

… If you run a crypto exchange and you want to set up a meeting with regulators to talk about how to write regulations to prevent a repeat of the recent crypto collapses, they will not trust you, because that is what FTX was saying too. There is not much goodwill left.

John Reed Stark goes through Coinbase’s public response and why it’s nonsense. “Not only are Coinbase’s argument weak, misguided, and more akin to public relations than legal positions, but Coinbase’s arguments are also proven failures of crypto-mumbo-jumbo and ludicrous jaundiced rhetoric.” [LinkedIn] 

Dirty Bubble is shorting $COIN because it’s “a cash-burning regulatory nightmare with limited upside.” [Substack] 

Regulatory clarity

In a class action against the Uphold exchange, Judge Denise Cote in the Southern District of New York has found that the Electronic Funds Transfer Act applies to crypto, specifically Reg E of the act. This is a finding that this complaint in the class action can go ahead — but the order is very clear, and if this order isn’t used in later cases we’ll be amazed. Reg E provides consumer protections over unauthorized transactions, error resolution, and provision of receipts and periodic statements. Crypto exchanges are not at all set up for dealing with any of this — so they might want to get onto it. [Credit Slips; Order, PDF; Consumer Finance] 

In a letter calling Binance a “hotbed” of illegal activity, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) along with two other Senators had asked Binance to provide balance sheets, data on the number of US users, internal policies relating to AML, as well as written policies regarding the relationship between Binance and Binance US. Binance responded with a 14-page letter describing its compliance history — and saying it has a team of 750 compliance staffers! — without addressing financials. [Bloomberg] 

Crypto advertising in Belgium will need to be submitted to the Financial Services and Markets Authority ten days in advance for approval, from May 17. [FSMA]

The SEC has issued a new alert to investors: “Those offering crypto asset investments or services may not be complying with applicable law, including federal securities laws.” [SEC]

Fun in the Sun

The SEC’s really going for it lately. It’s charged Justin Sun of Tron with issuing unregistered securities  — the TRX and BTT tokens — and wash-trading those securities.

Eight celebrities have also been charged, including YouTuber Jake Paul and actress Lindsay Lohan, for illegally touting TRX and BTT without making the proper disclosures. You have to say what you’re being paid to tout for securities, as Kim Kardashian found out previously. [SEC press release; complaint, PDF]

Paul, Lohan, and four of the other celebrities agreed to pay a total of $400,000 to settle the charges. Sun did not settle. Instead, he tweeted that the charges lack merit. So, he’s going to fight this? [Twitter, archive]

Selling Signature for its organs

Signature Bank has been sold! Well, mostly. Flagstar Bank has acquired most of Signature’s deposits and some of its loans. Flagstar did not acquire $4 billion of deposits from Signature’s crypto operations — those are being left with the FDIC. The Signet inter-crypto-exchange network is also being left behind. [FDIC; Bloomberg]

The FDIC anticipates losses on its insurance fund of up to $2.5 billion. Approximately $60 billion in likely-bad loans will remain in the receivership for later disposition by the FDIC.

Senator Warren wrote another one of her letters to bankers, this time to Joseph DePaolo, the former CEO of Signature, on March 15. Warren asks DePaolo to describe the full scope of his lobbying efforts to roll back Dodd-Frank. She also wants to know details of executive bonuses, including if DePaolo received bonuses related to his efforts to limit the regulation of Signature. [Warren, PDF]

In 2018, President Trump signed into law the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, scaling back Dodd-Frank regulations. The Act exempted mid-size banks with under $250 billion in assets from strict regulatory scrutiny. By the time Signature collapsed, it was over the old threshold of $50 billion, but under the new one. Warren sees this as the main cause of Signature’s failure.

Patrick McHenry is chair of the House Financial Services Committee, which is investigating the collapse of Signature and SVB. Signature threw a fundraiser for McHenry 10 days before it collapsed. McHenry’s campaign has said it won’t process any of the donations from the event. [Bloomberg]

The Wall Street Journal tells the story of the last days of Signature. “On Sunday afternoon, March 12, the Fed told Signature that it wouldn’t lend it any more money.” [WSJ]

Why was Signature shuttered? Maybe it was insolvent, but insolvency isn’t the only reason regulators take over a bank. Dirty Bubble suspects the takeover relates to misuse of Signature’s Signet payment network. As well as FTX, the bank “collected a laundry list of other bad actors in the crypto space despite their allegedly strict KYC practices.” [Dirty Bubble] 

Freeing crypto from the legacy fiat system

After the demise of Silvergate and Signature, US crypto firms lament that they can’t find new banking partners. CoinDesk asked several banks about crypto — and those that bothered replying said they didn’t want crypto customers. [Bloomberg; CoinDesk] 

The Kraken crypto exchange will no longer support ACH transfers following the implosion of Silvergate. “Beginning March 27th, you’ll no longer see a deposit option via Plaid or withdrawal option via ACH Silvergate.” [Twitter; Reddit; CoinDesk]

The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority has told banks to improve their reporting on crypto assets and provide APRA with daily updates. [AFR]

The Federal Reserve has just published its full order denying Custodia Bank’s application for an account at the Fed. We’ll detail this more next time, but we’d summarize it as: “no way are we letting you bozos near the financial system.” [Federal Reserve, PDF] (Update, April 9: Our Custodia report is finally out!)

Return of the FTX Bahamas party fund

FTX US says that FTX Digital Markets (FTX DM) — FTX’s Bahamas entity, whose main practical role was to fund Sam Bankman-Fried’s partying — is a legal and economic “nullity,” and that its bankruptcy should just be folded into the US proceeding in Delaware.

The joint provisional liquidators (JPLs) in the Bahamas have apparently been threatening avoidance actions over payments made by the entities in US bankruptcy. The JPLs also applied in the Bahamas for a ruling that FTX US does not own “core assets.”

FTX US is asking Judge Michael Dorsey for declaratory judgments that FTX DM has no ownership interest in FTX’s cryptos, money, intellectual property, or customer information. In an adversarial preceding, FTX wants the court to assert that the assets lodged under the Bahamas unit were “fraudulent transfers,” and are therefore rightfully owned by FTX US. [Complaint, PDF]

We covered the tale of FTX’s very dodgy Bahamas entity previously. FTX US had reached an agreement with the JPLs, but that agreement appears to have failed. 

The US Trustee is appealing Judge Dorsey’s refusal to appoint an examiner in FTX. The bankruptcy appellate panel — three bankruptcy judges from another district within the circuit — will hear that appeal. [Doc 1123, PDF]

The FTX bankruptcy estate is set to get back $404 million from Modulo Capital, a hitherto-unknown Bahamas hedge fund that received $475 million in seed capital from Sam Bankman-Fried in 2022. The court needs to approve the deal. [Bloomberg]

Crypto is really a large derivatives market propped up by an ever-shrinking spot market. Traders want leverage. We predicted in December that a new crypto futures exchange would spring up to replace FTX. A new one hasn’t sprung up yet — but a number of existing exchanges are thinking of buying FTX-owned LedgerX to do this job for them. [Bloomberg]

Image: Dont Kwoff

Posted on by Amy Castor 1

Crypto collapse: Signature Bank blows up, US crypto frantically looks for banking

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“In five years a number of banks will not be around because of blockchain technology.”

~ Joseph DePaolo, CEO, Signature Bank, 2018

All my banks gone

Crypto gets its wish — freedom from the corrupt and filthy fiat currency system! Silvergate and Signature, the two main crypto banks in the US, are gone.

After Silicon Valley Bank collapsed on Friday, March 10, US regulators worried about Signature’s concentration of large deposits that exceeded the FDIC insurance limit. Signature’s customers noticed too. They pulled billions of dollars in deposits from Signature later that same day. 

(Morning Brew has a good video explaining the process.) [Twitter, video]

New York regulators shut down Signature on Sunday, March 12. Shareholders are wiped out — but all depositors, even those with deposits above the FDIC $250,000 threshold, will be made whole. [Federal Reserve; NYDFS; FDIC]

The New York Department of Financial Services took control of Signature Bank pursuant to Section 606 of the New York Banking Law. Frances Coppola suspects the NYDFS acted under clauses (b), (c), and (d): the bank was conducting its business in an unauthorized or unsafe manner, it was in an unsound or unsafe condition to transact its business, and it could not with safety and expediency continue business. [FindLaw; Twitter]

Signature had 40 branches, total assets of $110.36 billion, and total deposits of $88.59 billion as of the end of 2022 — making this the third-largest bank collapse in US history.

Leading up to the announcement, President Biden met on Sunday afternoon with Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Federal Reserve Vice Chair Lael Brainard, and White House economist Jared Bernstein. Biden directed them to act, and the measures were announced just after 6 pm. [FT]

The closure came as a surprise even to the bank’s management — who only found out just before the public announcement. They were all fired. [Bloomberg] 

USDC can buy that for a dollar

After a weekend pause, Coinbase began allowing USDC redemptions again on Monday, and USDC has recovered its dollar peg. [Twitter]

Circle says no USDC reserves were held at Signature — but the company was dependent on Signature’s real-time payment rail, Signet. This left Circle scrambling at the last moment to set up new banking. Now Circle will be relying on BNY Mellon and a new partner: Cross River Bank. [Twitter, archive; Twitter, archive]

Cross River, based in Fort Lee, NJ, is another “crypto first” bank. We’re sure this will work out great. [Techcrunch, 2022]

Both Silvergate and Signature ran inter-exchange settlement systems specifically for crypto exchanges — SEN at Silvergate and Signet at Signature. These allowed exchanges to move money between each other at any time of day or night.

One guy told CoinDesk that Signet was still up and running in some capacity on Monday. Though Circle tried it and couldn’t use it. [CoinDesk]

Coinbase had about $240 million in corporate cash in Signature, but it expects to recover the funds fully. [Twitter, archive]

Paxos said it held $250 million of its stablecoin backing reserves at Silvergate, and that it “holds private deposit insurance well in excess of our cash balance and FDIC per-account limits.”[Twitter]

Freed from the lead weight of the legacy bankster system

With the closure of Silvergate and now Signature, crypto has been effectively shut out of the US banking system.

Exchanges, stablecoin issuers, and crypto hedge funds are all frantically hunting around for new banking — even looking outside the US. [Bloomberg]

Crypto companies are eyeing up other banks and payment processors, including Mercury, Brex, MVB, Western Alliance, Synapse, and Customers Bank — the last of which presently holds some of the reserves for the USDC and Paxos stablecoins. Or maybe JPMorgan Chase will take their calls. [The Block]

What happens next

These FDIC interventions are a warning cannonball shot to every other bank in the US. Straighten up your books and don’t specialize in bad customer bases — or the FDIC will swoop in, shoot you through the head, and sell your organs.

Crypto is one such customer base. Crypto customers were already strongly correlated with money laundering and crime — and now crypto correlates with hot money that flows in and out by billions a day. That’s a hazardous kind of customer for any bank to specialize in.

This is terrible news for crypto. Losing your banking rails is the worst thing that can happen to a crypto firm. Unless the crypto industry can find reliable US dollar payment rails that regulators will put up with, crypto in the US is dead as a financial product.

A few small banks will step in to pick up where Silvergate and Signature left off. But we greatly doubt the US is going to let these banks replace Silvergate and Signature.

Good thing crypto is uncensorable and unstoppable and doesn’t need banking.

More good news for bitcoin

It isn’t just a liquidity problem — Coinbase has removed all Binance USD trading pairs. The only place you can turn BUSD into dollars is now Paxos itself, BUSD’s issuer. This requires you to pass KYC and AML to US standards. Quite a lot of Binance traders can’t do that — so they’re buying BTC on Binance and moving that off instead. This makes number go up, so it’s definitely good news for bitcoin. [CoinDesk]

Paysafe, Binance’s UK payments processor, has cut them off, effective May 22 this year. “We have concluded that the UK regulatory environment in relation to crypto is too challenging to offer this service at this time and so this is a prudent decision on our part taken in an abundance of caution.” Ya don’t say. [Bloomberg]

HMRC in the UK has required Coinbase to provide information on all users who received a payout of more than £5,000 in the 2021 tax year. HMRC required the same of Coinbase in 2020. If you made money on Coinbase in the UK in the bubble, you may want to double-check if you need to correct your 2021–2022 tax return. These statist jackboots aren’t going to pay for themselves. [circumstances.run; Twitter, 2020]

The US Department of Justice is probing the collapse of Terra-Luna. [WSJ]

Kyle Davies from Three Arrows Capital has a very particular understanding of 3AC’s part in the crypto collapse. “If you think about, why are people angry? It has nothing to do with me actually. They’re angry that the market went down. In terms of us, we have no regulatory action anywhere, no lawsuits at all. There’s just nothing, so I know they’re clearly not mad at anything. They’re mad because the supercycle didn’t happen maybe, I don’t know. Something like that,” Davies said from his new desk in a non-extradition country. [CoinDesk]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0