Binance gets hit with crypto’s worst possible fate: compliance

Binance and CZ himself just settled with the US Department of Justice, the Treasury, and the CFTC. The stake through Binance’s heart won’t be the $4.3 billion in fines — it’ll be the compliance. 

Real finance businesses that don’t run on crime can do compliance — they just don’t like it. Businesses that run on crime are screwed.

We wouldn’t be surprised if Binance files for bankruptcy next year, and the regulators just become creditors in the bankruptcy.

This one is on David’s blog. [David Gerard]

SEC sues Binance, part 1: the complaint, Binance US asset freeze, Tai Chi plan, sock puppet CEOs, weird cash flows

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“Every single one of these news updates from the slow motion implosion of the great fake tech money pyramid scheme is like reading headlines that say: ‘Man confused as to why his clothing caught fire after dousing self with kerosene.’ Every one.”

A Shiny Blue Thing

CZ: “4”
SEC: “Fore!”

A day before the SEC sued Coinbase, the agency also filed a suit against Binance, the world’s largest offshore crypto casino, and its affiliate Binance.US. Binance founder Changpeng Zhao, better known as “CZ,” was also named in the suit. 

CZ tweeted “4,” which means he is dismissing the complaint as “FUD, fake news, attacks, etc.” If you have a single-digit shorthand for this sort of thing, you may already be in trouble. [Twitter, archive; Twitter, archive]

The 136-page complaint, filed in the District of Columbia on June 5, outlines 13 charges. Unlike the Coinbase suit, this one alleges fraud. The complaint comes with nearly 100 exhibits, some of which are incendiary. [Press release, Complaint, PDF; Docket]

CZ has his hands full these days. The US Department of Justice is currently investigating Binance over money laundering. In March, the CFTC filed its own enforcement action against Binance and CZ — which Binance has until July 27 to respond to. [CFTC docket]

The SEC complaint covers some of what’s in the CFTC complaint. But there’s a pile of new stuff. This is a huge amount to cover, so we’ll be doing it over a few posts.

The SEC complaint

The lawsuit is against Binance Holdings Limited, BAM Trading Services Inc., BAM Management US Holdings Inc., and Changpeng Zhao. (BAM Trading runs Binance.US; BAM Management is a holding company that owns BAM Trading.) Summons were served to listed company addresses and to an address for CZ in Malta. [defendant list, PDF]

The SEC comes out of the gate loud:

This case arises from Defendants’ blatant disregard of the federal securities laws and the investor and market protections these laws provide.

Among the accusations:

  • Binance and BAM Trading both operated as unregistered securities exchanges, broker-dealers, and clearing agencies, while raking in $11.6 billion in revenue. 
  • Binance’s own BNB and BUSD tokens are securities, as are 10 other tokens listed for trading on Binance.US.
  • Binance lending products (Simple Earn and BNB Vault) and Binance.US staking products are also securities.
  • CZ claimed BAM operated separately from its offshore parent and had its own leadership. In practice, he firmly controlled BAM and the US platform’s customer assets.
  • Binance secretly enabled US-based high-value “VIP” customers to trade on its non-US platform. 
  • BAM defrauded company investors of $200 million by lying to them about non-existent controls against abusive trading on the platform.
  • CZ funneled customer funds to Sigma Chain, a trading entity that he owned.
  • Sigma Chain inflated the trading volume on the US site through wash trading — because the Binance trading engine let anyone trade with themselves.
  • Binance and CZ commingled billions in customer funds on Binance.US and sent them to market maker Merit Peak, also owned by CZ.

The SEC wants Binance and BAM permanently enjoined from doing any of this ever again, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with interest, civil money penalties, and equitable relief.

The SEC has also sought to freeze customer assets on Binance.US — specifically to protect US customers from CZ and Binance.com. 

Tai Chi: A plan to evade regulation

CZ launched Binance in July 2017 to rapid popularity. He evaded accountability from the start, moving his headquarters from China to Japan to Malta.

Per the complaint, CZ denies that Binance has an office at all: “Wherever I sit is the Binance office. Wherever I meet somebody is going to be the Binance office.”

A month after launching in China, Binance revealed that the US and China together made up nearly half of its customer base. [Binance, archive]

But how to keep the ball rolling? Crypto trading was banned in China in 2019. It continued online through foreign exchanges until September 2021, when China declared all cryptocurrency transactions illegal.

CZ needed US customers — especially “VIP” ones — but not US regulation. So, starting in 2018, he worked on how to surreptitiously evade US securities laws. As his chief compliance officer Samuel Lim admitted: “we do not want [Binance].com to be regulated ever.” [Doc 17-5, PDF]

The trouble was, as Lim put it to fellow Binance employee Alvin Bro: “we are operating as a fking unlicensed securities exchange in the USA bro.”

Lim was keenly aware of the hazards of US law enforcement:

there is no fking way in hell i am signing off as the cco for the ofac shit

theres a certain point where money is totally useless, and that is making a declaration to the USA that you are clean

when shanghai is totally cowboy

there is no fking way we are clean

i have zero visibility on our VIP clients

ZERO

the strategy of bnb is to survive for 2 years and f off

and in this 2 yrs try ur bestest to not land in jail

An unnamed “consultant” who ran “a crypto asset trading firm in the United States” suggested options to CZ and his team. One option was low-risk: settle the regulators’ concerns in an orderly manner. But if they went that route, they might be shut out of the US market entirely for months or years. The second option was risker, but more profitable: create a separate US entity that would head off the regulators.

The consultant suggested engaging with the SEC on how to comply but “with no expectation of success and solely to pause potential enforcement actions.” The new entity would “become the target of all built-up enforcement tensions” and “reveal, retard, and resolve built-up enforcement tensions.”

The new entity would also give Binance better access to US dollars without Binance.com needing its own banking relationships.

Binance would still need to insulate the new entity from US enforcement: “Key Binance personnel continue to operate from non-US locations to avoid enforcement risk” and “Cryptocurrency wallets and key servers continue to be hosted at non-US locations to avoid asset forfeiture.”

This was the “Tai Chi plan,” first reported in Forbes in October 2020. Binance filed a defamation suit against Forbes for this report, though they withdrew it a few months later. Binance then tried to buy equity in Forbes in a SPAC deal that later fell through — though this didn’t hold Forbes back from going in hard against Binance. The SEC complaint includes the original Tai Chi documents. [Forbes, 2020; Doc 17-2, PDF; Doc 17-3, PDF]

CZ opted to go ahead with the Tai Chi plan. Binance.US launched in July 2019, run by a separate entity, BAM Trading. Binance announced it would begin restricting US customers from transacting on Binance.com and they should use the US site instead.

CZ’s sockpuppets

Binance.US was a supposedly independent US affiliate of Binance.com, run by BAM Trading, incorporated in Delaware. In practice, CZ reportedly ran BAM himself with an iron hand.

Catherine Coley and Brian Books — “BAM CEO A” and “BAM CEO B” in the complaint — sang like birds to the SEC. Brooks detailed to the SEC how CZ was not merely the chairman of BAM, but exercised CEO-level close control.

Even BAM’s accountants cautioned their client that the lack of information around money movements “makes it very difficult to ensure the Company is fully collateralized at specific points in time.”

Only two people — CZ and another person, Guangying Chen, who nobody seems to admit much about — controlled all of the flows of cash and cryptos.

Coley and her team were extremely unhappy after reading the Forbes article on the Tai Chi plan:

As BAM CEO A [Coley] explained to the Binance CFO shortly after the article was released, BAM Trading employees “lost a lot of trust with the article” and “the entire team feels like they’ve been duped into being a puppet.”

The SEC wants to freeze Binance.US funds

The SEC was very concerned about the status of Binance.US customer funds all through early 2023 and couldn’t get straight answers out of BAM or Binance.com as to where the funds were held and who controlled the purse strings.

On June 6, the SEC filed a motion seeking an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Binance and BAM. Customer assets at Binance.US are largely controlled by non-US entities, and Binance has allegedly siphoned a pile of cash out of BAM. Motions like this are what the SEC does when it suspects huge fraud.

The SEC specifically wants to let Binance.US customers withdraw their funds, but not allow Binance to transfer money outside the US. [SEC press release; Doc 4, PDF; Memorandum of law, PDF]

A hearing on the matter is set for Tuesday, June 13 at 2:00pm. It’s expected that Judge Amy Berman will rule on the day as to whether to put the TRO into place.

Where’s the US money?

The SEC’s investigation into Binance and Binance.US started on August 17, 2020 — before Forbes told the world about the Tai Chi plan. [Doc 12, PDF]

The first SEC contact with BAM was a December 17, 2020, subpoena for documentation of BAM’s control of Binance.US crypto assets.

The SEC requested more information in September 2022. BAM finally answered in February 2023, but “its answers were not reassuring.”

BAM had a “wallet custody agreement” such that Binance would custody Binance.US crypto — the part of the Tai Chi plan where the crypto would be held outside the US. BAM told the SEC that the wallet custody agreement “was never operationalized.”

The SEC sent Binance Holdings Limited (Binance.com) a Wells notice, indicating that an enforcement action was imminent, on February 21. BHL responded on March 15 that “BHL does not, and has not, served as the custodian of the digital assets on Binance.US.” [Doc 19-13, PDF]

But the SEC already knew this was not true — based on information it had gotten from Signature Bank, conversations with former BHL and BAM employees, and reports to BAM from BAM’s auditor Armanino. 

In the two weeks leading up to filing the June 5 complaint, the SEC was still trying to resolve the custody issue — with “numerous written and oral exchanges concerning custody of Binance.US Platform customers’ assets and, more importantly, who is in ultimate control of those assets.” [Doc 19-15, PDF; Doc 19-16, PDF]

BAM now “disputes its own auditor’s conclusion of past Binance custody over customer assets” (emphasis SEC’s) and “admits that Zhao and Binance continue to possess substantial control over at least some of BAM Trading’s crypto assets.”

BHL and CZ have not been helpful:

Zhao’s attorneys have continued to maintain that Zhao is not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States — despite setting up a crypto trading platform in the United States that has made hundreds of millions from trading with U.S. customers, and despite his beneficial ownership of accounts held at banks in the United States through which billions of dollars flowed to some of his foreign domiciled companies like Merit Peak and Sigma Chain.

As recently as June 4, BHL was begging the SEC not to freeze BAM assets. [Doc 19-14, PDF]

The Binance money funnel

Binance is a network of shell companies. These entities hypothetically have different roles, but in practice, money flows between them in vast amounts — mostly via transfers between the entities’ accounts at Silvergate Bank, and some at Signature. We know this because Silvergate, Signature, and FedWire told the SEC all about it. [Doc 21, PDF]

How much money are we talking about? Sachin Verma, an SEC forensic accountant, says:

At times the amounts being credited and debited during a single month amounts to movement of more than a billion dollars.

… On January 1, 2023, eight Binance/Zhao-owned companies had $58.7 million on deposit. During that same time frame, $840 million was deposited into, and $899 million was withdrawn, from those accounts

Binance could and did transfer funds without BAM’s knowledge. At one point, while she was CEO, Coley had to ask where $1.5 billion in daily transfers was coming from — neither she nor her team had the access needed to verify them. 

Coley also had to ask why on earth $17 million in BUSD was moving from Merit Peak (Binance) to Sigma Chain (Binance) via BAM, and where Merit Peak got the money from. [Doc 19-2, PDF]

The billions of dollars flowed in from Binance.US customers, through the various Binance companies’ checking accounts, into a Merit Peak account, to Paxos Singapore (for $21.6 billion of BUSD between 2019 and 2021), and out to … somewhere:

Binance Holdings Limited and Binance Capital Management show large deposits and withdrawals from and to Signature accounts for some Zhao-owned companies, and hundreds of millions of dollars have been transferred.

Per the SEC’s request to freeze Binance.US assets:

During 2022, a U.S. bank account for Swipewallet (beneficially owned by Zhao) sent $1.5 billion offshore in foreign exchange, or “FX,” wires … Between January and March 2023, multiple Binance accounts wired more than $162 million offshore for further credit of a foreign account belonging to the company beneficially owned by the Binance Back Office Manager.

That manager was Guangying Chen.

CZ ran billions of dollars through Silvergate every month. None of it ever stayed in one place for long — all the accounts were just checking accounts where money sat for a moment before being shuffled under another shell.

Unlike Sam Bankman-Fried, CZ seems from all this to have had the good sense to stash away billions of dollars in actual money. He also purchased a home in Dubai in 2021 — a coincidentally non-extradition jurisdiction. 

Where did the money end up? Where’s CZ keeping the dollars? Following the money trail is confusing — which appears to be the point.

It’s not clear whether Silvergate filed suspicious activity reports on all these dubious transfers. They certainly should have.

__________________

Also read:

SEC sues Binance, part 2

SEC sues Binance, part 3

Crypto collapse: Fahrenheit buys Celsius, DCG may be broke, Hong Kong cracks down, Binance commingling, how Bitfinex was hacked

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

Temperature drop

Fahrenheit has officially won the bid for the bankrupt Celsius Network’s assets —  pending approval by the court, which is near-certain, and by regulators, which is less so. A $10 million deposit is due by Monday. [Doc 2713, PDF]

Fahrenheit is a consortium that includes VC firm Arrington Capital, miner US Bitcoin, investment firm Proof Group, former Algorand CEO Steven Kokinos, and Seasons Capital CEO Ravi Kaza.

The new deal is an adaptation of the previous NovaWulf proposal. A “NewCo” will be created to take ownership of Celsius’ remaining DeFi tokens, its loan portfolio, its venture capital investments, its bitcoin mining operation, and $500 million in “liquid cryptocurrency” (not specified, but presumably Celsius’ remaining BTC and ETH). US Bitcoin will manage Celsius’ bitcoin mining operation.

Holders of Earn claims, some holders of Convenience claims, Withhold claims, and Borrow claims will receive equity in NewCo, pro rata. NewCo will endeavor to get a public stock exchange listing for the equity. Earn claimants will also get a distribution of the liquid cryptocurrency and any proceeds from litigation.

If you’re a Celsius creditor, the plan contains lots of important details. Read it and discuss this with your fellow creditors.

As with the original NovaWulf proposal, we think this is a Hail Mary pass that can only work if number goes up. On the other hand, it’s doing something and not just liquidating what little remains. Also, Alex Mashinsky won’t be involved.

DCG: When your left pocket can’t pay your right pocket

In the Genesis bankruptcy, Genesis’ parent company Digital Currency Group missed a $630 million payment to Genesis due earlier this month. Note that that’s a payment from themselves to themselves, and they still failed to make it.

This failure to pay was noted by Gemini, which has a tremendous interest in getting that money so Gemini Earn investors can be paid back. Gemini Earn’s retail customers are the largest creditor of Genesis. [Gemini, archive of May 25, 2023]

Gemini Earn was an investment product where Gemini customers put their money into Genesis to earn unlikely interest rates. Gemini’s customers were not so happy at the prospect of their money being stuck in the Genesis bankruptcy for months or years.

So in February, the creditors worked out an “agreement in principle” — not, you’ll note, an actual deal — whereby they would get money back from DCG, as the owners of Genesis. [press release]

In April, the creditors got sick of DCG messing about and upped their demands. This led to a bizarre statement from DCG on May 9 that they were “in discussions with capital providers for growth capital and to refinance its outstanding intercompany obligations with Genesis.” They didn’t have the money to pay themselves. [CoinTelegraph]

Gemini also plans to file a reorganization plan of its own. This is likely why Genesis has filed asking for its exclusive right to make reorganization proposals to be extended to August 27. The court will hear this motion on June 5. [Doc 329, PDF]

Either DCG is trying extremely hard to screw over Genesis customers … or, despite all the millions and billions with dollar signs in front in their accounts, and “$200 million” a year in Grayscale management fees, DCG is broke — at least in actual money — and has been pretending not to be broke. And we’re pretty sure Gemini is pushing this point this hard because they can’t cover their customers either. Imaginary assets are great — until you have to pay up.

Binance is outraged at Reuters catching them out again

Reuters has caught Binance at it again. This time, Binance was commingling customer funds and company revenue on the order of billions of (actual) dollars in their Silvergate accounts in 2020 and 2021. Controls? What are controls? [Reuters]

Binance told Reuters that this was money being used to buy BUSD and this was “exactly the same thing as buying a product from Amazon,” per Brad Jaffe, Binance’s VP of communications since August 2022.

This explanation is at odds with Binance’s previous claims to customers that dollars they sent to Silvergate were “deposits” that they could “withdraw” as dollars. Jaffe said that “the term ‘deposit’ is a communication term, it’s not an indication of the technical treatment of the funds.” Oh, a communication term — you mean like when words mean things in a context?

Reuters didn’t find any misappropriation of customer funds in the documents they saw. But commingling is a massive red flag for incompetence (as it turned out to be with FTX) and fraud — such as moving money around to evade regulatory scrutiny. Reuters includes a complex diagram of the international flows of Binance’s cash in the report.

Binance PR person Patrick Hillmann dismissed the story as “1000 words of conspiracy theories” and said that Reuters was “making stuff up.” Though Hillmann never stated at any point that Binance hadn’t commingled funds at Silvergate. Hillmann also decried “the xenophobia behind consistently mentioning @cz_binance’s ethnicity without noting that he’s been Canadian since the age of 12” … which the Reuters story didn’t do at all. [Twitter, archive]

Hong Kong brings some regulatory clarity

The Hong Kong Securities And Futures Commission (SFC) has finished its consultation on virtual asset trading platforms opening to retail investors. The rules allow licensed exchanges to offer trading to the public in tokens that are highly liquid and are not securities.

The rules are strict — no securities, no lending, no earn programs, no staking, no pro trading, and no custody. Unlicensed crypto exchanges are not allowed to advertise. Hong Kong very much wants to avoid the sort of embarrassment that comes with a large exchange like FTX failing. 

Exchanges will be required to assess the failure risk of all tokens they offer trading in. Tokens are required to have a 12-month track record. Exchanges will need to get smart contract audits where appropriate. 98% of client assets must be in cold wallets (offline); hot wallets must not hold more than 2%.

Margin trading is not yet allowed even for professional investors, but the SFC will issue guidance on derivatives in the future.

The guidelines take effect June 1, which is when exchanges can begin to apply for a license. [SFC; Consultation Conclusions, PDF]

Regulatory clarity around the world

Japan will be enforcing FATF rules on crypto from June. This went through with no objections because Japan learned its lesson from Mt. Gox and regulated crypto exchanges early. [Japan Today]

FATF tells CoinDesk that it didn’t actually demand that Pakistan not legalize crypto. “Countries are permitted, but not required, to prohibit virtual assets and virtual asset service providers.” [CoinDesk]

The International Organization of Securities Commissions is putting together recommendations on crypto. Service providers need to address conflicts of interest, separation of functions, and accounting client assets, and this has to work across borders. Get your comments in by July 31. [IOSCO, PDF; recommendations, PDF]

Huobi gets kicked out of Malaysia for failure to register. Not registering is a violation of Malaysia’s Capital Markets and Services Act of 2007. The Securities Commission Malaysia said Huobi has to disable its website and mobile apps on platforms including the Apple Store and Google Play.  [Securities Commission Malaysia]  

The CFTC is talking about all the fraud in crypto, says it’s on good working terms with the SEC on these matters, and warns the crypto industry that it’s not going to be a soft touch. [Reuters

The SEC has changed the disclaimer that commissioners say before speeches — probably in response to William Hinman’s comments saying ether wasn’t a security being cited in the Ripple case. [blog post]

Molly White put up Rep. Sean Casten (D-IL) questions at May 18, 2023, stablecoin hearing, and it’s a lovely five minutes. This guy understands precisely how Web3 was fundamentally a venture capital-funded securities fraud. [YouTube]

Bitfinex: whoops, apocalypse

The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project obtained an internal report on the August 2016 hack of the Bitfinex crypto exchange — the hack that led to the Tether printer going wild and the 2017 crypto bubble.

The report was commissioned by iFinex and prepared by Ledger Labs. It was never released, but OCCRP has obtained a draft.

Bitfinex kept transaction limits secured by three keys. It looks like someone made the mistake of putting two of the three keys on the same device. This is how the hacker was able to raise the global daily limit and drain the accounts.

One key was associated with a generic “admin” email address and another linked to “giancarlo,” which belonged to Bitfinex CFO Giancarlo Devasini. The report does not blame Devasini for the hack.

Ledger Labs thinks the hacker came in from an IP address in Poland. [OCCRP]

Tether’s issuance is up — but its usage is through the floor. The trading volume is at its lowest in four years. Most of the tether trading happens on Binance, which is where the majority of all trading volume happens, and where USDT is accepted as being worth a dollar. We mentioned last time that volume was down, but Kaiko has the numbers. [Kaiko]

More good news for bitcoin

Do Kwon’s bail has been scrapped. He’s back in jail in Montenegro, awaiting his local trial on charges of forging documents, specifically the ones he was using to try to get out of Montenegro to his next bolt-hole. [Reuters]  

Glassnode tells us that hodling has never been more popular! 68.1% of BTC hasn’t moved in the past year! Now, you might think that this is because most people who bought in during the bubble are still underwater. But “baghodler” isn’t yet a word. [Glassnode]

Shaquille O’Neal was finally served in the FTX class action suit against the exchange’s celebrity promoters — at the former FTX Arena. [Washington Post

Openfort is scraping up the very last of the Web3 gaming venture cash — they just got $3 million to do an online crypto wallet for blockchain games. You know, that gigantic current market that anyone has the slightest interest in. Openfort doesn’t appear to have a customer as yet. [VentureBeat]

Coinbase has a new TV ad! We know you lost all your money — but crypto is like the early Internet, really. [Youtube]

Solana is so thoroughly out of ideas that they’re adding a ChatGPT plugin. Presumably, it can write tweets for them. [The Block]

Crypto fans make up new justifications for the importance of their magic beans all the time. David Rosenthal takes us through a few. [DSHR Blog

Video: The problems with Crypto Currency. Max Silverman wanted to do an animation, so asked David for 90 seconds of audio. It came out great! [YouTube]

Crypto collapse: New Sam Bankman-Fried charge, Binance fallout, SEC sues exchange over crypto securities, how Signature died

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“who needs an examiner when you can just hand sam an empty sheet of paper and wait”

— haveblue

Sam is a growing boy, he needs his crimes

A new superseding indictment against FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried alleges that he paid Chinese officials $40 million in crypto in a bribe to unfreeze $1 billion in crypto on Alameda — which would violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Sam now faces 13 criminal counts. [Superseding indictment, PDF]

On Thursday, March 30, Sam took a trip to New York and pleaded not guilty to his latest five charges. He had to battle his way through a gaggle of reporters just to get in the door. At least it got him out of the house. [Twitter; YouTube; NYT]

In early 2021, China froze $1 billion of cryptos in various Alameda accounts on two of the country’s biggest crypto exchanges (which aren’t named in the indictment). Bankman-Fried “understood that the Accounts had been frozen as part of an ongoing investigation of a particular Alameda trading counterparty.” A bribe was sent from Alameda to a private blockchain address in November 2021. The accounts were unfrozen shortly after, and Alameda got its cryptos back.

Somehow, Daniel Friedberg, FTX’s chief counsel at the time knew nothing of this. Friedberg said in an affidavit dated March 19, 2021, when the FTX Arena naming rights deal was going through, that FTX and its affiliated companies “do not have any ownership or contracts or any other obligations with respect to any governmental agency of the People’s Republic of China, or any governmental agents or political persons.” [Miami-Dade Legislative Item, PDF, p. 54]

Sam will be kept on a very short leash while he’s out on bail. Sam gets a non-smartphone that only does voice and SMS — no internet access — and a locked-down laptop configured to access only certain websites. He can work with his lawyers, order food from DoorDash, and keep up with the sportsball. YouTube is also on the list, so we’re looking forward to the 10-hour video blogs detailing crimes hitherto unknown to humanity. [Order, PDF]

Sam’s father, Joseph Bankman, is paying his son’s lawyer fees with over $10 million that Sam borrowed from Alameda and gave to his father as a present in 2021. We wonder if John Jay Ray is going to come calling to claw this back for the bankruptcy estate. [Forbes]

In the FTX bankruptcy, a group of ad-hoc FTX creditors with $2 billion in claims want to participate in the bankruptcy without revealing their identities. They include “large institutional market makers and asset managers.” This is the precise sort of creditor that the Bankruptcy Act is not intended to protect from public scrutiny. [Doc 1137, PDF]

FTX appears to have been hiding money under the names of employees. The OKX exchange, formerly OKex, has agreed to turn over $157 million in FTX funds. $150 million of that was in an account of a former FTX employee. The ex-employee says the account was opened on behalf of Alameda. He has agreed to forfeit the assets. [Doc 1189, PDF; Doc 1190, PDF]

Binance: This is fine

The CFTC lawsuit against Binance, which we covered in detail on Tuesday, has rattled customers. Within days, the exchange saw outflows of $2 billion, out of a claimed reserve of $63.2 billion, according to Nansen. Currently, 28% of Binance reserves are in Tether and 10% are in BUSD. [WSJ, paywalled; Nansen]

The three large US hedge funds trading on Binance weren’t named in the CFTC complaint — though Radix Trading later came forward and said that they were “Trading Firm A.” Radix insists they did nothing wrong — they ran their apparent conspiracy to violate commodities laws past their in-house legal team, after all. [WSJ, paywalled]

But the CFTC complaint has “already sent chills” across the commodity trading industry — particularly firms who make their money from real commodity trading and only dabble in the toxic waste barrel of crypto. Market makers are wondering if they’re risking their own broker-dealer licenses. [Bloomberg]

Cash withdrawals from Binance US are no longer working via ACH through Signature. Binance says: “ACH deposits and withdrawals for a small subset of our users were disrupted last week and, out of an abundance of caution, remain paused. Our teams are working through this transition and expect to restore functionality within the next 24 hours.” It’s probably fine. Your funds are safe. [Reddit]

You’ll be shocked to hear that Binance kept substantial business links to China for years after its claimed 2017 exit, despite Binance executives repeatedly saying otherwise. [FT]

The Block reported in 2019 that Binance had offices in Shanghai. CZ hit the roof and threatened to sue them, with the explicit aim of outspending them on lawyers … and The Block stood by its story. (Ben Munster, then of Decrypt, helped with the response story, though The Block took out Ben’s harsher additions.) [The Block, 2019; Twitter, archive; Twitter, archive; The Block, 2019]

The sale of Voyager Digital to Binance US is on hold. The Department of Justice and the US Trustee appealed the sale on the basis that the order granted inappropriate immunity from prosecution, and asked for a stay. The appeals court has granted the request for a stay while the appeal proceeds. [Doc 1222, PDF; Doc 1223, PDF; Bloomberg]

Be your own Signature Bank

In his statement on the recent bank failures and the federal regulatory response, FDIC Chairman Martin Greunberg explained why Signature failed: the bank was insolvent, contrary to Barney Frank’s claims. [FDIC, PDF]

On March 10, Signature Bank lost 20 percent of its total deposits in a matter of hours, depleting its cash position and leaving it with a negative balance with the Federal Reserve as of close of business. Bank management could not provide accurate data regarding the amount of the deficit, and resolution of the negative balance required a prolonged joint effort among Signature Bank, regulators, and the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York to pledge collateral and obtain the necessary funding from the Federal Reserve’s Discount Window to cover the negative outflows. This was accomplished with minutes to spare before the Federal Reserve’s wire room closed. 

Over the weekend, liquidity risk at the bank rose to a critical level as withdrawal requests mounted, along with uncertainties about meeting those requests, and potentially others in light of the high level of uninsured deposits, raised doubts about the bank’s continued viability. 

Ultimately, on Sunday, March 12, the NYSDFS closed Signature Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver within 48 hours of SVB’s failure.

The FDIC has told crypto clients with deposits at Signature Bank that they have until April 5 to close their accounts and move their money. The FDIC is looking to sell off Signature’s Signet inter-crypto-exchange dark liquidity pool. [Bloomberg]

Frances Coppola explains precisely what happened at Signature. [Coppola Comment]

We noted previously how larger US banks don’t want to go within a mile of crypto. But some smaller banks are still feeling lucky. [WSJ, paywall]

The SEC shuts down Beaxy

The Beaxy crypto exchange shuttered after the SEC filed charges against it for failing to register as a national securities exchange, broker, and clearing agency, and over its 2018 ICO. The SEC also charged a market maker operating on Beaxy as an unregistered dealer. [SEC press release; complaint, PDF; CoinDesk]

Beaxy ran a “private sale” ICO for its internal exchange token BXY from May 2018 to June 2019. The SEC is charging Beaxy and its founder Artak Hamazaspyan over the ICO as an unregistered offering of securities to US retail.

That’s the sort of complaint we’re used to seeing from the SEC — but they’re also charging Windy Inc., who ran the Beaxy platform, and Windy’s founders, Nicholas Murphy and Randolph Abbott, over unregistered securities trading on the exchange.

If cryptos being traded are securities — and it’s likely that most are — that leaves even the normal activities of an exchange subject to a vast array of additional regulations.

The SEC is also charging Brian Peterson and Braverock Investments as unregistered dealers for market-making on Beaxy for the BXY and Dragonchain DRGN tokens. The SEC sued Dragonchain in August 2022, alleging that DRGN was an unregistered offering of securities; that case is proceeding. [SEC, 2022; case docket]

Hamazaspyan is also alleged to have misappropriated $900,000 from the ICO for his own use. Murphy and Abbott discovered this in October 2019 and convinced Hamazaspyan to pay back $420,000 to Beaxy and let Windy run Beaxy going forward.

Windy, Murphy, Abbott, Peterson, and Braverock settled, paying a total penalty between them of $228,579. The SEC case against Beaxy and Hamazaspyan over the ICO is proceeding.

Beaxy shut down on Tuesday, March 28, owing to “the uncertain regulatory environment surrounding our business.” We think it’s deadly certain. [Beaxy, archive]

This is the first SEC action over securities trading on an exchange. It’s a likely template for future SEC cases against other crypto exchanges — like, say, Coinbase.

The Coinbase employee convicted in a criminal case of wire fraud by insider trading is fighting an SEC civil case claiming that the insider-traded tokens were securities. [WSJ]

SEC chair Gary Gensler will be testifying before Congress on April 18. The very non-partisan committee announces that “Republicans will hold @GaryGensler accountable for his flagrant disregard for the law, jurisdiction, and the APA.” (The Administrative Procedure Act.) We hope the Blockchain Eight show up. [Twitter]

More good news for decentralization

Judge Larry Alan Burns of the Southern District of California has denied the motion to dismiss of members of the bZx DAO who held governance tokens (BZRX), finding the DAO is plausibly alleged to be a general partnership. [Order, PDF; CoinDesk]

One of the earliest objections to the original DAO in 2016 was that it would be a general partnership, leaving everyone involved jointly and severally liable. (This is why incorporation is a thing.) The same problem was frequently noted in the rise in DAOs in the recent crypto bubble. Nobody involved can claim they had no idea.

Regulatory clarity, European style

The European Banking Authority has a new consultation paper on anti-money laundering (AML) risk factors that national bank regulators should consider. Crypto-asset providers are listed as an area that regulators should examine closely, including if “Distributed Ledger Technology” is “essential to the sector’s business model and operation” or “where services of the subject of assessment are provided using DLT or blockchain technology.” Comments are due by June 29, 2023. [EBA, PDF]

Coming soon in European AML: no anonymous crypto payments in the EU of over 1,000 EUR. Crypto asset managers will be required to verify “their customers’ identity, what they own and who controls the company.” [EP]

Terra-Luna

After he was arrested last week, Do Kwon of Terraform Labs is serving time in a Montenegrin prison. Kwon is likely to stay in jail there for at least a year, while his appeals and extradition hearings proceed. We expect he’ll be sent to South Korea first, and only then to the US. [YNA, in Korean; Protos

South Korean prosecutors are making another effort to arrest Terraform Labs cofounder Daniel Shin, who left the company in March 2020. [Bloomberg]

MicroStrategy doubles down 

As part of winding the bank down, Silvergate struck a deal with MicroStrategy to accept $161 million to repay a $205 million bitcoin-backed loan — taking a $44 million loss. Silvergate had said repeatedly that its bitcoin-backed loans were safe. [WSJ, paywall]

MicroStrategy sold 1.35 million shares of MSTR in Q1 2023, diluting shareholders by over 10% to pay off its Silvergate loan — and bought $150 million more BTC between February 16 and March 23. This is a Hail Mary pass praying for number to go up, which it is quite unlikely to do. [8-K; Twitter]

More good news for bitcoin

Hindenburg Research’s latest short-seller report is on Jack Dorsey’s Block, formerly Square. Cash App’s growth is aimed at targeting the “unbanked” — which mostly means embracing noncompliance to grow its user base. A Cash App employee told Hindenburg, “every criminal has a Square Cash App account.” And this is before Block has even got into crypto in any substantial way. [Hindenburg]

Indicted crypto promoter Guo Wengui used his culture-war social network Gettr to pump cryptos. Wengui was fined a billion dollars by the SEC in 2021 over his crypto offerings. [Washington Post]

The British Virgin Islands has ordered Three Arrows Capital founders Zu Shu and Kyle Davies to attend an examination on May 22 or be in contempt of court. We’re sure they’ll be right on that. [CoinDesk]

Freeing yourself from fiat history

If you click on a lot of old links to theblockcrypto.com, it’ll tell you that The Block has “sunset our News+ product” — their previous paywalled news offering. They didn’t open up those old pages — they’ve just effectively deleted a whole swathe of their journalism from 2018 to 2020!

We discovered this when Amy went looking for one of her old Block pieces on Binance for our article on Tuesday and when David looked for various other Block articles for today’s story.

You’d think a publisher wouldn’t just trash their own search optimization — but in practice, both mainstream and specialist publications destroy their own URLs and content all the time. So it’s pretty likely this was an error. Hopefully a reversible one.

We remember when Decrypt moved their domain from decryptmedia.com to decrypt.co. They saw their Google hits go through the floor and thought they’d been shadowbanned … not realizing they’d done it to themselves. The Block changed its URL to theblock.co around the same time, with similar effects.

In the meantime: ARCHIVE EVERYTHING. Stuff that’s blocked from the Internet Archive saves just fine into archive.is, and archive.is also accepts pages from the Internet Archive, Google cache, and Bing cache and indexes them correctly under the source URL. David uses and recommends the Get Archive extension for Firefox. [Mozilla Add-Ons]

CFTC cracks CZ’s phone, sues Binance — what’s a little terrorist financing between friends

The CFTC dropped a bomb on the world’s largest offshore crypto casino on Monday. It’s suing Binance and its founder Changpeng Zhao (“CZ”) for violating US commodities trading laws. Samuel Lim, Binance’s former chief compliance officer, was also charged with “willfully aiding and abetting” Binance’s violations.

We hope you’re not too shocked to hear that Binance trades against its own customers, or that the CFTC somehow got access to CZ’s phone and private chats on Signal.

This complaint is odd. It reads like it has a shadow twin document — a sealed criminal indictment that’s just waiting until CZ can be extradited.

Read our latest on David’s blog.

Image: The Untouchables