Tag: Caroline Ellison

Tether, FTX, and Deltec Bank: MONEY TIME

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

There’s a lot of class action lawsuits in crypto. We mostly don’t note these — they so rarely go anywhere — but a consolidated class action against FTX’s various enablers has turned up some interesting allegations concerning everyone’s favorite stablecoin, Tether, and its remaining US dollar banker, Deltec Bank of the Bahamas.

Tether has banked with Deltec since 2018. Deltec was one of the few banks in the world that would have anything to do with Tether after their deal with Crypto Capital led to $850 million of the Tether reserve being frozen.

We already knew that FTX/Alameda, also based in the Bahamas, was in it up to their necks with Tether. Alameda was Tether’s largest customer between 2020 and 2022 that wasn’t a crypto exchange.

The new allegations, filed in a Florida federal court, are that Deltec was an active and enthusiastic part of the FTX and Alameda business schemes that lost billions of customer dollars and for which Sam Bankman-Fried is now in jail.

The amended complaint

The new amendment to the complaint, filed on February 16, is based on 7,000 pages of direct text messages that were offered up in discovery. The full amended complaint is 158 pages. The Deltec shenanigans are paragraphs 133 to 260. [Motion, PDF; Complaint, PDF; Case docket] 

The complaint hammers on Deltec’s relationship with Tether, FTX, and Alameda. It states that Jean Chalopin, the head of Deltec, and Gregory Pepin, Deltec’s deputy CEO, played a key role in FTX’s money laundering.

FTX/Alameda: MONEY PARTY THE BEST PARTY

Bankman-Fried’s empire came crashing down in November 2022, when it was revealed the company had an $8 billion hole in its customer accounts. The complaint lists the various defendants in the case — Gary Wang, Nishad Singh, Caroline Ellison, Ryan Salame, and others. 

Deltec provided banking for FTX Trading, FTX US, and Alameda. Pepin manually allocated incoming customer funds to FTX accounts and moved the funds to Alameda. Deltec also extended a “secret line of credit” to Alameda of $1.8 billion.

Deltec was a money launderette for FTX. They would happily let all those annoying compliance requirements slide for their very good friends at FTX.

Deltec would pass compliance questions from intermediary banks to FTX or just make up fake invoices to account for otherwise unexplained transactions. Here’s Pepin:

[Ibanera] are asking info about [the foregoing FTX customer] do you have the agreement linked to this deposit? so i can get [the wire] release asap?

Idea 🙂 Send me a PDF of the term and condition + Invoice and I’ll send

… Now if you send me a XLS sample or whatever of invoice I can populate invoice myself later can do? 

Pepin would send ecstatic messages in the group chat when a batch of wires came in. The complaint has a whole page of Pepin posting like this:

MOOONNNEEEYYY TTTIIIIMMMMEEEE

I HEAR A MONEY TIME IS HAPPENING HERE I THINK I NEED TO BE A PART OF IT

doing my best to hold the wall but such money tsunami is hard to handle dude

MONEY PARTY THE BEST PARTY

it is MONEY TIME INDEEDE

Deltec Bank also moved FTX customer deposits directly to Alameda on request, in the billions. Deltec would even run out of cash to pay FTX customer withdrawals and have to ask Alameda to cover for them. Pepin: “Lena you send today the 300m? or later? As we won’t have liquidity”.

Moonstone Bank

Chalopin bought Farmington Bank in Washington in 2020 in a deal with FTX, turning a tiny local bank into a crypto service company — mostly for FTX and Alameda. The bank was then renamed Moonstone.

Moonstone joined the Federal Reserve without notifying the Fed of its change of business plan from a local farmers’ bank to a crypto money launderette. The Fed shut Moonstone down in August 2023.

North Dimension: Ipad 11 “ich Cell Phone

North Dimension was a fake electronics company that FTX/Alameda created so they could set up accounts at Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank in its name. FTX had customers wire money to North Dimension’s Silvergate and Signature accounts so that it would go directly to Alameda. This was part of the money laundering charge that Bankman-Fried was convicted on.

Pepin made sure that deposits from North Dimension came through to Deltec and were sent to FTX or Alameda as needed.

FTX put actual effort into the North Dimension bit of the fraud, if only the barest minimum. North Dimension even had a website!

The site didn’t actually work — all the product links went to the contact page. It was “rife with misspellings and bizarre product prices,” including “sale prices that were hundreds of dollars above a regular price” — such as the fabulously desirable “Ipad 11 “ich Cell Phone,” normally $410, but available at a sale price of just $899.

The North Dimension website is in the Internet Archive. The “About” page is a trip. The company logo comes from DesignEvo Free Logo Maker — it’s their “3D Orange Letter N” logo. You can see every penny of the twenty-five cents they spent on this. [North Dimension home page, archive; product page, archive; about page, archive; DesignEvo]

Tether and Deltec

When Tether became a Deltec customer in November 2018, it deposited about $1.8 billion — making up nearly half of Deltec’s total deposits at the time.

Alameda was the second-largest creator of tethers (USDT) — “about one-third of USDT minted at any time went to Alameda.”

The USDT was funded with FTX customer deposits which Deltec routed to Alameda. Remember that Alameda and FTX were claiming at this time to be completely separate operationally.

Alameda created and redeemed tethers directly via Alameda and Tether’s Deltec accounts. Alameda would first send a message to the Alameda/Tether/Deltec group chat. Transfers would often have to wait for Pepin to be awake.

Alameda pumping out new tethers seems to have been the engine for the billions of tethers printed in 2020, 100 million at a time: “In total, Alameda minted more than $40 billion USDT through this scheme, encompassing nearly half of USDT in circulation at the time.”

How solidly backed was USDT by the account at Deltec? About as solidly as it was in 2017 when Tether didn’t have a bank account at all for months at a time:

… in November 2018, Deltec Bank provided an assurance letter stating that USDTs were fully back by cash, one U.S. dollar for every USDT. However, the next day, Tether began to transfer hundreds of millions in funds out of its Deltec Bank account, such that within 24 hours, Deltec Bank’s assurance letter was no longer true.

FTX’s alleged Tether scam

The complaint postulates that Alameda was furiously printing tethers so that Alameda could make less than a tenth of a percent from arbitraging the price of USDT:

Upon information and belief, Alameda and Tether profited from the scheme as follows. Alameda would create USDT in amounts and at times that would inflate the market price of the stablecoin. Alameda would promptly sell the USDT in the market, at several basis points above the purchase price. Tether, in turn, would receive U.S. dollars for stablecoins it minted from nothing.

This sounds unlikely to us — there just isn’t the volume on any existing USD-USDT trading pair. To turn USDT into dollars in any quantity, you need to buy crypto then sell that at an actual-dollar exchange.

Deltec allowed Alameda a three-day grace period to pay for its freshly created USDT — that $1.8 billion line of credit. We think Alameda’s scam would have been to do some market-moving trades to make enough dollars to pay for the tethers they’d just bought.

Attachments to the complaint

Also attached to the complaint is a declaration from Caroline Ellison, former head of Alameda. Ellison apparently settled with this class action’s plaintiffs in January 2024 and offered to assist them. This declaration asserts the accuracy of the claims in the complaint as far as Ellison directly knows.

FTX former counsel Dan Friedberg adds a declaration. Friedberg has also settled with the plaintiffs of this class action. He only confirms the plaintiffs’ claim that Avinash Dabir managed FTX’s celebrity sponsorships out of FTX’s Miami office.

The last attachment on the amended complaint is a transcript of a podcast with Dabir talking to Joe Pompliano on the Joe Pomp Show about FTX’s celebrity sponsorships.

Harborne corrects the record by lawsuit

Christopher Harborne, shareholder of 12% of the Tether empire under his Thai name, Chakrit Sakunkrit, is suing the Wall Street Journal for an article it wrote in March 2023. The story was about Tether’s efforts to get banking after they were cut off by correspondent bank Wells Fargo in 2017. [Complaint, PDF, archive]

The WSJ story said that Harborne aided Tether’s efforts to skirt the traditional banking system by using his company AML Global to set up an account at Signature Bank: “The Sakunkrit name had earlier been added to a list of names the bank felt were trying to evade anti-money-laundering controls when the companies’ earlier accounts were closed, but Mr. Harborne’s hadn’t.”

Harborne states that “AML’s Signature Bank account was never used for Tether or Bitfinex whatsoever.” WSJ told him that the story didn’t imply that he had committed crimes, but he is suing over a claimed inference that he had.

WSJ edited the story on February 21 to remove the bits about Harborne. [WSJ; archive of March 3, 2023]

Harborne’s lawyers also reached out to Mike Burgersburg, a.k.a. Dirty Bubble Media, asking him to take down his article on Harborne. Mike kept the story up but made edits. [Dirty Bubble, archive of November 30, 2023]

Originally Mike had noted that the account Harborne set up at Signature was a back door for Bitfinex to access the US banking system. His source was the WSJ. “This was edited because WSJ removed those comments from their story. I am not making this claim, and there is no evidence at present for this assertion,” Mike said. 

Tether is run by a handful of people, some known and many unknown. Former CTO Paolo Ardoino is the named CEO and he acts like a social media intern. This reeks of Ardoino being the fall guy for whoever actually is running Tether.

Harborne doesn’t want to be thought to be that person. He says he “is not now and never has been in any management or executive role at Bitfinex or Tether; he is merely a minority shareholder.” A large chunk of his net worth is apparently in ether. His son, Will Harborne, has worked for various iFinex entities over the years.

Squeal!

Pig butchering scams, a.k.a. romance scams, have taken $75 billion from victims, according to a study by University of Texas finance professor John Griffin and his student Kevin Mei.

Once scammers collect the funds, they most often convert them to tethers: “Funds exit the crypto network in large quantities, mostly in Tether, through less transparent but large exchanges—Binance, Huobi, and OKX.” [SSRN]

Zeke Faux researched Tether’s pig butchering use case in depth for his book Number Go Up. That chapter of the book was put up by Bloomberg as a teaser. [Bloomberg, 2023, archive]

Griffin has been following Tether for some years. He was behind another paper on Tether money flows, 2018’s “Is Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered.” That study showed how Tether was used to prop up the price of bitcoin for most of the 2017 crypto bubble. 

Tether shills on Twitter have been frantically congratulating Tether on its “deal” with the Department of Justice to combat romance scams. No such deal has been announced. [Twitter, archive]

Just in case

USDT tokens are currently available on 15 different blockchains. Most of the issuance is on Ethereum and Tron.

Tether has proudly announced a recovery tool in case any of these blockchains have problems and your USDT becomes inaccessible. [Tether, archive]

We doubt Tether would make an announcement like this without a gun to their heads. So this reads to us like Tether reassuring the crypto whales that their tethers will be protected if Tron goes down.

Heading for the trillion

Tether crossed 100 billion USDT in circulation on March 5. This is completely in line with Dan Davies’ theory from Lying for Money that frauds snowball over time: 

The reason for this is that unlike a genuine business, a fraud does not generate enough real returns to support itself, particularly as money is extracted by the criminal. Because of this, at every date when repayment is expected, the fraudster has to make the choice between whether to shut the fraud down and try to make an escape, or to increase its size; more and more money has to be defrauded in order to keep the scheme going as time progresses.

The news about crossing 100 billion made it into Reuters, which noted Tether’s remarkably non-transparent reserves and the risks Tether poses to crypto and the broader financial system. [Reuters; Reuters]

Tether needs to be shut down. We’ve been saying this since 2017. It’s a risk to anyone who holds crypto. It’s also helped to accelerate other scams, so they’ve grown to a whole new level. 

As we write this, Tether has just printed 2 billion USDT — its biggest issuance yet. Tether has printed 5 billion new USDT in just the past week. Gotta keep number going up. MOOONNNEEEYYY TTTIIIIMMMMEEEE!

Image: Gregory Pepin photographed on the ipad 11 “ich sell phone.

(Updated March 12 at 5PM ET to add a quote from Mike Burgersburg and clarify why he edited his story on Tether.)

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Posted on by Amy Castor 3

FTX Bahamas vs. John Jay Ray, Bankman-Fried pleads not guilty, DoJ seizes FTX assets

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

i wonder how many times someone’s managed to hack in to a bitcoin exchange and found there wasn’t any money there and just left

— Boxturret, SomethingAwful

FTX vs the Bahamas

There’s a turf war going on between the FTX Digital Markets (FTX DM) liquidation in the Bahamas and the FTX Trading Ltd bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. We wrote about it earlier, along with some of the fishy stuff going on in the Bahamas.  

The Securities Commission of the Bahamas (SCB) filed their liquidation for FTX DM, a small subsidiary of FTX Trading, just one day before John Jay Ray III filed for Chapter 11 on behalf of FTX. Sam Bankman-Fried helped the SCB get in before Ray by waiting until the wee hours of November 11 to hand control over to Ray. Now the SCB feels it is entitled to FTX assets so that the liquidators can distribute them to creditors of FTX DM — whoever those might eventually turn out to be. [PwC]

The Bahamas side seems to be working on the theory that FTX DM was the operating center of the FTX companies. But FTX DM wasn’t even incorporated until July 22, 2021. It lay dormant for nearly a year and didn’t start operating in any manner until May 13, 2022. Note that’s a few days after the Terra-Luna collapse — FTX and Alameda were already utterly screwed by the time FTX DM was used for anything, suggesting that that may have been part of SBF’s reason to activate it.

The SCB pissed off Ray even further when, on December 29, they valued the FTX funds they seized late in the night on November 11 — in violation of the Chapter 11 stay — at $3.5 billion. This is mostly a pile of FTT tokens, whose market value is way less than $3.5 billion. FTX says the assets were worth just $296 million — “assuming the entire amount of FTT could be sold at spot prices at the time.” [SCB press release, PDF; FTX press release]

Christina Rolle, SCB executive director, said the Commission sought control of the crypto held by FTX after SBF and FTX cofounder Gary Wang told them about “hacking attempts overnight” — a perfect justification to seize the assets. Her affidavit, filed with the Supreme Court of the Bahamas, confirmed that SBF and Wang were behind the transfers on November 11 and 12. [Affidavit of Christina R. Rolle, PDF]

U.S. Federal prosecutors are looking into the $370 million hack — or “hack.” [Bloomberg]

Rolle also said that Tether gave the SCB 46 million tethers (USDT). SCB had asked Tether to freeze some USDT held by FTX DM or FTX Trading Ltd (it’s not clear which entity), then create 46 million fresh USDT and send it to SCB: 

76. Additionally, the Commission sent instructions for the transfer of approximately US $46 million Tether tokens to a secured wallet under the control of the Commission. These Tether tokens were not transferred to the Commission’s wallet but, after a meeting with Tether representatives, the Commission agreed that Tether, in light of the Chapter 11 proceedings, would maintain a freeze over the Tether tokens until ownership of the tokens is resolved.

This sounded odd to us — a “meeting with Tether representatives”? Coincidentally, the Bahamas Attorney General, Ryan Pinder, used to work for Deltec Bank, the bank associated with Tether.

The SCB then put out a press release on January 3 accusing Ray of “material misstatements” and having a “cavalier attitude to the truth.” They claim Ray is “promoting mistrust of public institutions in the Bahamas.” Well, yes, he is. [LinkedIn]

The joint provisional liquidators (JPLs) handling the FTX DM liquidation in the Bahamas have been pushing for access to substantial amounts of FTX data. Ray and his lawyers are working to make sure that never happens. Ray’s team has submitted piles of evidence pointing to the Bahamas government acting in bad faith.

FTX has filed an incendiary objection to the JPLs’ motion to compel the turnover of electronic records. This is a 37-page must-read rant: [FTX objection, PDF]

10. Finally, the stunning press release issued late yesterday, on December 29, 2022, by the Commission, along with certain related materials, is a game changer. The press release (and the supporting affidavit of the Executive Director of the Commission) boldly admits that the Commission violated the automatic stay in taking certain of the Debtors’ digital assets and then recklessly values the assets taken at $3.5 billion. As described in more detail below, yesterday’s disclosures demonstrate conclusively that the JPLs and the Commission are cooperating closely to do an end run around this Court and chapter 11. In a situation where maximizing recoveries for creditors should be the primary goal of all concerned, one can only wonder why.

We expect Ray isn’t wondering at all. He believes that “an elaborate and intentional game is being played” by the JPLs, the SCB, and the Bahamas government. As FTX says in their objection: “The fact that the founders left the Debtors more closely resembling a crime scene than an operating business cannot be ignored.”

FTX lawyer James Bromely filed a 675-page declaration, presenting exhibits to support their case. FTX financial advisor Edgar Mosley at Alvarez & Marsal also filed a 185-page declaration loaded with exhibits. [Bromely declaration, PDF; Mosley declaration, PDF]

The Mosley declaration details what business FTX Digital Markets actually did. FTX DM seems to have been Sam’s local partying fund:

17. The Debtors’ records reflect that $15.4 million for “Hotels & Accommodation” was paid primarily to three hotels in The Bahamas: the Albany ($5.8 million), the Grand Hyatt ($3.6 million), and the Rosewood ($807,000). The $6.9 million for “Meals & Entertainment” was paid primarily to Hyatt Services Caribbean ($1.4 million), Six Stars Catering ($974,000), and to three other catering and delivery services ($2.3 million in total).

18. The Debtors’ records reflect that in the first three quarters of 2022, FTX DM had total operating expenses of approximately $73 million, including over $40 million labeled “other expenses.”

19. The Debtors’ records reflect that FTX DM’s 2022 income statements show that FTX DM made no disbursements in connection with transaction, engineering or product expenses.

The newly formed Unsecured Creditors’ Committee in the U.S. chapter 11 also objects to the Bahamas motion. “These requests are sweeping and appear to be based on the faulty theory advanced by the JPLs that FTX DM was actually the nerve center of the FTX enterprise.” [Committee objection, PDF]

Just seizing some assets, don’t mind us

There was a scheduling conference in the Delaware FTX bankruptcy hearing on January 4. This wasn’t expected to be interesting — but Department of Justice Attorney Seth Shapiro made a surprise appearance over Zoom to let Judge Michael Dorsey know that the DoJ has been seizing assets.

SBF held a 7.6% stake in day trading brokerage Robinhood. He admitted to borrowing from Alameda in April and May to purchase the shares, in an Antigua court affidavit shortly before his arrest. [CoinDesk; affidavit, PDF]

SBF pledged the Robinhood shares to multiple companies as loan collateral. Who was getting the shares in the bankruptcy was a point of some contention. Now the DoJ has seized the shares.

Various bank accounts connected to the FTX Digital Markets (Bahamas) case and the JPLs motions for provisional relief, and the money in them, have also been seized. “We didn’t just want the court to read that in the papers filed by Silvergate and Moonstone” (FTX’s banks), said Shapiro. The DoJ also seized some cryptocurrency, though Shapiro didn’t say who from — the banks? The DoJ is working things out with the parties.

Shapiro told Judge Dorsey that the bank accounts had been seized with a view to “a criminal or asset forfeiture proceeding at some point down the line, in the Southern District of New York, to which entities could file claims.”

Shapiro said: “We either believe that these assets are not the property of the bankruptcy estate or that they fall within the exceptions under sections 362(b)(1) and/or (b)(4) of the bankruptcy code.” 362(b) is about criminal proceedings. [LII]

The Bahamas JPLs, who were also hoping for the contents of these bank accounts, are in touch with the DoJ.

Sam did nothing* wrong

Sam Bankman-Fried stood before U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan on January 3 and pleaded not guilty to all eight counts against him. SBF actually flew to New York for his arraignment and had to squeeze through a mob of reporters to enter the courthouse. The judge set a tentative trial date of October 2. [Twitter; Twitter thread; NYT]

Sam thinks he’s too smart, rich, and pretty to go to jail. He just needs to explain things properly to the people in charge, and it’ll all be fine. 

SBF’s not-guilty plea doesn’t necessarily mean a trial will happen. SBF and his lawyer Mark Cohen are likely just buying time so they can negotiate a better deal with the prosecutors. We very much doubt the case will go to trial, or that Sam’s parents would be able to foot the legal bill if it did.

More funds mysteriously moved out of Alameda wallets on December 27, mainly illiquid altcoins being swapped for ETH and BTC. Over $1 million in funds were sent through crypto mixers, according to crypto intelligence firm Arkham. [Twitter; Decrypt]

This isn’t the work of a liquidator. Sam says it wasn’t him, even though Sam, FTX co-founder Gary Wang, and FTX director of engineering Nishad Singh were the only ones who had access to the keys. Reddit user Settless notes that SBF had previously claimed to own these addresses: “The pattern is similar — the wallet receives funds and swaps them via no-KYC exchange to launder the funds.” [Twitter; Reddit]

The U.S. isn’t happy about this movement of crypto. During SBF’s arraignment in Manhattan, the prosecutors asked the court to add a new condition to the bond: that Sam be prohibited from accessing or transferring any FTX or Alameda assets. Judge Kaplan agreed. 

Molly Crane-Newman from the NY Daily News said: “SBF became animated when prosecutors successfully requested that the judge prohibit him from accessing or transferring FTX assets — furiously writing notes to his attorneys on a legal pad and pointing to them with a biro.” [Twitter]

The judge also agreed to the redaction of names and addresses of Sam’s two additional bail signers — who he may not have actually found yet. The press has until January 12 to file any objections to this. Matthew Russell Lee of Inner City Press has already filed an application to unseal the names. [Motion, PDF; Twitter; Application to Unseal]

Two of SBF’s associates, Caroline Ellison and Gary Wang, have already pleaded guilty in the hopes of getting a lesser sentence. John Reed Stark ordered and posted their plea agreements and hearing transcripts. [LinkedIn; Ellison plea, PDF; Ellison agreement, PDF; Wang plea, PDF; Wang agreement, PDF]

* except all the things he may possibly, hypothetically, have done wrong

Other perfectly normal happenings in FTX

North Dimension, the company that FTX customers were unknowingly sending their actual U.S. dollars to, was a fake online electronics retailer. North Dimension has two accounts at Silvergate Bank. [archived website; NBC News]

The assorted shenanigans with FTX likely explain why Silvergate Bank (NASDAQ: SI) has 54% of its shares sold short. Smart investors know how this will end. [Fintel]

John Reed Stark discusses FTX investors getting hosed on CNBC Squawkbox. [YouTube]

“Beyond Blame: The philosophy of personal responsibility has ruined criminal justice and economic policy. It’s time to move past blame” — by Barbara H. Fried. Now, you might say that if Sam’s circumstances are to blame for his apparent crimes, then Barbara happens to be one of those circumstances. [Boston Review, 2013]

Someone made an NFT with actual artistic value. We’ve used it as the feature image for this article. [OpenSea]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

FTX updates: How Sam Bankman-Fried got bail, and more

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

The entire industry is Wile E Coyote and they don’t want to look down because if they don’t look down gravity won’t acknowledge they are standing on the clear blue sky.

Patrick McKenzie

How SBF got out on bail

How did Sam Bankman-Fried get out on $250 million bail with only his parent’s $4 million Palo Alto house put up as security? A lot of people — including lawyers! — are confused by this.

The short answer is that federal court, unlike state courts, defaults to the presumption of release.

Sam was released to stay with his parents on his own personal recognizance — which is little more than a promise that he’ll show up in court again. There’s no financial obligation. The terms of Sam’s bond initially required the signatures of Sam and his parents — Barbara Fried and Joseph Bankman — for his initial release on December 22. [Bail disposition, PDF; Appearance bond, PDF]

The idea of bail is to make sure that the accused will show up in court. In the federal court system, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 says that unless someone is a flight risk, they should get bail — and the court has great leeway in setting conditions.

The judge was reasonably sure that SBF wasn’t a flight risk. This was his first arrest, he wasn’t accused of a violent crime, he was a publicly-known person, and he complied with extradition. He did have to give up his passport, though. He can’t leave Palo Alto other than to show up in court in New York.

Bail works completely differently for federal white-collar defendants than for poor people accused of crimes in a state court — where bail can be arbitrary without regard to ability to pay, and is often punitive and used to try to coerce the defendant into pleading guilty. This is the sort of bail most people will have heard about, and that seems to be the source of the confusion.

Compare Reggie Fowler, Bitfinex/Tether’s money man in the U.S. The government pushed hard to have Fowler held as a flight risk. But the judge let Fowler out on a $5 million personal recognizance bond, and he hasn’t flown yet — though his sentencing has been delayed to March. In SBF’s case, federal prosecutors weren’t even pushing to hold him.

Many are also wondering why SBF’s parents did not have to come up with 10% of the bail, or $25 million, for the bond. This is also a misconception about state versus federal bail — where the convention is that you can pay a bail bondsman a nonrefundable 10% of your bail and he’ll put up the rest. Again, this is not at all a requirement at the federal level.

While Sam and his parents didn’t have to put any money down, it’s another story if Sam disappears. Sam’s parents’ home could be seized and the government could hold the bond co-signers liable for the full amount of the bond — which Sam’s parents obviously won’t be able to pay.

In SBF’s bail is a provision that by January 5, he has to find two wealthy friends, one of whom must be a non-family member, to put up surety — they need to sign bonds in lesser amounts “to be agreed to.” But if Sam can’t find anyone else to sign, it’s not clear how concerned the court will be, as long as Sam doesn’t flee and doesn’t violate other bail conditions. Sam’s parents have until January 12 to post the equity interest in their home.

The house is technically owned by Stanford University — the original Stanford land grant said that the land could not be sold. Professors buy a multi-decade lease on houses on campus, and Bankman and Fried put up their interest in that lease as security for the bail. This does not mean that Stanford is putting up Sam’s bail, as some have been claiming.

Ken White, better known as Popehat, a criminal lawyer in Los Angeles, was surprised that the court agreed to let Sam out on bail. Is the prospect of bankrupting his parents enough to keep Sam from misbehaving? “Personally, he strikes me as a man-child sociopath unlikely to be deterred by the complete destruction of his family.”[Serious Trouble] 

Fresh hell from FTX

Caroline Ellison and Gary Wang had their plea hearings on December 19. The hearings weren’t open to the public. Bloomberg reporters went and got the transcript from the court. (You have to go to the court physically.) Ellison and Wang both said they acted as directed by Sam Bankman-Fried, and they knew what they were doing was wrong. [Bloomberg]

Ronnie Abrams, the Southern District of New York judge who was overseeing the SBF case, has stepped down: “It has come to the Court’s attention that the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, at which my husband is a partner, advised FTX in 2021, as well as represented parties that may be adverse to FTX and Defendant Bankman-Fried.” [Bloomberg]

SBF appears to have pledged the same shares in day-trader brokerage Robinhood as collateral for multiple loans. There are now four jackals circling the corpse: BlockFi, FTX creditor Yonathan Ben Shimon, FTX led by John Jay Ray, and SBF himself, who has mounting legal bills. FTX has asked the court to freeze the shares until the issue is sorted out. [Doc 291, PDF]

SBF hasn’t posted to Twitter since December 12. But he’s still using Twitter, and just followed Dogecoin co-creator, Billy Markus. [Reddit]

Other FTX fallout

The collapse of FTX had systemic effects on crypto. Basically, everyone was just using FTX as their bank.

Didier J. Mary follows crypto-colonialism, where cryptocurrency missionaries try to inveigle themselves into poor countries — now that America is sick of crypto. Smart but poor people in Africa, wanting an opportunity, thought crypto might work to help them get ahead. The usual flurry of crypto-trader academies, masterclasses, and hype followed. Bank the unbanked!

A huge number of these African enterprises kept their cryptos at FTX — the blockchain contingent at the World Economic Forum promoted FTX in particular. That’s all gone now, and everyone’s wrecked. This post is in French but is very readable with a translator. [LinkedIn, in French]

Sam Bankman-Fried ended up putting $100 million into Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter. John Ray will definitely be calling to get that back. [Semafor]

Brendan Greeley from the Financial Times has locked down his Twitter in these post-Musk times, but in 2018 he gave us “Greeley’s First Law of Capitalism: Any industry that can afford stadium naming rights needs more aggressive regulation.” [Twitter]

Even Zhu Su from Three Arrows Capital (3AC) was calling out Alameda in 2019. [Twitter, archive] 

A&P has provided me with the world’s smallest turkey

As you sit around the Christmas table with the family, don’t forget to ask that relative how their “bot-coins” are going. Merry Christmas, and don’t let the buttcoins bite.

Feature image: This terrible picture is from a 2021 FTX Christmas tweet, in which Santa Sam takes treats out of the stockings and sends them to Alameda. [Twitter]

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

FTX: Sam Bankman-Fried out on bail, Ellison and Wang cop pleas

We just posted our latest coverage on the FTX saga. This one is on David’s blog. [David Gerard]

SBF is back on US soil, after being escorted by the FBI from the Bahamas to NY, and yes, he is free on bail. His parent’s secured their Palo Alto home on a $250 million personal recognizance bond. Their home is only worth a fraction of that.

SBF’s friends Caroline Ellison and Gary Wang have been charged as well, but they’ve ratted Sam out to save themselves. 

Expect more superseding indictments to come. The DoJ is coming down fast and hard on FTX.

The entire game in crypto right now is pretending you’re solvent when you’re not. We’ve put together a list of clever tricks that crypto firms are currently employing to do this. 

Posted on by Amy Castor 0

Crypto collapse: J. Pierpont Moneygone — FTX rekt, bought by Binance

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard
  • Send us money! Our work is funded by our Patreons — here’s Amy’s, and here’s David’s. Your monthly contributions help greatly!

The 2021–2022 crypto bubble made a lot of traders look like geniuses. Then the bubble popped, the tide went out, and the traders turned out to be hugely overleveraged formerly-lucky idiots.

Sociologists know that when a cult prophecy fails, most cultists exit the cult, and the remaining factions turn on each other.

Crypto watchers know that this can also be exceedingly funny.

Imaginary assets, real liabilities

Sam Bankman-Fried’s boosters compare him to the legendary banker J. P. Morgan. He’s spent the crypto collapse bailing out ailing companies to keep the entire market afloat.

Bankman-Fried runs three large crypto enterprises:

  1. Alameda Research, his crypto hedge fund;
  2. FTX, his unregulated offshore crypto casino that doesn’t allow US customers;
  3. FTX US, his exchange for US customers that purports to operate under US law and accepts actual dollars.

On November 2, Coindesk’s Ian Allison posted an explosive story on a partially leaked balance sheet for Alameda. [CoinDesk]

Of Alameda’s $14.6 billion in claimed assets, $5.8 billion is FTT — FTX’s internal exchange token. You can use FTT for cheaper trading fees and increased commissions. FTT is also traded outside FTX.

Allison also noted that $5.8 billion is actually 180% of the circulating supply of FTT!

Alameda’s liabilities are listed at $8 billion, most of which is $7.4 billion of loans — quite a bit of that from FTX.

Alameda is super cashed-up … if you account for FTX’s own FTT token at mark-to-market, and not what you could actually get for that much of their private illiquid altcoin.

To make matters worse, Dirty Bubble notes that a lot of Alameda’s other assets are crypto tokens from other Sam Bankman-Fried enterprises. [Dirty Bubble Media]

Alameda and FTX seem to have printed FTT, pumped its price using customer assets — FTX was quite open that it was the FTT market maker, and there’s no other real demand — and used the mark-to-market value of their illiquid made-up token as collateral for loans, or as evidence that pension funds should invest in crypto companies.

This works great while number is going up!

Regular readers will know that this sort of flywheel scheme is precisely what Celsius Network tried to run with their CEL token and Nexo with their NEXO token. Celsius is bankrupt, and regulators have noticed that Nexo is only solvent if you allow them this particular tricky bit of accounting.

Alameda CEO Caroline Ellison said the leaked balance sheet Coindesk got a hold of was “incomplete,” and there were $10 billion in assets not listed there. [Twitter, archive] 

The crypto world spent a few days wondering if Alameda was the next Three Arrows Capital.

CZ pulls the plug

Large flows of FTT were noticed on the blockchain on November 6. Binance CEO Changpeng Zhao confirmed that this was Binance selling off its FTT: [Twitter, archive]

“As part of Binance’s exit from FTX equity last year, Binance received roughly $2.1 billion USD equivalent in cash (BUSD and FTT). Due to recent revelations that have came to light, we have decided to liquidate any remaining FTT on our books.”

The remaining FTT that Binance sold was worth $530 million. [Bloomberg]

CZ was also annoyed at Bankman-Fried’s lobbying efforts for crypto regulation in Washington: “We won’t support people who lobby against other industry players behind their backs.” [Twitter, archive]

The crypto market is incredibly shaky. Alameda and FTX operate as separate corporations, but the market seems to think they’re closely entwined. Trouble at Alameda leads to worry about FTX.

So panicked holders, thinking Alameda might be insolvent, started withdrawing funds from FTX as fast as possible — and hardly deposited anything at all.

FTX paused all withdrawals on the Ethereum, Solana, and Tron blockchains around 11:37 a.m. UTC on November 8, according to Steven Zheng at The Block. [The Block]

Finally, just after 4 p.m. UTC, Bankman-Fried and CZ announced that Binance was buying FTX. Specifically, they have a non-binding letter of intent, pending due diligence. [Twitter, archive; Twitter, archive]

Essentially, CZ started a bank run on FTX, then swooped in to buy his competitor after breaking it. CZ did to Bankman-Fried what Bankman-Fried has been accused of doing to a string of others.

At present, this is only a letter of intent, not a done deal — CZ is making Bankman-Fried suffer. He could just let FTX go hang.

How screwed are FTX and Alameda?

CZ said FTX was in a “significant liquidity crunch.” This is the sort of “liquidity crunch” that everyone else calls “insolvency.” If it were just liquidity, FTX could have borrowed against its assets and found another way out of this. [Twitter, archive]

We don’t know for sure that Alameda was trading with FTX customer funds — but this sort of fractional reserve operation is the only not-entirely-fraudulent reason that FTX could have run out of customer funds in this way.

Bankman-Fried claimed on November 7 that “FTX has enough to cover all client holdings. We don’t invest client assets (even in treasuries).” This appears not to have been true, and he later deleted the tweet. [Twitter, archive]

If FTX couldn’t get its funds back from Alameda quickly, that would have then led to the liquidity crunch.

What about FTX US?

Bankman-Fried was quick to reassure customers that FTX US was not affected and that it was “fully backed 1:1, and operating normally.” So at least FTX US explicitly claims it isn’t playing the markets with your deposits. [Twitter, archive]  

FTX US is also attempting to buy the remains of the bankrupt Voyager Digital, a deal that we think is likely to go through.

The separation of customer funds and platforms is the whole point of FTX US versus FTX. It’s there to make Sam look good to regulators.

But it’s all Sam Bankman-Fried. It’s Sam’s left pocket versus his right pocket.

We think that if your paycheck goes into FTX US, you probably want to stop doing that immediately.

What happens next? It’s contagion time!

Alameda has likely been borrowing against the FTT it held — the FTT that is now crashing. (Earlier today, FTT was worth $19; as we post this, it’s trading at $4.60.)

Binance might rescue FTX, but it’s sure not going to rescue Alameda.

This means a series of margin calls by everyone who’s lent to Alameda. If Alameda defaults, those lenders will likely end up with worthless FTT.

BlockFi and Genesis have a pile of money in Alameda. BlockFi is or will be owned in some unspecified manner by FTX US, but that doesn’t make the books balance — there’s already a rumor of a 24-hour margin call by BlockFi against Alameda. [Twitter]

Remember that Three Arrows Capital collapsed when their UST turned out to be worthless. This then took out a pile of other crypto trading firms — most notably Celsius Network and Voyager Digital.

We’re left with two questions:

  1. Who is lending to Alameda?
  2. Who’s lending to those lenders — and risks going down in turn?

The crypto market is not happy. Bitcoin has been up and down like a yo-yo today, from $19,500 just before 4 p.m. UTC to a peak of $20,500 and a trough of $17,500.

We predict more market excitement to come — specifically, a possible Alameda collapse, a chain reaction of lender failures, and attempts to cover sudden balance-sheet holes, much as we saw after the Terra-Luna and Three Arrows collapses.

But Caroline Ellison from Alameda insists there’s another $10 billion behind the sofa or something. Maybe it’s all fine!

Image: FT Alphaville

Posted on by Amy Castor 2