Amy and David answer your questions on crypto! (Part 1)

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

Crypto is still hungover from New Year’s and there’s no news. So we asked readers what they were curious about in crypto. [Twitter; Bluesky]

Keep your questions coming for part 2, some time or other!

Sending us money will definitely help — here’s Amy’s Patreon, and here’s David’s.

Q: I keep wondering what’s keeping the circus alive, given that the retail dollars are practically gone, and the last remaining on/off-ramps are all but down the drain. [Tomalak on Bluesky]

The circus is fed by dollars — real and fake — and its product is hopium, the unfaltering belief that number will always go up. The hopium runs on narratives, such as the current story that a bitcoin ETF will result in a magical influx of fresh dollars.

In crypto, the retail dollars have largely gone home — but too many people have large piles of crypto accounted as dollars to let the number go down. So they deploy fake dollars to keep the crypto flowing.

There are currently 93 billion dubiously-backed tethers sloshing around the crypto markets. We expect that to go over 100 billion as we get closer to the bitcoin mining reward halving in April.

The circus is advertised by the crypto media, which functions as PR outlets for the space. The CoinDesk live-wire feed on any given day is about half hopium, for instance. There are no respectable media outlets in a crypto winter.

(Except us, of course. Subscribe today!

Q: Why can’t or wouldn’t the average investor make money in crypto? We criticize it, and rightfully so, but why should the person looking to make a profit care? [King Schultz on Twitter]

There is no source of dollars other than fresh retail investors. Old investors can only be paid out with money from new investors.

Crypto isn’t technically a Ponzi scheme — it just works like one. So investing in crypto will always be a slightly negative-sum game.

Functionally, crypto is a single unified casino, run by a very small number of people, with no regulation. Binance is the tables, Coinbase is the cashier window. The flow of cash is from retail suckers to very few rich guys at the top.

There are many, many complicated mechanisms in the middle, and they’re fascinating to look at and describe and watch in action. But the complex mechanisms don’t change what’s happening here — money flows from lots of suckers to a few scammers.

Some people make money in crypto, just like some people make money in Las Vegas — but gambling in Vegas isn’t an investment scheme either. And the house always wins.

You can make money in crypto if you’re a better shark than all the other sharks in the shark pool, who built the pool. It can be done! Good luck!

Q: be interested in reading about money laundering [Broseph on Bluesky]

Money laundering is when you try to turn the proceeds of crime into money that doesn’t appear to be the proceeds of crime. Laundering money is also a specific crime in itself.

With money going electronic, it’s harder to obscure the origins of ill-gotten gains and avoid unwanted attention from banks and the authorities. Many crooks have attempted to launder money by using crypto as the obfuscatory step.

Bitfinex money mule Reggie Fowler set up a global network of bank accounts. He told the banks the accounts were for real estate transactions. He was sentenced to six years in prison.

Heather “Razzlekhan” Morgan and Ilya Lichtenstein tried laundering the bitcoins from the Bitfinex hack through the Alphabay darknet market. This would have completely covered their trail! Except that the police had pwned Alphabay by then, and Lichtenstein’s transactions were all right there for the cops to track him. Whoops.

We also highly recommend Dan Davies’s fabulous book on fraud, Lying for Money.

Q: Not so much baffled but curious as to how law enforcement can and does identify people using blockchain. Also, do some coins not have a public blockchain? [Bob Morris on Twitter]

Cryptocurrencies run on publicly available blockchains. In theory, you can trace the history of every transaction on a blockchain right back to when it started.

The hard part for authorities is linking someone’s real-world identity to a specific blockchain address. Achieving this was the key to busting Heather Morgan and Ilya Lichtenstein, for instance. The hardest part for crooks is cashing out successfully without being busted.

The trail can be difficult to trace, especially if the crook has put effort into obfuscation — e.g., running transactions through a mixer such as Tornado Cash. But specialists can get good at tracing blockchain transactions and several companies sell this as a service.

Privacy coins like Monero and ZCash try to obfuscate the traceability of transactions on the blockchain itself. But users often give themselves away by other channels — e.g., transaction volumes elsewhere that coincidentally correspond to amounts of Monero sent to a darknet market.

Even if you can protect yourself cryptographically, one error can leave your backside hanging out — and crypto users are really bad at operational security.

Q: nfts aren’t really relevant these days but I’ve never been clear on what ‘mint events’ are and how they relate to the icos. Are users generating new nfts paid for by using the coins they previously bought? [Robert Kambic on Bluesky]

Initial coin offerings (ICOs) were huge in 2017 and 2018 — but the SEC came down hard on them because they were pretty much all unregistered offerings of penny stocks.

Since that time, crypto has tried to come up with other ideas for doing unregistered offerings while making them look at least a little less illegal. There were SAFTs, airdrops, and now NFT mint events. These are all about creating fresh tokens out of thin air and promoting them as an investment in a common enterprise that will make a profit from the efforts of others.

A “mint event” is when you buy into an NFT collection early — when it first mints — hoping the value will increase astronomically over time.

But these are not securities, no, no, no. Yuga Labs wasn’t selling you shares in a company — they were selling you ape cartoons! You weren’t getting dividends, you were getting Mutant Apes, dog NFTs, and ApeCoins! You’re not investing in a speculative startup, you’re buying art!

The SEC has so far sued one NFT company, Impact Theory, after it raised $30 million through NFT sales. The SEC said the NFTs were promoted as investment contracts and not registered. [Complaint, PDF]

We didn’t say too much about NFTs in our 2024 predictions, but we expect that the SEC will go after more NFT projects this year, as they clear their backlog of violators.

Q. I’d like a definitive explanation on the amount of apes you can feed with a single slurp juice. [Etienne Beureux on Twitter]

Slurp juices were popularized in a tweet about Astro Apes, a Bored Apes knockoff, which also featured tokens called “slurp juices” that you could apply to your Astro Ape tokens to generate more Astro Ape tokens and get rich for free.

The tweet was posted on May 4, 2022 — just a few days before Terra-Luna exploded and popped the 2021-2022 crypto bubble.

Also, the guy who tweeted about slurp juices is a neo-Nazi. Welcome to crypto. [BuzzFeed News]

Q: I’ve often wondered why new languages like Solidity were necessary for smart contracts. [David John Smailes on Twitter]

The Ethereum team originally just wanted to use JavaScript, but it didn’t quite do what they needed in terms of functionality and data types — so they created Solidity, a new language based on JavaScript.

A blockchain is an extremely harsh programming environment. It’s hard or impossible to modify your code once deployed — you must get it right the first time. It’s about money, so every attacker will be going after your code.

In situations where programming errors have drastic consequences, you usually try to make it harder to shoot yourself in the foot — functional programming languages, formal methods, mathematical verification of the code, not using a full computer language (avoid Turing completeness), and so on.

Solidity ignores all of that — and the world’s most mediocre JavaScript programmers moved sideways to write the world’s most mediocre smart contracts and cause everyone to lose all their money, repeatedly. Smart contracts are best modeled as a piñata, where you whack it in the right spot and a pile of crypto falls out.

Other blockchains saw Ethereum-based projects making a ton of money (or crypto) and wanted that for themselves — so they tend to just use the Ethereum Virtual Machine so they can run buggy Solidity code too.

There are other, somewhat better, smart contract languages — but Solidity is overwhelmingly the language of choice, which keeps the comedy gold flowing nicely.

Q. Miner extracted value? [Cathal Mooney on Twitter]

Miners — or now validators — supposedly make money from block rewards and transaction fees.

There is a third way for validators to make money. Smart contract execution depends on the order of transactions within a block. Since the validator controls what transactions they can put in a block and how they order those transactions, they can front run the traders — the validator sees an unprocessed transaction, creates their own transaction ahead of that one and takes some or all of the advantage that the trader saw.

The term “Miner Extractable Value” was coined in the paper “Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability” in 2020. [IEEE Xplore]

Front-running is largely illegal in real finance. But since the Ethereum Foundation couldn’t stop their validators from front-running their users, they decided to claim it was a feature, which they have renamed “maximal extractable value.” [Ethereum Foundation]

Q: What do you think will eventually happen to all the Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin wallets? [Steve Alarm on Twitter]

Quite likely nothing. We suspect the keys, and thus the million bitcoins, are simply lost. Nobody has heard anything verifiably from Satoshi since April 13, 2011, when he sent a final email to bitcoin developer Mike Hearn. [Plan99]

If the Satoshi coins ever did move, there would be a lot of headlines. But we don’t think the crypto trading market would be affected much — the market is so thin, there are multiple large holders who could crash the market any time they felt like it, and the market is already largely fake. We think everyone will just pretend nothing happened and everything is fine.

Q. Did Do Kwon actually sell all his BTC to prop up Luna? [Saku Kamiyūbetsu on Twitter]

Terra (UST) was an algorithmic dollar stablecoin and luna was its free-floating twin. Terraform Labs ran the Anchor Protocol, which promised 20% interest on staked UST. At peak, there were 18 billion UST in circulation.

It turned out there was money to be made in crashing UST — so in May 2022, someone did. There is a strong rumor (and DOJ investigations) that it was Alameda. Other parties who collapsed because of Terra-Luna left the gaping hole in Alameda that eventually killed FTX. If Alameda fired the first shot directly into their own leg, that would be extremely crypto, as well as extremely funny.

UST was crashing, so Terraform Labs tried to prop up Terra-Luna. The bitcoins came from the Luna Foundation Guard, which promised to deploy $1.5 billion worth of bitcoin to defend UST. This didn’t work. [Twitter, archive]

We haven’t found a smoking gun that Luna actually spent the bitcoins on buying up UST or luna. In 2023, the SEC charged Terraform Labs and Do Kwon and said that Kwon and Terraform took over 10,000 BTC out of Luna Foundation Guard in May 2022 and converted at least $100 million into cash.

Q: I’m baffled at the lack of interest from crypto critics that the DoJ will not be pursuing additional charges against SBF. Specifically, the charges that could make some politicians very uncomfortable. [Amer Icon on Twitter]

The issue was specifically whether to further prosecute Sam Bankman-Fried. The prosecution letter to the judge quite clearly explains their reasons why a second case wouldn’t do anything useful in this regard. [Letter, PDF]

The evidence that Sam was the guy who made these bribes was presented in the case that just concluded and will be considered when he’s sentenced in March — they don’t need a second trial to nail those facts down.

Hypothetical other evidence that might have come to light about other parties wasn’t a factor in considering what to do about Sam Bankman-Fried. It’s quite reasonable to want to get those guys, but you will probably need a more direct method than a side factor in an additional case against a guy who is already likely going to jail forever.

Q. snarkier memes would be worthy [Chris Doerfler on Twitter]

“Esto no puede ser tan estúpido, debes estar explicándolo mal.”

We did a follow-up on this story. Part 2, though not labeled as such, is here!

Image: Amy Landers and Dear David reading today’s Web 3 Is Going Just Great

Crypto collapse: Terra Luna, 3AC’s Singapore liquidation, Celsius, Voyager 

“Lotta stadiums getting renamed in the next few years”

Ben McKenzie
Daniel Shin and Do Kwon while number was going up. Source: Terraform Labs

TerraUSD

Centralized finance (CeFi) is centralized DeFi — investment firms that played the DeFi markets. CeFi was where a lot of the money in DeFi came from.

CeFi looked like an industry of separate institutions — but it turned out to be a few companies all investing in each other. The chart of who invested in who would look like an inverted pyramid resting on a single point — Terraform Labs’ Anchor protocol.

Anchor offered 20% interest rates on holdings of dollar-equivalent stablecoin Terraform USD (UST), the interest being paid in UST. You could get UST by buying Terraform’s luna token from exchanges like Crypto.com or KuCoin. (Crypto.com Arena used to be Staples Center in Los Angeles.)

All the other CeFi firms just put their money into Anchor at 20%, then offered slightly lower interest to their own investors and skimmed the difference. Terraform made its money by dumping luna on these UST buyers.

UST and luna were both tokens that Terraform made up one day — neither had any reason to be worth anything. Everyone in DeFi knew how rickety UST/luna was for months — they just went along with it while it made them money. A truly fiat currency.

The party ended on May 9, when UST and luna imploded, setting off a cascade of insolvencies across cryptoland. We’re still seeing the fallout.

Crypto hedge fund Three Arrows Capital (3AC) went into liquidation as it was heavily invested in UST and luna. Firms that had big loans to 3AC, such as Voyager, Celsius, and BlockFi, had to file bankruptcy or seek bailouts from other crypto firms. Even crypto exchanges had been playing the CeFi markets with customer funds, and many had to close their doors.

Thousands of South Koreans also lost money when UST and luna collapsed. Terraform Labs founders Daniel Shin and Do Kwon are stuck in South Korea for now, while investigators look into the incident.

On Wednesday, July 20, investigators from the Seoul Southern District Prosecutors Office raided seven crypto exchanges, including Upbit, Bithumb, and Coinone. They’re looking for clues as to whether Terraform intentionally caused the collapse. They also raided some exchange executives’ homes and the home of Daniel Shin. [Yonhap News; Donga News, in Korean]

Elsewhere, South Korean prosecutors have discovered a shell company called “Flexi Corporation” that Kwon allegedly used to launder large sums of money out of Terra and into his own private accounts via over-the-counter trades. How can this be? Kwon said he only took a small salary from Terraform. [KBS, in Korean; Twitter

Three Arrows Capital 

UST and luna went under, and pulled crypto hedge fund Three Arrows Capital down with them.

The Terra collapse completely nuked 3AC. Their exposure was about $600 million. (This is triple what co-founders Su Zhu and Kyle Davies had claimed in mid-June.) [Fortune]

Zhu and Davies are in now hiding. Nobody knows where they are. They told Bloomberg they were headed to Dubai. [Bloomberg, archive]

The pair knew immediately that they were screwed. But on May 11, when investors asked if 3AC had survived the Terra collapse, 3AC told them everything was fine — and kept taking in money! 

3AC had abandoned its Singapore office by late May — they just locked the door and skipped the country — and they finally admitted there were problems only in mid-June.

But Zhu and Davies have been telling the public — especially their creditors — how they lost money too, how they fear for their lives, and how they are so overwhelmed that they can’t turn over banking information just yet, but they’ll get to that soon, for sure.

The two old school buddies say they were shocked by how quickly things unraveled. “What we failed to realize was that luna was capable of falling to effective zero in a matter of days.”

Never mind that the instability of UST/luna was obvious to outside observers, that UST/luna worked exactly the same way as the Titan/Iron pair that collapsed in 2021, and that these guys were supposed to be a crypto hedge fund with alleged competence, and not the drooling crypto degen brainlet rubes they appear to have been trading like.

Zhu and Davies never planned for number go down, and had just been piling leverage on leverage. “We positioned ourselves for a kind of market that didn’t end up happening,” Zhu told Bloomberg. Never mind that a “hedge fund” is named for the act of hedging your speculations, and not just assuming you’re a genius because there’s a bubble going on.

Teneo is the firm handling 3AC’s liquidation, and they are moving quickly. They filed Chapter 15 in the US on July 1. Shortly after, they also filed for recognition of 3AC’s British Virgin Islands liquidation with the Singapore high court. 

Someone leaked Teneo’s 1,157-page Singapore filing earlier this week. The comprehensive document is a gem — it gives us a full update on the bankruptcy proceedings up to July 9. Teneo’s Christopher Farmer and Russell Crumpler left no rock unturned. [Filing, archive]

We recommend reading at least the first 35 pages — it tells the story of Ponzi borrowing, multiple defaults, ghosting creditors and liquidators, and doing deals with some lenders while cutting out others. The rest of the filing is exhibits, other court filings, and affidavits of furious creditors.

3AC’s biggest creditor is Barry Silbert’s Digital Currency Group, the parent company of Genesis Trading, which had a $2.4 billion partially collateralized loan to 3AC. DCG is now stuck with up to $1.1 billion in losses. [The Block]

Other large creditors include Voyager Digital ($687 million), Blockchain.com ($302.6 million, up from the originally claimed $270 million), and Deribit ($80.6 million).  

Kyle Davies’ wife, Chen Kaili Kelly, filed a claim for $65.7 million, and Zhu Su himself submitted a $5 million claim. We have no idea how 3AC was structured to allow an owner and a cofounder to be a listed creditor in a bankruptcy.

Zhu and Davies reportedly made a $50 million down payment on a yacht — with borrowed money, while they defaulted on their lenders. (We’re definitely feeling the Quadriga vibes with this one.) They wanted it to be bigger than any of the yachts owned by Singapore’s billionaires, and ready for pick-up in Italy. Zhu told Bloomberg that the yacht story was a “smear.”

Tai Ping Shan Capital, an over-the-counter desk in the BVI, claimed it operated independently of 3AC, but it turns out to have tight connections. On June 14, 3AC transferred $30.7 million in USDC and $900,000 in USDT to TPS. It’s unclear where those funds subsequently went. [Coindesk]

Good news! In a supplemental Chapter 15 filing, Teneo says it’s recovered $40 million of assets! The bad news is that this is a drop in the bucket. Creditors have so far submitted $2.8 billion in claims, and there’s plenty more coming. [Court filing]

3AC creditors have picked a creditor committee consisting of the largest creditors: Voyager, DCG, CoinList, Blockchain.com, and Matrixport. The committee will work closely with Teneo to “maximize the value of the assets available for distribution.” [The Block

Blockchain.com is struggling to survive in the aftermath. It just laid off 25 percent of staff. [CNBC

In addition to owning CryptoDickButt #1462, 3AC had also started a $100 million NFT fund with pseudonymous NFT trader Vincent Van Dough. They supplied the funding, while Van Dough curated the art. (We mentioned CryptoDickButt last time, and we’re shocked that some of you thought we were just making that up. You should know by now that crypto is always stupider.)

The fund, called “Starry Night Capital” planned to launch a physical gallery in a “major city” by the end of 2021. [The Block, 2021]

The Defiant noted on June 17 that the Starry Night portfolio had been aggregated into a single Ethereum address, probably controlled by Zhu, Davies, and Van Dough. Teneo has noticed and is concerned. [The Defiant]

Celsius

Celsius promised 18% returns on your crypto. When too many people tried to pull their money out at once, Celsius paused withdrawals on June 21 and filed for bankruptcy on July 13. We covered the bankruptcy filing and CEO Alex Mashinsky’s declaration in our last post. 

Celsius admits to a $1.2 billion hole in its balance sheet. Others think the assets are fake and the liabilities are very real, which would put the hole at $4 billion to $5 billion.

Mashinsky says that Celsius’ losses include $15.8 million from investments in UST and luna, along with $40.6 million in loans to 3AC. He also said that Celsius lost 35,000 ether tokens in 2021 due to an incident involving a staking provider that “misplaced” the keys to its tokens. Oops!

Celsius held its first bankruptcy hearing on July 18. SDNY Judge Martin Glenn is presiding over the case. Kadhim Shubber from the Financial Times live-tweeted the hearing, which took place over Zoom. Here’s a copy of the presentation Celsius gave to the judge on Monday. [Stretto; Twitter thread]

Celsius’ lawyer Patrick Nash told the judge there won’t be a liquidation. Celsius has a recovery plan: to HODL — and mine bitcoins! That’s right, Celsius wants to mine their way out of bankruptcy. Nash says the plan is to mine 10,000 bitcoins in 2022.

How did Celsius end up in bankruptcy? You might think it had something to do with Celsius making horrible investments and losing everyone’s money, but no! As Nash explained, Celsius was driven to insolvency by unfounded Terra/luna fears, worries about Coinbase’s bankruptcy risk factor disclosure in May, and a bank run that knocked over an otherwise well-run business.

Former Celsius employees tell a different story. Celsius compliance and financial crimes director Timothy Cradle spoke of the company’s “sloppiness and mismanagement.” [Coindesk

Cradle also told CNBC that Celsius execs “were absolutely trading the token [CEL] to manipulate the price.” A former HR employee said she was told not to do a background check on Yarom Shelem, the former Celsius CFO who was arrested in Israel for fraud. [CNBC]

Celsius creditors have been filing claims since July 18. [Twitter] The letters make for some disturbing reading. Molly White has been posting excerpts on Twitter. It’s a reminder that Celsius investors were ordinary people lured in by Mashinsky’s false promises. [Twitter thread]

Québec pension fund CDPQ also has some questions to answer. CDPQ invested $150 million in Celsius in October 2021 as part of a $400 million funding round co-led by WestCap Investment Partners LLC. “We understand that our investment in Celsius raises a number of questions.” [Bloomberg

Celsius’ next bankruptcy hearing is August 10.

Voyager

Crypto broker Voyager said its secret sauce was “low-risk investments.” Yet it loaned out three-quarters of its assets under management to 3AC.

In June, the firm signed an agreement with Sam Bankman-Fried’s Alameda Ventures for a revolving line of credit so it could keep the music playing a bit longer. But on July 1, Voyager Digital filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Coffeezilla points out that Voyager is trying to sell people on this “Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorg,” and hides the fact that under bankruptcy law, a company that describes itself as a broker cannot file Chapter 11. They should be required to liquidate under SIPA. (Securities Investor Protection Act) [Youtube; Twitter]

The CEO of of crypto media outlet Benzinga will be on the unsecured creditor committee in the Voyager bankruptcy. Jason Raznick is among the largest unsecured creditors for Voyager. [Inside Bitcoins]

Voyager’s next bankruptcy hearing is on August 4. It has $350 million of customer money in an omnibus account at Metropolitan, and it keeps reassuring everyone that they’ll get their money soon! It just has to work things out with the judge first. [Voyager blog; archive]

In the meantime, Bankman-Fried proposed a partial bailout. Under his proposal, Voyager customers would have the opportunity to open new accounts at FTX with a cash balance funded by their bankruptcy claim. They would be able to withdraw the cash, or use it to purchase crypto on FTX. [FTX press release; FT, archive]

Other CeFi firms that are definitely robust and doing fine 

Vauld is a Singapore-domiciled crypto lender that serves mainly customers in India. It stopped withdrawals on July 4 and owes $402 million in crypto to its customers. 

After suspending withdrawals and laying off 30% of its staff, Vauld filed for protection against creditors in Singapore on July 8. [WSJ]

A Singaporean moratorium order is similar to Chapter 11 in the US. It allows Vauld to avoid a complete cessation of operations and liquidation of assets, while it tries to get its act together. 

Vauld later disclosed they were short $70 million, partly from exposure to UST/luna. Vauld issued a statement on July 11. Vauld and Nexo are still discussing an acquisition of Vauld. [Vauld blog, archive]

BlockFi released its Q2 2022 transparency report. The report showed it had $1.8 billion in open loans from retail and institutional investors by the end of June and $600 million in “net exposure.” [BlockFi blog, archive; Decrypt]