Crypto collapse: Silvergate implosion continues, Signature Bank, Tether lied to banks, Voyager, Celsius

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard

“I like the Bernie Madoff test: does this have a higher return than Bernie Madoff promised? If so, it’s probably a scam!”

— HappyHippo

Media stardom

Amy wrote about why Bitcoin would rather continue contributing to the destruction of the planet than switch to proof of stake. [MIT Technology Review]

Amy was also quoted in Cointelegraph talking about stablecoins, mostly BUSD. [Cointelegraph]

David did a fun podcast with C. Edward Kelso back in November, about FTX exploding and the ongoing forest fires in the world of pretend nerd money. He also did a video in November with El Podcast. [Anchor.fm; YouTube]

Silvergate’s goose continues cooking

What’s next for crypto’s favorite bank? Will a team of FDIC agents storm Silvergate? The market is expecting an unfriendly resolution. The bank’s stock (NYSE:SI) is 95% down on its one-year price and is still being heavily shorted.

We wrote up Silvergate’s current problems on Thursday. One of the many ways that Silvergate screwed itself over was by putting cash deposits into long-term treasuries. When their panicky crypto customers needed their money, Silvergate had to sell bonds at a loss of $1 billion in Q4 2022. If they had just bought one-month T-bills, they would have been better off — but those don’t pay as much interest. 

Silvergate has paid back its $4.3 billion loan from FHLB-SF, though. [American Banker]

What we still don’t know is who pressured Silvergate to pay back the loan immediately. It’s utterly unclear why they had to liquidate a chunk of mildly underwater securities to pay off FHLB-SF instead of rolling over the advances.

How did Silvergate end up in this situation in the first place? Greed. A banking charter is a literal license to print money. But that wasn’t enough for them. So Silvergate CEO Alan Lane, who joined the bank in 2008, got into cryptocurrency because crypto was an under-served customer base. But Silvergate didn’t stop to ask themselves why it was under-served. Anyway, look at all this free money!

Worse than that, Silvergate de-diversified — they got rid of those tawdry and tedious retail deposits and mortgages that the bank had focused on since the 1980s. This left them at the mercy of the sector crashing, or one large customer collapsing.

Frances Coppola said: “The problem is not the business model, it’s the customers. If your customers are volatile, you’re at risk of runs. And if your customers are fraudsters, you’re at risk of lawsuits.” [Twitter]

On Friday afternoon, Silvergate made a “risk-based decision” to shut down its inter-crypto-exchange payments network, the Silvergate Exchange Network (SEN). [Silvergate website, archive]

This was a major part of Silvergate’s business. The SEN allowed real-time transfers of real money, any time of day or night, which crypto companies loved. It helped Silvergate attract billions of dollars in deposits from crypto exchanges and stablecoin issuers.

Signature Bank’s similar Signet platform is still up and running, for some reason. 

Moody’s just downgraded Silvergate’s credit rating for borrowing from B3 to Ca. This is Moody’s second-lowest grade: “highly speculative and are likely in, or very near, default, with some prospect of recovery in principal and interest.” [Bloomberg; Moody’s, PDF]

MicroStrategy has a loan to pay off to Silvergate — or its successor — by Q1 2025. “For anyone wondering, the loan wouldn’t accelerate b/c of SI insolvency or bankruptcy,” says MicroStrategy. [Twitter]

The MicroStrategy loan is not delinquent — and it has nothing to do with Silvergate’s present crisis. But this loan, and similar loans to bitcoin miners, are part of the thinking that got Silvergate here. If you’re making loans secured by bitcoins at bubble prices, then you’re an idiot.

Signature Bank, crypto’s tiny lifeboat 

There were two banks critical to US crypto. Silvergate on the West Coast and Signature Bank in New York. With the potential collapse of Silvergate, that means $750 billion per year in USD transfers between crypto exchanges is gone. Now it’s all on Signature.

Signature Bank’s 10-K for 2022 is out. [Business Wire; 10-K, PDF

Crypto was one-quarter of deposits to Signature in Q3 2022. When FTX crashed in November, crypto companies were caught short and had to withdraw their dollars in a hurry.

Signature could weather this rush because they were diversified, unlike Silvergate. They then claimed in December, and later in their 10-K, that they were totally trying to get out of crypto anyway. The January letter from the Fed, the FDIC, and the OCC warning banks to stay away from crypto probably helped push this opinion along.

(We wonder slightly where all these crypto exchanges are going to get US dollar banking now. If you have any thoughts, let us know!) 

In 2022, Signature’s deposits declined $17.54 billion or 16.5% to 88.59 billion. Most of that ($12.39 billion) was crypto deposits leaving the bank. At the end of last year, the bank’s crypto asset deposits totaled $17.79 billion, or 20% of its deposits. 

Unlike Silvergate, Signature doesn’t lend money to the crypto industry, nor do they have loans secured with crypto. Their relationship with crypto clients is only US dollar deposits and their Signet platform.

But Signature’s stock price (NASDAQ:SBNY) is being dragged down with Silvergate’s. SBNY is 64% down on its one-year price. 

Tether (again)

The Wall Street Journal got hold of some Tether emails. Tether “intermediaries” used faked companies and shell accounts in 2018 to skirt the Bank Secrecy Act and move money for terrorists. Oops. [WSJ]

One of those intermediaries was a major USDT trader in China. On a list of several accounts created for use by Tether and Bitfinex, another account was in Turkey and was allegedly used to launder money raised by Hamas. 

Elsewhere, the sentencing of Tether/Bitfinex US money mule Reggie Fowler has been adjourned again. It’s now scheduled for April 20 at 3:30 p.m. ET. [Twitter]

Voyager Digital: a terminally stupid loan to the cool kids at 3AC

Voyager Digital went broke because a single unsecured loan to Three Arrows Capital was over a quarter of their loan book, and then 3AC went bust. The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee has prepared a report on Voyager’s loan practices in general, but especially that one fatally stupid loan. [Committee Report, PDF

Voyager’s rewards program was run at a substantial loss — it was “primarily implemented as a marketing tool.” So Voyager implemented the lending program to fund its rewards program.

Evan Psarapoulos, Voyager’s chief commercial offer, told Ryan Whooley, the company’s treasury director “we have to beef up the team and onboard/lend to riskier borrowers.”

So Voyager ran a super risky lending program. Just in 2022, 3AC, Celsius, and Alameda Research each borrowed more than 25% of Voyager’s total assets at various times. If 3AC hadn’t taken down Voyager, it would have been someone else.

Voyager’s risk committee met through 2022, though Voyager executives didn’t believe the committee had the power to overturn decisions by Psarapoulos or CEO Steve Ehrlich.

Various borrowers sent varying amounts of information to be able to borrow from Voyager. Genesis sent audited financials. Galaxy sent unaudited financials. Celsus and BitGo sent balance sheets. Wintermute sent income statements.

But 3AC sent only a single-sentence statement of their net asset value and had a half-hour phone call with Voyager. Here is the complete text of the letter from 3AC that let them borrow a quarter of Voyager’s assets:

AUM Letter PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

Three Arrows Capital Ltd. (the “Company”)

1-January-2022

To Whom It May Concern,

We confirm the following for Three Arrows Capital Ltd as at 1-January-2022 in millions of USD.

NAV 3,729
On behalf of Three Arrows Capital Ltd.

[signed]

Kyle Davies

Director

Voyager sought out a relationship with 3AC in particular because of “the prestige that 3AC had at the time in the industry.” So 3AC could set its terms. It only wanted to borrow without providing collateral, and, incredibly, it refused to provide audited financial statements.

Psarapoulos figured 3AC was safe because Genesis had lent to 3AC and Voyager thought Genesis’ diligence process was robust. Ehrlich said refusing to provide financials was “not uncommon for hedge funds.”

Voyager’s first loan to 3AC was on March 8, 2022. Two months later, Terra-Luna collapsed.

Tim Lo from 3AC told Voyager in May that 3AC had lost only $100 million in the Terra-Luna collapse. But on June 14, 2022, Lo told Psarapoulos that 3AC directors Zhu Su and Kyle Davies had disappeared, and things were “in bad shape.”

Voyager recalled all its loans. 3AC returned no assets. On June 24, 2022, Voyager issued a notice of default. 3AC entered liquidation on June 27. Voyager filed for Chapter 11 on July 6.

In other Voyager bankruptcy news, Judge Michael Wiles said the SEC had asked him to “stop everybody in their tracks” with its claims that Voyager’s internal VGX token may have been a security. The SEC needs to explain its claim and how to address its concerns. [Reuters]

The Department of Justice, the FTC, New Jersey, and Texas object to wording in Voyager’s latest proposed confirmation order that might purport to restrict government action against Voyager. [Doc 1134, PDF; Doc 1135, PDF; Doc 1136, PDF]

Celsius Network

NovaWulf put in a bid to start a new Celsius company with actual lines of business and issue shares to Celsius creditors. This is now the official Stalking Horse bid. NovaWulf hopes to get the new company up and running by June 2023. We think the plan is a hope-fueled bet on crypto bubbling again, but it’s this or liquidation. [Doc 2150, PDF; Doc 2151, PDF]

Celsius, the UCC, and the Custody ad-hoc group want the court to let them put to creditors a settlement that would get Custody holders “72.5% of their eligible Custody Assets on the effective date of the Debtors’ Plan.” [Doc 2148, PDF]

A 60-day stay, with further discovery, has been agreed upon in the KeyFi v. Celsius suit and countersuit. [Stay order, PDF]

Celsius is moving to compensate cooperating witnesses for their time and effort — both their past help to the examiner and further help Celsius may need going forward — in the cause of recovering money for creditors. [Doc 2147, PDF]

Celsius hearings, December 5: Whose stablecoins are these? KERP bonuses, new deadline for restructuring plan

  • By Amy Castor and David Gerard
  • Send us money! Our work is funded via our Patreons — here’s Amy’s, and here’s David’s. Your monthly contributions help greatly!

The Celsius Network bankruptcy held two hearings on Monday, December 5. The first was to establish ownership of Earn accounts and see if Celsius can sell $18 million in stablecoins. The second was an omnibus hearing, dealing with multiple motions. Amy sat through six tedious hours of this, so you wouldn’t have to. [Agenda, PDF; Agenda, PDF]

A Chapter 11 bankruptcy generally has two outcomes: a bankruptcy sale (known as a “363 sale”) and the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Celsius wants to find a buyer for this ransacked corpse. But first, they have to decide who owns what. They can only sell what’s theirs to sell. The morning hearing was bitter arguments about the spare change in the stiff’s pockets.

Celsius is burning cash at a furious rate. They have no idea how to even coherently propose an ongoing business. So they need to keep finding new ways to keep up the farce and pay tens of millions in advisor and professional fees per month.

The word “liquidation” came up a few times in the first hearing. This ice cube is melting fast.

Whose are the stablecoins?

Celsius wants permission to sell $18 million in stablecoins to pay for ongoing business operations. The stablecoins are held in Earn accounts — Celsius’ main product. You would deposit cryptos and be paid interest on them.

But do the stablecoins belong to the bankruptcy estate or do they belong to the individual Earn account holders? This is what Judge Martin Glenn needs to decide.

Celsius will be out of cash to pay ongoing bills — payroll, vendors, and expensive professionals for the bankruptcy — by late February or early March. The burn rate for Chapter 11 legal costs and professional fees is $15 million to $20 million per month. Celsius needs a cash injection by January or March 2023 the latest. [Doc 1328, PDF]

Interim CEO Chris Ferraro says that right now, the bitcoin mining business is cash positive (which surprises us) — but that too will need a cash infusion by March 2023. 

Celsius (the debtors) and the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (UCC) think the stablecoins belong to the bankruptcy estate, which would give them the right to sell the coins for cash. But the account holders want their personal money back.

The stablecoins that Celsius wants to sell add up to $18,111,551. That’s 16,549,259 USDT, 1,119,089 NCDAI, 360,743 BUSD, and some shrapnel. Alvarez & Marsal’s Robert Campagna, Celsius’ restructuring advisor, admitted that the stablecoins buy them just a month of continued operations.

“If we sell $18 million now and have access to cash, we can always buy stablecoins again later,” said Campagna. LOL, like Celsius is going to have cash later. But anyway.

If Celsius is allowed to sell the stablecoins, the funds will not be used to cover the bitcoin mining operations. [Doc 1325, PDF]

So what happens after they burn through their stablecoins? Other sources of money include the settlement with Prime Trust, worth around $17 million — but Prime Trust will refund in crypto, not cash. Celsius also hopes for $44 million from the potential sale of Celsius’ custody solution GK8 to Galaxy Digital. GK8 is an Israeli firm that Celsius bought in November 2021 for $115 million. So they’ll take a 60% loss.

Other options to keep the business afloat include intercompany loans and debtor-in-possession financing — but those carry their own risks, Ferraro said. “They require us to post collateral and risk that coins would not be returned if the coins drop in value.” 

What company is going to lend money to Celsius? What collateral? What bank? What?

What did I just sign?

The terms of service for the Earn product changed a lot — in ways that contradicted what Celsius founder Alex Mashinsky had told customers.

Celsius updated its terms eight times between 2018 and September 2022, asking customers to accept changes each time by clicking a box. If they didn’t click on the box, they couldn’t access their coins.

Later versions of the terms, such as version six, more clearly asserted that Celsius owned the deposited cryptos — as is normal with any bank or investment firm, who then have a liability to the depositors. Even as Mashinsky said things that sounded like the investors owned their deposits.

Many small creditors objected that they weren’t aware of the important changes, or that they didn’t even agree to the changed terms.  

More than 90% of Earn account holders signed off on version six of the terms of service, per court filings. These customers held the majority of the coins in the Earn program.

Oren Blonstein, Celsius’ chief compliance officer, was called to the stand. Here are his original and supplementary declaration. [Doc 1327, PDF; Doc 1584, PDF]

Blonstein spent his time at Celsius administering the company’s compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act — money laundering law.

The state attorneys — Layla Milligan for Texas and Karen Cordry for multiple other states — went in hard on Blonstein.

Blonstein told Milligan that they tracked customer activity including acceptance of the terms of use.

This is an amazing interchange between Milligan and Blonstein (as quickly noted by Amy, please excuse errors):

Milligan: To your knowledge, was the business ever in compliance with money transmission laws? 

Blonstein: My understanding is based on a discussion with money transmission laws. 

Milligan: But you are not aware if the company was in compliance with state or federal securities laws?

Blonstein: Yes, correct. 

Cordry closely questioned Blonstein on how they flagged the change of terms — if the changes were ever called out to the customers. Judge Glenn asked Blonstein if the change of ownership in particular was brought to the customers’ attention.

Blonstein admits they didn’t flag the changes, but the customers had to tick the box and agree before they could proceed. Nor was the prior version of the terms available for a customer to compare them.

But Blonstein didn’t think any of this was a substantive issue: “I viewed the wording on the Earn program as you are giving coins to the company to use.”

The stablecoins will likely go to the estate

Despite the arguments over ownership of the stablecoins, Judge Glenn was leaning toward putting them into the bankruptcy estate — because that’s what the terms said, and that’s what you’d expect of an investment product.

Judge Glenn seemed skeptical of the terms meaning anything other than that Celsius owned the coins and had a liability to the depositor. “It was a lending platform, so they had to deploy the assets. There wasn’t a commitment to pay back specific assets.”

It wasn’t like Celsius would use the money to gamble in a “slot machine in Monte Carlo” — they’d use it to pay the bills, noted the judge.

He was also more comfortable if the stablecoins were converted to actual dollars anyway, given how crazy crypto is right now: “The dollars will frankly be safer than crypto.”

Shara Cornell for the US Trustee and Layla Milligan for Texas were not happy. Celsius had not complied with state regulations. The terms of service may have been an illegal contract, and thus void, Milligan argued. 

Judge Glenn responded that ownership of Earn cryptos had been a “gating issue” (an obstacle to recovery) ever since Celsius filed for bankruptcy in July 2022. “They didn’t only just spring this on anyone.”

Celsius had failed hard at compliance, but any buyer would have to comply with regulations — and if Celsius had broken securities laws, “you’ll get your pound of flesh against them,” he told Milligan.

Judge Glenn said that he wouldn’t rule on the stablecoins this week. But we think he’s going to let Celsius sell the coins. Matt Levine at Bloomberg concurred — because not having the money to pay back a liability is what “bankruptcy” means. [Bloomberg]

KERP motion

Celsius employees have been running away screaming. In early 2022, the company had over 900 employees. They are now down to 167 employees. Attrition is a real problem. 

In the afternoon omnibus hearing, Judge Glenn approved Celsius’ Key Employee Retention Plan (KERP) to give out up to $2.8 million in bonuses to 59 key employees, so they don’t quit. Previously, he had denied the motion because Celsius and their lawyers had blacked everything pertinent out. [Doc 1426, PDF; Bloomberg]

You can’t really say no to a KERP if a company is trying to stay a going concern. We know very well that Celsius is a shambling zombie — but while it’s in Chapter 11, the judge probably has to treat it otherwise. 

Celsius lawyers also need to look into who transferred crypto within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. Those employees will not get bonuses.

Most of the KERP payments will be no more than $75,000. Salaries for the KERP employees range from $25,000 to $425,000.

Celsius will totally come up with a plan, honest

Next, Judge Glenn agreed to grant Celsius’ motion to extend exclusivity  — the exclusive right to come up with a new business plan — until February 15.  

After a Chapter 11 filing, you normally have 120 days to come up with a bankruptcy plan. Celsius still doesn’t have a plan. Judge Glenn said that this is not unusual for large companies. The court can extend the period of exclusivity, though the total period with extensions cannot exceed 18 months.

Once that exclusivity period is up, any party in the bankruptcy can introduce their own reorganization plan. There are already some plans being floated by Celsius creditors. More court time — and bankruptcy estate money — will then be spent discussing all the plans.

Kirkland’s Patrick Nash, appearing for Celsius, wanted to avoid such a free-for-all. Celsius is working to sell the GK8 custody business, and they are working with the UCC on a reorganization they can both agree on. The US Trustee also agreed on extending exclusivity. 

Judge Glenn concurred that lifting exclusivity now would lead to a free-for-all. He worried that a pile of new plans would be “a crushing load on my chambers.” Remember, he has to actually read all these hundreds of pages of legal filings.

The judge can see that Celsius is a melting ice cube and it’s just consuming money. But Celsius has to come up with something. He granted the motion.

For Celsius, this is just a game that they have to play to keep shambling forward and paying themselves from creditor funds. 

Celsius v. Stone et al. 

Jason Stone of KeyFi was Celsius’ DeFi trading guy. Stone is suing Celsius for non-payment. Celsius has countersued, calling Stone incompetent and a thief.

Later in the hearing, Judge Glenn denied a motion by KeyFi and Stone to dismiss Celsius’ counterclaims. [Doc 17, PDF]. 

Stone is being represented by Kyle Roche, formerly of Roche Freedman. He is now in his own practice. Roche is not an eloquent courtroom speaker. He rambles interminably, and Judge Glenn was getting noticeably annoyed at him.

Roche said that Celsius’s claim should be dismissed because the issue is a contractual dispute, and Stone was authorized to transfer the assets in dispute to KeyFi under an asset purchase agreement. Celsius argued that Stone was not a party to the cited APA.

Judge Glenn said he would be denying the motion for now. He told the parties to complete discovery before a scheduled January hearing on Celsius’ motion for a preliminary injunction in the dispute — and he didn’t want them dragging their feet.

Roche said he had collected 150,000 documents as part of discovery. Glenn asked when Roche would produce the documents. Roche said that he had been busy because his grandmother died.

Prime Trust

Judge Glenn approved the settlement with Prime Trust, returning $17 million in cryptos to Celsius that Prime had been holding since the two stopped doing business in June 2021. [Doc 20; PDF]  

Celsius gets cryptos, not the actual dollars it needs to pay the bankruptcy professionals — hence why they want to sell the stablecoins to pay the bills.

Next time

We’ll be writing up the December 7 hearing on who owns the Custody and Withhold accounts and the December 8 hearing on the GK8 sale. Send Amy money for eardrops! [Agenda, PDF; Agenda, PDF]

Crypto collapse: Celsius sues KeyFi, BlockFi’s FTX deal, Scaramucci’s SkyBridge, Voyager suit, 3AC going to jail?

David Gerard and I posted our latest episode of “Everything is going to hell in a handbasket.” This one is on David’s blog! [David Gerard]

In this update:

  • Celsius strikes back — Mashinsky is countersuing Jason Stone and KeyFi. This is what happens when two crypto firms do business on a handshake. (They don’t need a lawyer until they need lots of lawyers!)
  • How FTX saved BlockFi from being as utterly screwed as everyone else.
  • SkyBridge Capital — you can’t withdraw your money, but that’s okay because Anthony Scaramucci is coming out with a new fund!
  • Voyager pays the boys a little less than planned. Its KERP goes through but with smaller bonuses.
  • 3AC accuses Teneo of misleading the High Court of Singapore as to its corporate structure.
  • A bunch of crypto exchanges are treading water and/or closing their doors.
  • The crypto crash is a slow-motion train wreck. We keep writing about it, but what happens next?