Poloniex gets busted by SEC for $10M, and Circle pays — again

Sometimes you make a bad business decision, and you keep paying for it. And for Circle — the company behind the USDC stablecoin — that bad decision was Poloniex, the crypto exchange it bought in February 2018 for $400 million.  

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced in a press release on Monday that Poloniex agreed to pay $10 million to settle charges that it operated an unregistered securities exchange. Poloniex neither admits or denies the claims by agreeing to the settlement. 

Circle, which plans to go public via a special-purpose acquisition company merger, will cover the cost of the settlement, adding to the $156.8 million it already lost when it sold Poloniex in October 2019 — only 18 months after buying the troubled exchange. 

According to the SEC, Poloniex allowed users to trade digital assets that were unregistered securities from July 2017 through November 2019, though it didn’t specify exactly which tokens were securities. 

Exchanges that sell securities have to register with the SEC or apply for an exemption, according to Section 5 of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934. 

Although Circle had plans to turn Poloniex into a regulated exchange, those plans never materialized. Instead, Circle ended up paying for Poloniex’s mistakes.

History of Polo

Poloniex launched in January 2014. In its early days, it operated out of Somerville, Massachusetts, not far from Circle headquarters in Boston. 

The exchange started off allowing users to trade bitcoin for a number of “promising” altcoins — such as Namecoin, Memorycoin, Klondikecoin, Earthcoin, and the like — as you can see from this 2014 web archive. 

In March 2014, Poloniex lost 12.3% of its bitcoin supply (97 BTC), worth around $48,000 at the time, when it was hacked, leaving the company insolvent.  

“I take full responsibility; I will be donating some of my own money, and I will not be taking profit before the debt is paid,” Poloniex then-owner Tristan D’Agosta said on BitcoinTalk, writing under the username Busoni.

By July 2014, D’Agosta said he had paid back the debt, thanks to the popularity of Monero, a privacy coin known for its use in money laundering, darknet markets, ransomware, and cryptojacking. 

Later, the exchange allowed users to trade altcoins against Ether and increasingly Tether — a stablecoin with dubious backing. 

Since Poloniex was never able to get proper banking, it remained a crypto-to-crypto exchange. If you wanted to exit into fiat, you had to move your BTC or ETH to a banked crypto exchange, such as Kraken or Coinbase.

All through the initial coin offering craze and bitcoin bull market of 2017, Poloniex cashed in, listing a slew of ICO tokens in the same manner that it had previously listed all those altcoins. 

Circle knew the SEC was breathing down Polo’s neck when it opted to purchase the exchange.

According to Circle’s consolidated December 31, 2020, and 2019, financial statements, which were part of its SPAC filing, the SEC had filed a complaint against Poloniex in December 2017 related to “the trading of cryptocurrencies that may be characterized as securities.” Circle set aside $10.4 million to pay for the settlement. 

In July 2017, the SEC released its infamous DAO Report, effectively saying that most ICOs were investment contracts. The report also warned crypto exchanges that they needed to register with the SEC as a national exchange or apply for an exemption — if they were going to list these tokens. 

At that time, Poloniex should have delisted every single one of its ICO tokens. Instead, the exchange put profits ahead of common sense. 

“Poloniex chose increased profits over compliance with the federal securities laws by including digital asset securities on its unregistered exchange,” Kristina Littman, chief of the SEC enforcement cyber unit, said in a statement.  

Big plans

Circle purchased Polo with pie-in-the-sky plans. A few months after the purchase, Circle would get $110 million in funding led by Bitmain, a Chinese crypto mining company, to launch USDC. Eventually, the stablecoin business would become more attractive. 

Jeremy Allaire and Sean Neville, Circle’s co-founders, described turning Poloniex into a marketplace for “tokens which represent everything of value,” including physical goods, real estate and even creative productions. 

The timing of the purchase was terrible. In February 2018, Bitcoin had lost half of its value since reaching nearly $20,000 in December 2017. Retailers were selling their bitcoin and getting out of the crypto markets. And Poloniex was left with a backlog of 140,000 open customer tickets to deal with.

Circle figured that if it could transform Poloniex into a respectable alternative trading system — a type of exchange that would qualify for an exemption — the SEC would not push charges. 

According to a leaked slide from a Circle presentation, the SEC told Circle that it would “not pursue any enforcement action for prior activity” at Poloniex as long as Circle turns it into a regulated exchange. 

Only the ATS never happened. Instead, Circle moved most of Poloniex’s international operations offshore to Bermuda in July 2019, so that it could sidestep US regulations. 

Around the same time, Poloniex announced a partnership with payment processor Simplex in mid-2019 that allowed users in 80 countries to fund their accounts with cash and have their money automatically “tokenized” into USDC.  

Meanwhile, throughout 2019, Poloniex’s problems kept adding up.

Circle received subpoenas from the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and an Iranian government agency looking into Poloniex registered accounts and transactions that may have violated sanctions. According to its SPAC filings, Circle estimated the penalty would be between $1.1 million to $2.8 million.

Several Poloniex investors lost money in May 2019 when CLAM token suffered a flash crash, causing substantial numbers of margin loans to default. The exchange had to socialize $14 million in losses, opening itself up to class-action lawsuits. 

Circle estimated it would have to pay $1.3 million for two settlements, according to its filings. The company says “the remaining prospective claims are not probable of being successful at the current time and will continue to monitor developments around these claims and other claims made by affected lenders.”

Enough is enough

In October 2019, Circle decided to spin off Poloniex to a new entity — Seychelles-based Polo Digital Assets Ltd — backed by an Asian investment group. Tron CEO Justin Sun led the consortium with plans to invest $100 million into the exchange. 

Why did Circle sell Polo? It is likely the crypto downturn of 2018 made operating the exchange too costly. And I’m guessing it was a lot more work to turn Polo into a regulated exchange than Circle anticipated, given all Polo’s previous mishaps. 

Neville stepped down from Circle after the sale. He didn’t give an explicit reason why, but he told Coindesk that the company’s recent sale of Polo was one of several factors that made “the time appropriate for me to transition.” 

After that, Circle decided to put all of its energy into its USDC stablecoin, of which there are now 26.7 billion in circulation. 

CLAM flash crash forces Poloniex to socialize $14M worth of BTC in losses — here’s what happened

Crypto markets are extremely volatile. You never know how wildly up or down the price may go or when. This turned out to be a disaster for US crypto exchange Poloniex when an obscure token that it offered peer-to-peer margin trading on suffered a flash crash.

On May 26, the price of  CLAM dropped so violently that margin borrowers blew their margins multiple times over. The loss was huge: 1,800 BTC, valued at around $14 million.

Now Poloniex has to figure out how to extract the losses from the borrowers. For now, lenders will have to suck up the loss. On 14:00 UTC on June 6 — a full 10 days after the incident — Poloniex applied a 16.202% haircut to the principal of all active BTC loans. Even lenders not active at the time of the crash were affected.

Prior to announcing the haircut, Poloniex suspended trading for several hours on Wednesday as part of a “planned” maintenance. It wasn’t until trading resumed that margin lenders realized a portion of their BTC was missing. 

In a Medium postPoloniex revealed that a large part of the loans were collateralized in CLAM — so both the borrowers’ positions and their collateral lost most of their value. In other words, the funds simply evaporated, and there was nothing to repay loans with.  

The exchange says it has frozen all defaulted borrowers’ accounts until they repay their loans, as spelled out in the the company’s terms of service

“As we recover funds, we will return them to affected lenders. We’re also exploring other ways to help defray margin lender losses,” Poloniex wrote.  

Naturally, the margin lenders, which only account for 0.4% of Polo’s user base, are completely pissed off. Why did Polo not have better risk management in place? Why did it not have an insurance fund set up to absorb the loss? And why did  Polo allow margin trades — and collateral loans — on an extremely illiquid coin in the first place?

What is margin trading?

Margin trading is risky business, even more so when you are trading crypto assets, due to their high volatility. When you trade on margin, you put down a collateral and borrow against that, doubling, tripling, quadrupling — or whatever — your trade.

Trading on margin magnifies your profits, but also your losses. If the trade goes in your favor, you can repay the loan and tuck in a nice profit. But if the price of the asset slips enough so it looks like your trade won’t pay off, the exchange can call in your margin, and you lose all of the collateral you put down for the loan.  

Bitcoin derivatives exchange BitMEX loans you the funds for margin trades. Poloniex does something different. It uses peer-to-peer margin trades, where a common pool of lenders puts up BTC, CLAM, and other coins. They get paid in interest. According to Poloniex’s website (archive), only customers who are outside of the US are allowed to loan their funds on the exchange.

As a lender, you set your own daily interest rate, and Poloniex takes a fee of 15% from the interest earned. Margin traders consume lending offers starting with the lowest rate. If your rates are too high, your funds sit in the pool, and you don’t earn any interest. 

CLAM, the casino coin

Screen Shot 2019-06-06 at 10.36.34 PMIf you were paying close attention a year ago, you may have heard John Oliver mention CLAM on “Last Week Tonight,” along with Titcoin, Jesuscoin, Trumpcoin and a bunch of other coins with hilarious names.  

CLAM stands for “Caritas Libertas Aequitas Monetas,” which roughly translates to freedom, fairness, equality coins — whatever that means. The coin launched in May 2014, as a fork of Blackcoin (BLK), which launched in February 2014 as a fork of Peercoin, an early proof-of-stake coin.  

On May 12, 2014, CLAM was sent to all active users of bitcoin, litecoin and dogecoin —three popular coins at the time. Every unique wallet address pulled from those blockchains that had a balance above zero got about 4.6 CLAM. The total amount of CLAM distributed to those addresses was 14,897,662.

CLAM was mainly intended for use on Just-Dice, a gambling site created by a Canadian known only as “dooglus.” Originally Just-Dice relied on bitcoin. But due to new bitcoin regulation in Canada, dooglus decided to switch to CLAM in late 2014. 

The circulating supply of CLAM is only 3,624,208. Nearly all of that—99.81%—is traded on Poloniex. At one point, CLAM was listed on Bittrex and Cryptopia, but Bittrex delisted the coin in October 2018 and Cryptopia went belly up in May 2019.   

According to CoinMarketCap, CLAM has a daily trading volume of less than $100,000, meaning the coin barely has a pulse. Three months ago, two traders complained on Reddit of long delays withdrawing CLAM as they waited for the lifeless network to pick up their transactions.

I withdrew CLAM 11 days ago. Poloniex Support said ‘as soon as a miner picks up the transaction’ How f@%#$%g long is that?,” wrote Reddit user interop5. (Technically, CLAM is a proof of stake coin, so it relies on stakers, not miners.)

CLAM’s lack of liquidity makes it extremely easy to manipulate. All you need is one person to put up a large sell order to crash the price. Poloniex has yet to release details on what happened, but we can guess it was something along those lines. 

History repeats 

As a result of the flash crash debacle, Poloniex has removed CLAM from margin trading, along with three other coins: bitshares (BTS), factom (FCT), and maidsafecoin (MAID). The exchange outright admits these coins lacked sufficient liquidity:

“In order for margin liquidations to process in an orderly manner, the market must have sufficient liquidity, and these tokens currently lack that liquidity. We will continue to monitor them and may reinstate margin trading for them in the future”

This is not the first time Poloniex removed CLAM as a margin market and collateral coin. It was removed in early November 2017 due to low liquidity, after an earlier flash crash, despite CLAM’s liquidity never recovering, at some point, Poloniex decided to add CLAM back as a margin market and collateral coin—though I’m not sure exactly when.   

Screen Shot 2019-06-08 at 7.20.19 AMAnd then, of course, the exact same thing happened. In February 2019, the price of CLAM started to climb rapidly on Poloniex. In a matter of six weeks, it went from around $1.50 to a high of nearly $20 on May 26. At that point, the bottom fell out with CLAM losing three-quarters of its value in the blink of an eye. It sunk down to around $5.

According to Andrew Hires, a neurobiology professor at the University of Southern California, who has been watching the exchange, Poloniex had been struggling with its CLAM wallet for months. He tweeted:

“All deposits had to be manually credited via ticket. This screwed up the sell-side liquidity. Huge bids (>500BTC), presumably margin longs, crept up over months, pushing $ price up 17x. Just after it hit $20, everything imploded.” 

Spreading the loss

Socializing losses is unique to crypto exchanges. Like Poloniex, OKEx also socializes extreme margin losses, but literally requires customers to pass a test on their terms of service before they can trade futures, so they are absolutely clear on how it works.

According to crypto lawyer David Silver, socializing losses could open Poloniex to a lawsuit. Another lawyer, Stephen Palley, disagrees. Palley told The Block, he doesn’t think Poloniex breached its terms of service.

On the other hand, Emilien Dutang, who was pinged by the haircut and says he offered margin lending on the exchange after the flash crash, is threatening legal action.

None of this bodes well for Poloniex. Circle acquired the exchange in early 2018 with the intention of cleaning it up and dealing with a humongous backlog of support tickets. But at this level, Poloniex appears only slightly more competent than QuadrigaCX.

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